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One day a countryman going to the nest of his goose found there 
an egg all yellow and glittering. When he took it up it was as heavy 
as lead and he was going to throw it away, because he thought a 
trick had been played upon him. But he took it home on second 
thoughts, and soon found to his delight that it was an egg of pure 
gold. Every morning the same thing occurred, and he soon became 
rich by selling his eggs. As he grew rich he grew greedy; and 
thinking to get at once all the gold the goose could give, he killed 
it and opened it only to find, – nothing. 
 
The story above is one of Aesop’s famous fables, “Killing the Goose That Laid 
the Golden Eggs,” and is one of many stories that describes the occurrence of 
greed in everyday life and its detrimental consequences (Jacobs, 2002). Greed is 
omnipresent. Greedy characters play important roles in various cartoons (Scrooge 
McDuck is the greedy uncle of Donald Duck in Duck Tales and Mister Crabs is 
the greedy founder and owner of the Krusty Krab in SpongeBob). Greed is also 
center stage in numerous stories (e.g., “King Midas’ Golden Touch”, “A 
Christmas Carol”) and movies (e.g., “Wall Street”, “The Wolf of Wall Street”).  
Indeed, we encounter instances of greed on a daily basis. The media covers 
stories about big frauds and scandals that are supposedly caused by greed. An 
example is Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme (Sarna, 2010). Madoff defrauded 
thousands of investors and his Ponzi scheme cost billions of dollars. Also the 
Enron Scandal is often linked to the greed of its top executives. Enron was one 
of the most renowned American companies, until it went bankrupt in 2001, after 
the uncovering of a variety of illegal activities. A more recent example, is the tax 
evasion of hundreds of people, including (former) world leaders, business people, 
criminals, and football players brought to light by the Panama Papers 
(Trouw/FD, 2016). It seems that greed is an integral part of our capitalistic 
society and in particular in the financial markets. 
But, also in our immediate surroundings we see greedy behavior. For example, 
that colleague that always complains about his salary, the kid that wants the 





(and typically also the last one). Greedy behavior is also witnessed at the end of 
the season sales, when people sometimes seem to lose their mind while shopping 
and purchase much more than needed. More than once, Black Friday has led to 
crazy fights between people who wanted to purchase the same product. Finally, 
the eagerness with which consumers use coupons and respond to temporary 
discounts can also be seen as a manifestation of greed.  
Maybe because of this omnipresence, much is said and written about greed 
and its potential causes and consequences. In that light it is remarkable that 
empirical research on this topic is scarce, not to say lacking (Wang & Murnighan, 
2011).1 In this dissertation I aim to partially fill this gap and report on several 
studies investigating what greed is and what greed does. More specifically, I 
investigated the causes and consequences of dispositional greed, that is, how 
individuals differ in how greedy they are and how these greedy dispositions 
influence behavior in a variety of domains (e.g., financial, ethical). However, 
before I present these findings, I will first give a brief overview of the existing 
literature. My review centers on the definitional issues with greed and further 
summarizes the little empirical research on greed. For more extensive reviews on 
the conceptual work on greed that also elaborate on the philosophical, economic, 
and religious aspects, I refer the reader to Wang and Murnighan (2011), 
Sutherland (2014), and Oka and Kuijt (2014).  
WHAT IS GREED? 
So far I have talked about greed as if we all know and understand what this 
word refers to. However, the reality is that there are definitional problems with 
this construct. Let me first discuss the origin of the word, and next describe what 
these definitional issues are. I do not solve the issues in this first introductory 
chapter, but rather devote Chapter 2 completely to this. Most of the issues stem 
from the fact that what is written about greed is conceptual and not substantiated 
by empirical research. Still I believe that a better insight in these definitional 
                                                   
1 Over the last couple of years scholars have gained more interest in greed, and as a result, 







issues is a good starting point for understanding the importance of greed and 
provides valuable input for possible relationships with other constructs and 
behaviors.  
The word ‘greed’ originally stems from the Old English word græd or grædig, 
meaning hungry, voracious, or eager to obtain (Online Etymology Dictionary, 
2016). It has cognates in other Germanic languages, such as gradag in Old Saxon, 
grådig in Danish, graðr in Old Norse, and gretig in Dutch. In Dutch and 
German greed is usually called hebzucht or habsucht, a combination of “to have” 
(hebben/haben) and “sickness”, “passion”, or “addiction” (zucht/Sucht). Greed 
is thus an excessive or insatiable desire to have something. Although most people 
agree that greed encompasses a strong desire to have something, people do 
sometimes disagree on the specifics of greed.  
Greed: Material or non-material? 
The first problem with defining greed is setting borders on how broad the 
construct of greed is. In other words, what makes people greedy or what are 
people greedy for? Although, virtually everyone agrees that people can be greedy 
for money or other material goods, debate exists on whether greed also applies to 
non-material goods. Sometimes, the distinction between philargyria (the love for 
money) and pleonexia (a general tendency to want more of everything) is made 
(Newhauser, 2000). Philargyria refers to the more traditional view of greed as a 
desire for money (avarice/cupidity), whereas pleonexia encompasses a broader 
view and can also include other excessive desires, such as being greedy for food 
(gluttony), sex (lust), power, success, etc. (Tickle, 2004).  
To investigate what people are greedy for, I asked 163 participants (Mage = 
20.12, SD = 1.85, 68.71% female) to describe a situation in which they felt 
greedy and coded the object of their desire (see Figure 1.1). This allowed me to 
obtain some insight into the frequency in which people feel greedy for money 
and other things. The results are interesting and informative for the discussion of 
whether greed also applies to non-material things. In most instances of greed 





material things (clothes, books, etc.; 46%). But, there was a substantial amount 
of instances of greed (32%) in which participants desired something non-
material. This ranged from desiring a cigarette or food, to wanting more free 
time, higher grades, or even love. This finding corroborates the idea that greed is 
indeed a more general desire for more of something, and does not only apply to 
money and material things. 
In this dissertation I further elaborate on this discussion and show that people 
see greed as broader than just a desire for money or things (Chapter 2) and that 
greed is associated with more general desires, for example for food, sex, and 
friends (Chapter 3). 
Greed: Acquisition or retention? 
Related to the types of desires greed encapsulates, another distinction can be 
made based on acquisition or retention focus. That is, sometimes greed is used 
to describe behavior that is focused at acquiring as many new resources as 
possible, whereas other times, it is used to describe behavior that aims at keeping 
as many resources one already has to him or herself. Although greed is most often 
defined as acquisition focused (Wachtel, 2003), sometimes the construct is also 
used to refer to retention. According to Hume (1741) there are two types of 













who wants to acquire as much as possible, or a greedy person can be stingy and 
does not want to lose what he already has. One of the most known examples of 
a person exhibiting greed as both acquisition and retention behavior is Ebenezer 
Scrooge, the focal character in ‘A Christmas Carol’ (Dickens, 1843). On the one 
hand, Scrooge works very hard to build up his wealth, but on the other hand, he 
exploits his clerk and refuses to give to charity, because he does not want to lose 
the money he already has. 
This double definition of greed is also prevalent in everyday life, and people 
often use greed to describe behavior of people that are stingy or people that always 
want more. Moreover, research suggests that greedy people are indeed not only 
focused on acquiring more, but also on keeping what they already have. Krekels 
(2015) looked at greed as a retention motivation. In her research, greed was 
associated with increased loss aversion. Greedy people needed more than five 
times the amount of gain versus loss to participate in a gamble, whereas for less 
greedy individuals this ratio was a bit below four. In addition, greed was related 
to the endowment effect. Participants had the opportunity to buy a university 
branded pen. Psychological ownership was manipulated by letting one-third of 
the participants write with a different type of pen (no endowment), one third 
wrote with the exact pen they could buy (endowment), and one third wrote with 
an identical, but different pen (contagious endowment). In the endowment 
condition, where psychological ownership was high, greedy participants wanted 
to pay more to keep the pen, compared to participants is one of the other 
conditions. These studies indeed corroborate the idea that greed is more than just 
an acquisition motivation and that greedy people like to keep what they have. 
Although I do believe that both retention and acquisition motivations play a role 
in greedy behavior, I focus on greed as an acquisition motivation in this 
dissertation. I do this, because I think this latter motivation is more central to 
greed, which is also apparent from Chapter 2.  
Greed: Emotion or motivation? 
A third issue is whether to conceptualize greed as an emotion or a motivation. 





behavior. Theoretically, one can argue that greed can be an emotion and a 
motivation. According to appraisal theory (e.g., Roseman, 1996) emotions are 
associated with specific patterns of appraisals related to emotion-eliciting events. 
These specific emotions then help people to deal with this situation by guiding 
their behavior (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). For greed this means that the 
emotional experience of wanting something, or wanting more, will help people 
to reach their goals. The same event can elicit different emotions for different 
people, but the same pattern of appraisals will lead to the same emotion. Thus, 
although people will experience greed in different types of situations, the 
appraisal pattern associated with greed will always elicit greed.  
So what would be the appraisal pattern of greed? We know that greed is 
associated with a strong desire to acquire or have something. The appraisal 
patterns eliciting greed will thus arise in situations in which people have a strong 
desire for a particular resource. Because people might differ strongly in the things 
they desire, there might be a broad range of events that will elicit greed. However, 
desire will not be enough to trigger greed, as greed is also insatiable. A second 
appraisal to elicit greed will thus have to involve frustration, as it can and will 
never be enough. Giving in to temptation and getting what one wants it usually 
associated with pleasure at the moment of the decision, but typically disappears 
quickly afterwards (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998). Or to 
quote Mr. Spock: “After a time, you may find that having is not so pleasing a 
thing, after all, as wanting. It is not logical, but it is often true”. People often lose 
the pleasure at the moment they attain something, and as a result, people have 
the chance to become greedy for something else, or something more. Greed could 
thus be operationalized as an emotion that arises when we are confronted with 
something that we desire but that we cannot (or is hard to) get.  
Emotions are acute, temporarily, and are a response to a specific experience 
(Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981), which distinguishes them from more chronic 
affective and motivational personality traits. Greed can also be seen as a more 






is reached. However, for greed this does not seem to be the case. For greedy 
people the goal posts ever keep moving, resulting in a chronic urge to get more.  
Greed seems to be a hybrid of emotional and motivational components. On 
the one hand, the right situational cues will temporarily elicit greed, but on the 
other hand, some people are generally more motivated by greed than others. In 
this dissertation I focus on these internal and individually rooted motives to want 
more. Although I believe that everyone will experience greed once in a while, I 
also believe that some people more easily or more often feel greedy. In Chapters 
4 to 6 of this dissertation I discuss how several types of behavior are motivated 
by individual differences in greed.  
WHEN ARE PEOPLE GREEDY? 
As mentioned before, the empirical literature on greed is scarce. Typically, 
studies investigating greed looked at how situational cues influence greedy 
behavior in economic and behavioral games. These studies usually investigated 
how different social motives play a role when people have to choose between 
rational selfish actions and cooperative collective actions. Two motives are 
typically used to explain defection (Coombs, 1973; Dawes, 1980): greed and fear. 
People are considered greedy when they expect that enough others will cooperate 
so they do not have to. In this case, people can thus decide to defect because they 
want a free ride. When people act out of fear, they defect because they think that 
others will not cooperate. In this case, people defect because they fear being 
gypped. Several studies have investigated the role of both motives and suggest 
that greed is a more important motive for defecting than fear (e.g., Rapoport & 
Eshed-Levy, 1989; Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & Van de Kragt, 1986; Poppe & 
Utens, 1986). 
Before I discuss these studies, it is important to note that these studies 
typically measure greed with a question such as “I wanted to enhance my 
outcomes”. Though this is of course related to greed, it is hard to disentangle 
greed with other constructs such as general self-interest. Although I believe that 





studies give important indications about which situations will elevate greed. 
These studies have found a variety of situational cues that increase greedy 
behavior in social dilemmas. Research suggests that people behave greedier 
towards outgroups (Simpson, 2006; Van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983), 
when rewards are high (Dawes, 1980; Dawes et al., 1986), when there is little 
communication (Van de Kragt et al., 1983), and when they are part of a group 
(Murnighan, Kim, & Metzger, 1993; Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 
2009).  
Other research suggests that exposure to economic principles leads to more 
favorable attitudes towards greed and enhances greedy behavior (Wang, 
Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011). Students that majored in economics, or that 
had followed multiple economics courses, kept more money to themselves in a 
dictator game and had more favorable attitudes towards greed in general and 
one’s own greedy behavior. Moreover, this research found that even people 
without a background in economics were more favorable towards greed after 
reading a short text about self-interest. Related to this is other research, in which 
participants in a calculative mindset (by doing a calculative task), kept more 
money to themselves (Wang, Zhong, & Murnighan, 2014). Another study found 
that people with a higher socioeconomic status had more favorable attitudes 
towards greed and were more likely to behave unethically (Piff, Stancato, Côté, 
Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012).2 People with low socioeconomic status 
became more unethical after they were exposed to the positive sides of greed. 
These studies suggest that being in an economic mindset that is focused on one’s 
own interest, leads to greedier behavior.  
In other studies, the effects of mortality and death on greedy behavior have 
been investigated. These studies typically look at mortality salience, the process 
of becoming aware that death is inevitable. Terror management theory posits that 
people try to cope with the anxiety of unavoidable death by holding on to cultural 
                                                   
2 Others (Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, & Zeckhauser, 2013) failed to replicate Piff et al’s findings 
that higher social class is associated to more unethical behavior. Although they did not look at 






worldviews that give them meaning (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). 
For example, when people find the acquisition of wealth important, they are 
more likely to behave acquisitive when their mortality is salient. Kasser and 
Sheldon (2000) found that participants that were exposed to death had higher 
financial expectations for themselves fifteen years later. They expected that their 
overall worth would be higher and that they would be spending more on hedonic 
goods. In addition, participants with higher mortality salience consumed more 
in a harvesting game. Nonetheless, other studies found the opposing result that 
thinking about death decreases greed. Cozzolino, Sheldon, Schachtman, and 
Meyers (2009) found that people who have extrinsic values (focused on money, 
fame, etc.) became less greedy when they had a limited time perspective, that is, 
when they thought about being old and nearing the end of life. Other research 
suggests that the type of death awareness influences if people become more or less 
greedy (Cozzolino, Staples, Meyers, & Samboceti, 2004). When people think 
more generally about death, they become greedier and take more raffle tickets, 
whereas thinking more concrete about dying, and reflecting on life, decreases 
greed. Jonas, Sullivan, and Greenberg (2013) also looked at an explanation for 
these opposing results, and argue that whether people become more or less greedy 
depends on the norms in that particular situation. When there are prosocial 
norms people behave more generous, whereas proself norms lead to more greedy 
behavior. In sum, thinking about death influences how greedy people behave. 
Mortality salience makes people anxious, which leads them to behave in 
accordance with their worldview. If people value wealth, they are more likely to 
behave greedy. However, in some instances, thinking about death has the 
opposite result, for instance, people with a near death experience often become 
less greedy because they realize that there are more important things in life.  
Taken together, there seem to be systematic situational factors that amplify 
and attenuate greed. People are more likely to behave greedy in situations of 
uncertainty, such as when they have to deal with outgroup members or if there 
is little communication. Also when the stakes are high, or when people are 
focused on the benefits of greed, they are more easily lured into greedy behavior. 





direction depends on the concreteness of death. People become greedier when 
they think in a general sense about greed, whereas concrete thinking about greed, 
such as near death experiences, decreases greedy behavior.  
WHO ARE GREEDY? 
The research discussed before has thus mainly focused on situational greed. 
However, I believe that, besides temporal experiences of greed, people also differ 
in their general tendency to be greedy.  That is, I believe that some people are in 
general more motivated by greed than others. Many emotions or more general 
psychological motives can be experienced as both a state and a trait. For example, 
anger (Forgays, Forgays, & Spielberger, 1997), envy (Lange & Crusius, 2014), 
pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007), optimism (Kluemper, Little, & DeGroot, 2009), 
and happiness (Lucas & Donnellan, 2007), all have a trait and state component. 
Where previous research has mainly focused on situational cues influencing 
greedy behavior, I reveal in this dissertation that people differ in their general 
tendencies to be greedy. Although virtually all people are greedy sometimes, some 
are more likely to experience greed, and be motivated by greed, than others.  
Until recently, there was no empirical research investigating individual 
differences in greed. Nevertheless, this topic has gained more attention over the 
last couple of years. In Chapter 3 I report on the construction and validation of 
the Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS). Parallel to that research and independent 
of it, several other scales have been developed that measure individual differences 
in greed. Both Krekels and Pandelaere (2015) as well as Mussel, Reiter, Osinsky, 
and Hewig (2015) constructed scales to measure greed as a personality 
characteristic. In addition, Veselka, Giammarco, and Vernon (2014) constructed 
the Vices and Virtues Scale (VAVS), in which greed is one of the vices.  That four 
scales about the same topic have been developed in a short time span already 
signals that the topic of greed is a contemporary issue. In the Conclusions and 
Discussion section of this dissertation (Chapter 7) I elaborate on the similarities 







IS GREED GOOD OR BAD? 
Gordon Gekko, the main fictional character of the movie Wall Street, coined 
the famous quote “greed is good”. According to Gekko, greed is good because it 
drives progress and development. And indeed, from an economic perspective, 
greed is often seen as positive. The idea of homo economicus is central in 
economic theorizing. In economic theory, one of the assumptions is the axiom 
of greed, which posits that “If A contains more of one good than B, and at least 
as much as B of all other goods, A will be preferred over B” (Lea, Tarpy, & 
Webley, 1987, p. 109). Rational people should take as much as possible, as they 
should focus on maximizing their personal outcomes (Smith, 1776/1994). 
Interestingly, from this perspective, greed is not only beneficial for the greedy 
actor, but also for society as a whole. The idea behind this reasoning is that if 
people maximize their own outcomes, this also promotes activities that lead to 
economic growth (Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Williams, 2000). Thus, according to 
economic theory, greed is an important drive for economic growth and 
prosperity. These driving qualities of greed were also recognized by Ayn Rand 
(1964). Although she recognized the negative effects of greed, her philosophical 
viewpoint argues for rational selfishness and opposes altruism. People’s 
acquisitive nature should be free of moral evaluations, she argues, as it is not only 
possible for humankind to live selfishly, it is even necessary. In sum, from an 
economic perspective, greed is often seen as positive, as behaving in one’s own 
interest is thought to benefit everyone in the long run.  
Also from an evolutionary perspective, greed is seen as a driving force for 
human behavior. From this perspective, the drive for survival and natural 
selection has led people to maximize their own outcomes (Friedman, 1953). 
Especially in times of scarcity, taking as much as possible is beneficial and 
increases the chances of survival (Cassill & Watkins, 2005; Robertson, 2001). 
This might explain why people that grew up in relative scarcity tend to be greedier 
(Krekels, 2015; Poluektova, Efremova, & Breugelmans, 2015). From an 
evolutionary point of view, greed leads thus to self-preservation, and hence, to 





Although the principles for the greed-is-good-perspective have been around 
for ages, these ideas have only become mainstream recently with the rise of the 
importance of economics as a science (Oka & Kuijt, 2014). Historically, greed 
has been condemned. According to Christians greed is ‘the root of all evil’, and 
in the Catholic Church it is one of the seven deadly sins (Tickle, 2004). 
Buddhism and Hinduism believe that it leads to bad karma and obstructs 
spiritual development (Nath, 1998; Sundararajan, 1989). Judaism and Islam deal 
with greed by obliging people to share their wealth with charities (Bloch, 1984; 
Oka & Kuijt, 2014). Most major religions thus teach that greed is negative and 
sinful.  
This negative stance towards greed is shared by most philosophical traditions. 
Greek antiquity (e.g., Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle) believed that greed was 
inherent to human nature and warned for its immorality and irrationality. 
According to Thucydides greed led to human progress, but was also an important 
motive for people to start wars (Zagorin, 2009). According to Plato greed hurts 
both others and those who are greedy and eradicates happiness (Balot, 2001). 
Aristotle argued that greedy people do not know how to distinguish between 
needs and desires, and therefore do not know how to live life to the fullest (Wang 
& Murnighan, 2011). According to these Greek philosophers, greed is thus not 
only bad because it is immoral and hurts others, it also stands in the way of 
personal happiness thereby illustrating the irrational side of greed.  
Also later philosophers and political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and 
David Hume warned for the negative consequences of greed. Hobbes argued that 
greed leads to competition, war, and eventually to the destruction of mankind 
(Hueglin, 2008; Myers, 1983). Although Hume did see how greed could advance 
society, he shared the idea that unbridled greed had devastating consequences for 
society (Hume, 1739/2001).   
There are thus both advocates and opponents of greed. Some argue that 
positive qualities of greed are that it leads to progress, development, and 
prosperity. In contrast, others argue that greed mostly hurts and leads to immoral 






Because I am mostly interested in the workings of greed, the question of whether 
it is good or bad is not of primary interest. However, in Chapters 4 to 6 I present 
data that reveals that greed indeed motivates positive as well as negative behavior, 
providing support for both sides of the argument.  
WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO STUDY GREED? 
As I mentioned before, greed is omnipresent. We are all witnesses and actors 
of greed on a regular basis. There are innocent acts of greed, such as taking the 
last cookie or going on a shopping spree, but there are also acts with more severe 
consequences, such as stealing or committing fraud. Greed influences us in 
different ways. It can motivate us, make us competitive, and help us to reach our 
goals. On the other hand, greed can also make us egoistic, neglecting other things 
that are important for us and others. Greed can thus help us move forward, but 
it can also help us forget what actually matters.  
Given the fact that greed is an important motive for behavior, it is not 
surprising that greed plays an important role in both economic and moral 
theorizing. From an economic perspective, greed is often advocated as good as it 
drives economic progress and development (e.g., Greenfeld, 2001). Classical 
economic theory is based on the assumption that people should maximize their 
own outcomes. However, because unbridled greed often takes place at the 
expense of others, from a moral perspective greed is often seen as a sin or a vice 
(e.g., Tickle, 2004).  
Also in the popular media, greed is a timely and popular topic. Especially after 
the late 2000’s financial crisis, greed received much media attention and it is often 
argued that greed is the cause of the behavior of the bankers responsible for the 
crisis (Zandi, 2008). Nevertheless, we know very little about how greed actually 
drives and shapes human behavior. Although there is some empirical research on 
greed, it is still unclear what greed exactly is, and how it shapes people’s behavior. 
Most research on greed stems from the game theoretic literature (e.g., Dawes 
et al., 1986; Murnighan et al., 1993). In these studies greed is typically defined 





studies are insightful, they can usually not discriminate between greed and related 
constructs such as self-interest or actual need as they equate the behavior that 
could follow greed with the motive itself. The major other research line on greed 
stems from the terror management literature (e.g., Kasser & Sheldon, 2000; 
Cozzolino et al., 2004, 2009), where greed is treated as an outcome rather than 
as a motive causing other behavior. Although all this is important, these lines of 
research do not teach us more about how greed differs from related constructs 
and how greed influences people’s behavior. In this dissertation the focus lies on 
how to define and conceptualize greed, and how individual differences in the 
motivation to be greedy shape people’s behavior.  
THE CURRENT DISSERTATION 
This dissertation consists of two parts. Figure 1.2 provides a schematic 
overview of the two parts and the corresponding five empirical chapters in this 
thesis. The first part of this dissertation aims at getting a better understanding of 
what greed is. In Chapter 2 I report a prototype analysis of greed that I conducted 
to get a better understanding of what people talk about when they talk about 
greed, and to come to an empirically-based definition of greed. Based on this 
definition I construct a scale to measure individual differences in greed (Chapter 
3). In the second part, I investigate in three chapters the behavioral consequences 








Figure 1.2. Schematic overview of the empirical Chapters 2 to 6 of the dissertation. 
PART I: 






CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 
PART II: 














 Please note that all chapters are written as unique articles that have been or 
will be published separately, and therefore can be read independently. As a result, 
there is some overlap between the different chapters, particularly in explaining 
the relevant constructs and the previous literature. Moreover, because the 
empirical chapters are all co-authored, they are all written in ‘we’ form (a footnote 
at the beginning of each chapter names all co-authors of that chapter). Because I 
am the sole author of the Introduction and Conclusions and Discussion chapters, 
and these reflect my own opinions and thoughts, I use ‘I’ in these chapters. 
Part I: What greed is… 
Chapter 2. Defining Greed 
This chapter aims to get a better conceptualization of greed by using a 
prototype analysis. Such an analysis helps in providing more clear 
conceptualizations of ‘fuzzy’ psychological constructs. In Studies 2.1 and 2.2 I 
reveal which features people find important to describe greed. Features are 
categorized as being central or peripheral to greed. Studies 2.3 to 2.5 further 
validate the greed prototype and indicate that central features are indeed more 
important to describe greed than peripheral features. Based on this prototype 
analysis I conclude that greed is the desire to acquire more and dissatisfaction for 
never having enough. 
Chapter 3. Dispositional Greed 
Chapter 3 reports on the development of the Dispositional Greed Scale 
(DGS). In Study 3.1 I use four samples to construct and validate the DGS. The 
DGS consists of seven items and reliably measures individual differences in greed. 
Dispositional greed is conceptually different from other constructs such as 
maximization, self-interest, envy, and materialism. Because of the high 
correlation between dispositional greed and materialism, Study 3.2 gives further 
evidence for the differences between the two constructs. Studies 3.3 to 3.5 show 
that the DGS predicts behavior in both ultimatum and dictator games, as well as 






Part II: What greed does… 
Chapter 4. Greed and Adolescent Financial Behavior 
In this chapter I explore the relationship between dispositional greed and 
adolescent financial behavior. I construct a 3-item version of the DGS and show 
that individual differences in greed are associated with more income, more 
expenses, less savings, and more debt. Greed thus has both positive and negative 
consequences for financial behavior.  
Chapter 5. Enough is Never Enough: Greed, Work, and Overearning 
This chapter investigates the relationship between dispositional greed and 
overearning. In Study 5.1 I show that greedy individuals are more prone to 
overearning, that is, earning beyond one’s needs. In Study 5.2 I find that greedy 
people overearn more, because they like earning more, not because they like the 
work more. Replicating the findings of Study 5.1, Study 5.3 shows again that 
dispositional greed is associated with more overearning. Furthermore, this study 
finds that people that overearn feel more regret and are less satisfied with their 
outcomes. Finally, this study shows that even when people got the opportunity 
to learn from previous outcomes, dispositional greed is still associated with 
overearning at a second trial.  
Chapter 6. Greedy Bastards: Greed and Unethical Behavior 
In this chapter I examine how greed is associated with unethical behavior. In 
Study 6.1 I find in three samples that greedy individuals have more positive 
attitudes towards transgressions and are more likely to transgress. In addition, 
this relationship is mediated by self-control. Study 6.2 further investigates the 
relationship between greed and unethical behavior and shows that greedy 
individuals are more likely to accept bribes. In Study 6.3 I further explore the 
role of self-control in this relationship. Greedy individuals are more likely to 
transgress because they experience higher desires, and therefore have less self-







Chapter 7. Conclusions and Discussion 
In the last chapter I integrate and discuss the findings from the empirical 
chapters. I give a summary of the findings of this dissertation and discuss the 
theoretical implications of these findings. Moreover, I place the findings in a 
































Although greed is both hailed as the motor of economic growth and blamed as 
the cause of economic crises, very little is known about its psychological 
underpinnings. Five studies explored lay conceptualizations of greed amongst US 
and Dutch participants using a prototype analysis. Study 2.1 identified features 
related to greed. Study 2.2 determined the importance of these features; the most 
important features were classified as central (e.g., self-interested, never satisfied), 
whereas less important features were classified as peripheral (e.g., ambition, 
addiction). Subsequently, we found that, compared to peripheral features, 
participants recalled central features better (Study 2.3), faster (Study 2.4), and 
these central features were more present in real-life episodes of greed (Study 2.5). 
These findings provide a better understanding of the elements that make up the 
experience of greed and provide insights into how greed can be manipulated and 
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“Greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed 
clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit.” 
  – Gordon Gecko 
“There is a sufficiency in the world for man’s need but not for man’s greed.”  
– Mahatma Gandhi  
As the quotes above illustrate, people’s opinions about greed range from very 
positive to very negative. Whereas some people acclaim the driving forces of greed 
that increase economic growth and development (e.g., Greenfeld, 2001), others 
condemn its immoral and exploitative qualities (e.g., Stigler, 1981). Despite the 
fact that greed is an important construct in economics and in moral reasoning 
and that many people such as journalists, pop-science writers, and novelists talk 
and write extensively about greed, empirical research on the topic is scarce. 
According to Wang and Murnighan (2011) the relative neglect of greed in 
contemporary research is partly due to the “enormous difficulties that surround 
the seemingly simple task of defining greed” (p. 282). 
The aim of this research is to gain more insight into how people conceptualize 
greed. In order to achieve this goal we conducted an extensive prototype analysis. 
However, before describing the prototype analysis, we first review the existing 
literatures on greed. In doing this we build on and extend Wang and 
Murnighan’s (2011) pioneering work. We next explain some theory behind 
prototype analysis and proceed with an overview of the five studies that we 
conducted.  
What is greed? 
One way to get a better conception of greed is to look at the origin of the 
word. ‘Greed’ originates from the Old English term græd or grædig (with 
cognates in a variety of other Germanic languages; e.g., gretig in Dutch, grådig 
in Danish, and gráðigr in Old Scandinavian languages), meaning voracious or 
eager (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2013). Greed can thus be seen as an 





greed is described as the “selfish and excessive desire for more of something (as 
money) than is needed” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2013); “a strong 
desire for more wealth, possessions, power, etc. than a person needs” (Online 
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2013), and “when you want a lot more 
food, money, etc. than you need” (Online Cambridge Learner’s Dictionary, 
2013). As is apparent from all these definitions, greed refers to an inappeasable 
longing for not just money but also other goods and resources. Depending on 
the object of interest greed can manifest itself as avarice, cupidity, exceeding 
ambition, lust, or gluttony (Tickle, 2004). Thus, when people talk about greed 
they mean more than just an extreme desire for more money.  
Besides the excessive desire that is fundamental to greed, the scientific 
literature often mentions the selfish nature of greed. Some even argue that greed 
is an extreme and immoral form of self-interest at the costs of others (Balot, 
2001). In classical economic theory both self-interest and greed form key 
assumptions, as rational people should maximize their personal outcomes (Smith, 
1776/1994). Most authors focusing on greed’s economic consequences share this 
positive and productive view; greed and self-interest are for example seen as 
principal motivators for a flourishing economy (Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Williams, 
2000). Greed is said to increase economic development because it motivates the 
creation of new products and the development of new industries, which in turn 
enhances wealth, employment, and well-being (Melleuish, 2009).  
Another viewpoint is that greed is inherent to human nature and that all 
people are greedy to some extent. Some argue that being greedy is vital for human 
welfare (Greenfeld, 2001; Williams, 2000) and that it is an important 
evolutionary motive that promotes self-preservation (Robertson, 2001; Saad, 
2007). People who are more predisposed to gain and hoard as many resources as 
possible are argued to be better off and thus have an evolutionary advantage 
(Cassill & Watkins, 2005).   
While rational and evolutionary approaches to greed stress its productive and 
reproductive advantages, much else that is written about greed focuses on its 





traditions, they all seem to converge on the idea that greed is bad. Saint Paul 
states in the New Testament that “the love for money is the root of all evil”. In 
Christianity greed is known as one of the seven cardinal sins that lead to eternal 
damnation. In fact, greed is sometimes even referred to as the mother of all sins 
(Tickle, 2004), with the other sins (anger, envy, gluttony, lust, pride, and sloth) 
stemming from greed. In Buddhism, greed is one of the three poisons that create 
bad karma (Nath, 1998). Other religions are equally outspoken about the 
negativity of greed (for Hinduism, see Sundararajan, 1989; for Islam, see 
Rafiabadi, 2003; and for Judaism, see Bloch, 1984).  
In other writings, greed has been related to different forms of unethical and 
immoral behavior. It is argued that greed is a cause of war (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004), fraud (Smith, 2003), theft (Caudil, 1988), corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999), and deception (Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009). 
Furthermore, greedy behavior often takes place at the expense of others. Greedy 
individuals in a society often benefit from the rest of the (less greedy) population 
that has to pay the price (Foldvary, 1998).  
One reason for the negative stance towards greed may be its insatiability. To 
greedy people, enough is never enough. Greedy individuals find themselves 
permanently on a hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Campbell, 1971); they expect 
that they will be happier with more money (Easterlin, 2001), but as soon as they 
get more they adapt their desires and expectations and want even more (Diener, 
Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Keely, 2001). For greedy people, the goalposts ever 
keep moving.  
Finally, greed has been proposed to have negative consequences for the greedy 
themselves. Lunt and Livingstone (1991) relate greed to financial debts, implying 
impatience in the greedy with respect to things they desire (Johnson, 2008). 
According to Papatheodorou, Rosselló, and Xiao (2010) it is greed that made 
bankers behave recklessly and risky, which in turn led to the financial crisis 
(Zandi, 2008). A classic example of the negative consequences of greed is the 
well-known Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). Medieval herders in the 





own, private parcel. There was a clear preference for herders to let their livestock 
graze on these commons. Though rational from an individual perspective, it led 
to overgrazing and the common ground becoming infertile and useless to all. 
According to Wilke (1991) these types of situations occur when greed wins it 
from the desire to be efficient and fair.  
Thus, as a summary, much has been said about greed. Nonetheless, there 
appears to be considerable variation in, and hence lack of agreement on, the 
conceptualization of greed, both in the scientific literature (Wang & Murnighan, 
2011) and in the way people generally talk about it. Because greed is such a broad 
and ill-defined concept, we believe that a prototype analysis about greed can be 
helpful here in order to get at the central characteristics of this important 
motivational construct.  
Greed and related constructs 
As is apparent from the literature reviewed, greed is related to (and often 
confounded with) other constructs such as self-interest, materialism, and envy. 
Nevertheless, we think that they are distinct constructs. Below we explain why.  
In the psychological literature greed is often, and mistakenly, used 
interchangeably with self-interest. In the rational economic model, agents are 
thought to be self-interested and to maximize their outcomes. Self-interest refers 
to the fact that rational agents only care about their own outcomes, and are 
indifferent concerning the outcomes of others. Greed is related to the assumption 
of maximization, which states that agents always prefer to have more rather than 
less of a good. We believe that greed is an exaggerated form of maximizing, in 
which people not simple prefer to have more, but are also frustrated by not having 
it. While it may be rational to strive for the maximum, striving for more than 
what is possible is not rational. Thus, when people are greedy, they can become 
so focused on what they want or desire that it leads to behavior that is not rational 
anymore.  
Another construct used interchangeably with greed is materialism. In Belk’s 





Although materialistic people can indeed be greedy, greed is broader than just a 
desire for material possessions (Tickle, 2004). People can be greedy for food, 
power, or sex, which has nothing to do with materialism. Whereas materialists 
desire things because they signal success in life (Richins, 2004), greed can also be 
felt for things that do not signal success or status (e.g., being greedy for candy).  
Lastly, we want to focus on the differences between greed and envy. Envy is 
experienced when people are not happy with their current state and it may induce 
a desire for products (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011a&b). However, 
we think the antecedents of envy and greed are different. People are envious 
because others are better off and they desire the same things those others have, 
whereas people are greedy because they just have an inappeasable desire for more 
(Maijala, Mannukka, & Nikkonen, 2000). Envy is thus driven by an external 
factor (wanting what others have), whereas greed is driven by internal 
motivations (wanting more). 
Why we can benefit from adopting a prototype approach 
In science, good definitions are of vital importance. However, it is sometimes 
difficult to clearly describe the focal construct in a limited number of necessary 
or sufficient elements. When concepts have fuzzy boundaries, prototype analysis 
comes in handy (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Rosch, 1975; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, 
& O’Connor, 1987). In contrast to traditional dictionary definitions that 
identify a set of boundary conditions for a construct, a prototype analysis does 
not assume that all elements that are important for a construct are present at all 
times. Instead, it identifies a set of features that people see as representative to 
that construct. A common example to explain the need and benefits of prototype 
analysis is by demonstrating the impossibility to properly define the concept of a 
chair (see Shaver et al., 1987). A prototype of a chair, in contrast, is easily found: 
it is a piece of furniture that one can sit on with four legs and a backseat. Clearly, 
none of these features are strictly necessary to classify an object as a chair, nor are 
they able to discriminate between chairs and other objects in an absolute sense. 
We can also use other objects to sit on, some chairs have only one leg or three 





of what a chair looks like people are able to categorize objects as being more or 
less prototypical versions of a chair.  
If even a simple object like a chair is so hard to describe, it is understandable 
that even more problems are encountered when describing complex constructs 
such as emotions. Therefore, we use a prototype approach to get a better idea of 
what greed is. With this approach laypeople are asked to list characteristics they 
think to be important to describe the construct under investigation. These 
characteristics are then evaluated and placed into larger sets of features by 
independent coders. The features that are identified as being most representative 
of a construct make up the prototype of the investigated construct.   
In the past, prototype approaches have been fruitfully used to conceptualize 
many fuzzy concepts. They have been used to clarify the concepts of emotion 
(Shaver et al., 1987), modesty (Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008), 
relationship quality (Hassebrauck, 1997), commitment (Fehr, 1988), forgiveness 
(Kearns & Fincham, 2004), and prayer (Lambert, Fincham, & Graham, 2011). 
This approach has also successfully been applied to specific emotional states such 
as gratitude (Lambert, Graham, & Fincham, 2009), love (Fehr, 1988; Fitness & 
Fletcher, 1993; Regan, Kocan, & Whitlock, 1998), hate, anger, jealousy (Fitness 
& Fletcher, 1993), and nostalgia (Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 
2011). In the present research we follow this research tradition by applying a 
prototype analysis to the study of greed.  
It is arguable that everything can be conceptualized as a prototype, but this by 
itself does not make prototype analysis a worthwhile or worthless pursuit. In the 
case of greed we think a prototype analysis is particularly useful; not because we 
want to show that greed has a prototype structure, but rather to find what that 
structure is. Given the disparities in the scarce scientific literature on greed and 
the important role greed is thought to play in daily life, we simply want to get a 
better understanding of what people see as important characteristics of greed. A 
prototype analysis can provide us with these insights because it gives us important 
information about the cognitive and emotional representations people have of 





A prototype analysis can benefit us in three ways. First, it provides 
information about people’s perception of greed, helping us to create a working 
definition of greed. Second, it provides insights about whether greed is good or 
bad (and in what situations). Third, it provides information for the further 
empirical study of greed, for example in scale construction. Thus, the analysis 
will give us insights in how, why, and when people feel and behave greedy and 
gives us important directions on how to manipulate and measure greed in future 
studies. It may enable us to more effectively grasp what greed is and what greed 
does.  
Overview of the current studies 
The total analysis of greed consists of five studies. The goal of Study 2.1 was 
to determine which features are prototypical for greed. Study 2.2 served to classify 
each of the features of greed as central or peripheral. Studies 2.3 and 2.4 
investigated differences in automatic information-processing of central and 
peripheral features. Finally, Study 2.5 examined the ecological validity of central 
versus peripheral features by examining the prototype of greed in the context of 
real-life events.  
STUDY 2.1 
This study aims to provide a list of the features and characteristics that make 
up the experience of greed. Participants were asked to list as many exemplars of 
greed that they could think of, and these were later coded to extract the most 
common features of greed.  
Method  
Students (N = 195, 88.2% female, Mage = 19.19, SD = 2.46) participated in 
exchange for course credit. Participants had five minutes to list as many features 
of greed as they could think of. 
Results and discussion  
Following the procedure used by other prototype analyses, we first divided 





8.51, SD = 3.97, per person). Most exemplars were single items; when a 
description contained more than one related statement, these were divided into 
separate “units of meaning” (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). The exemplars were then 
coded into larger categories by two coders (first author and a research assistant) 
following the procedure used by Hepper et al. (2011). This was accomplished by 
(a) grouping exemplars that were identical, (b) grouping exemplars that were 
semantically related (e.g., selfishness and selfish), (c) grouping exemplars that 
were meaning-related (e.g., desiring and wishing), and (d) grouping exemplars 
that had a common meaning (e.g., rich and millionaire).   
As a result of this procedure, the two coders together constituted a list with 
categories; discrepancies were resolved by discussion and, in the few cases where 
this was not sufficient, by a third party (second author). This resulted in a coding 
scheme that contained 60 categories. We chose to use a strict coding scheme that 
consisted of many categories because we did not want to lose too much 
information beforehand. In addition to constructing the coding sheet, the coders 
also jointly assigned each exemplar to one of the categories. Fifteen exemplars 
described groups or individuals (e.g., Scrooge McDuck and Berlusconi) and two 
exemplars literally mentioned hebzucht (the Dutch word for greed); these were 
excluded from the analysis. This left 1643 exemplars for use in the analysis. 
Next, two other research assistants independently assigned each of these 
exemplars to only one code. Interrater agreement between the joint coding of the 
first author and the first research assistant (coding 1) and the individual codings 
of the two research assistants (coding 2 and 3) ranged from good to very good 
(κ12 = .87, κ13 = .77, κ23 = .76). Therefore, the coding by the first assistant was 
used. The number of categories was reduced from 60 to 46, based on the number 
of times that categories were confounded and on comments by the coders about 
categories that were very similar (κ’s go up to κ12 = .88, κ13 = .81, κ23 = .80). 
Table 2.1 displays the final categories and exemplar frequencies.  
None of the features was mentioned by all participants. Only four features 
were mentioned by more than half of the participants (self-interest, 





mentioned feature (166 times), which is consistent with Balot’s (2001) definition 
of greed as self-interest taken to such an extent that the effects on others are seen 
as unacceptable or immoral. However, greed is more than just excessive self-
interest.  
Other important elements of greed are acquisitiveness and stinginess, which 
were mentioned 133 and 118 times respectively. Acquisitiveness refers to 
behavior in which people have the urge to gain and possess as much as possible, 
whereas stinginess refers to behavior in which people do not want to give to others 
and spend their possessions. These features refer to two sides of the same medal; 
people want to get as much as they can, and once they have it they do not want 
to give it up anymore.  
Materialism is also seen as an important feature of greed (mentioned 112 
times). Though greed can be felt when one wants to be the best at something 
(Tickle, 2004), it seems that greed is often felt as the result of wanting to attain 
material goals. Another frequently mentioned feature was that greed is something 
bad or sinful. This is in line with previous research that has found that people 
tend to disapprove of greed, especially when it impels other people’s behavior 
(Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011). Other features that were often 
mentioned were money, envy, power, desire, not being generous and never being 
satisfied.  
What is also interesting to note is that all other deadly sins, except wrath, were 
mentioned. Envy was the sin that was most often mentioned, and it seems that 
people get greedier when they see that others have what they lack. Greed is often 
seen as the root of all sins (Tickle, 2004), which might explain why other sins 
come so easily to mind when people have to describe greed.  
Although several features of greed have negative connotations, people also 
described features of greed that are positive. People associated greed with 
ambition and the drive for more and better things. Thus, besides all the negative 
connotations that greed has, it can also help us to move forward by motivating 





In conclusion, these findings reveal that the prototype of greed comprises of 
both positive and negative features. In extension of earlier definitions of greed 
(Balot, 2001) this study shows that greed is not just an extensive form of self-
interest, but encompasses other features as well. Greed also motivates us to 
achieve our goals by making us strive for more and better things. However, it 
seems that though greed has positive sides, the consequences for others are mainly 
thought to be negative. This is in accordance with Wang et al. (2011), who found 
that people see greedy behavior as bad especially when it drives other people’s 
behavior instead of their own. 
 STUDY 2.2 
In Study 2.2 participants were asked to indicate how typical each of the 
features derived from Study 2.1 was for greed. A prototype should not only be 
represented by the number of times each feature is mentioned, but also by how 
representative people find this feature for the concept. The representativeness of 
features can be determined by letting participants rate the centrality of these 
features (e.g., Gregg et al., 2008; Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2011). We 
included both American and Dutch participants in this study so we could 
investigate whether the greed prototype is similar across cultures. 
Method 
Two-hundred and fifteen (45.1% American, 54.9% Dutch, 59.5% female, 
40.0% male, 0,5% not specified, Mage = 26.76, SD = 9.96) participants were 
recruited via MTurk and received $0.30 in return for their participation or were 
recruited on the university campus and participated in exchange for course credit 
or money. Participants were shown each of the 46 features of Study 2.1 (in one 
of six random orders). For each feature, participants indicated how related it was 





 Table 2.1. Features of greed, exemplars, and frequencies in Study 2.1 and centrality ratings in Study 2.2. 
  Study 2.1 Study 2.2 
Feature Exemplars by participants N M SD 
 Central    
Acquisitiveness Sticky fingers, taking everything you can catch 133 7.18 1.17 
Selfishness Selfishness, self-fulfilling, not thinking of others 166 6.90 1.28 
Striving for quantity Wanting more, wanting everything  31 6.79 1.41 
Materialism Materialistic, goods are important, valuing goods 112 6.73 1.40 
Never satisfied Never enough, insatiable, not easily satisfied 51 6.55 1.58 
Money Money, euros, dollars, earning (money) 77 6.36 1.57 
Envy Envy, jealousy, wanting things that others have 66 6.30 1.56 
Not generous Not sharing, keeping everything for yourself, not generous 55 6.29 1.65 
Egocentrism Egocentrism, self-centered 45 6.27 1.68 
No matter what the consequences are No matter what, going behind someone else’s back 29 6.20 1.69 
Capitalism Capitalism, consumer society, Western world 28 6.06 1.50 
Power Power, sovereign 54 6.05 1.49 
Desire Desiring, longing, wishing 50 6.05 1.72 
Stinginess Stingy, miserly 118 5.91 1.82 
Ungrateful Ungrateful, spoiled  17 5.83 1.78 
Immoral behavior Fraud, stealing, blackmailing  20 5.66 1.87 
Wealth Rich, millionaire, rich people 40 5.64 1.80 
Manipulation Manipulation, manipulating  9 5.57 1.79 
Gluttony Gluttony, fat, voracious  18 5.54 2.00 









Arrogance Arrogance, cockiness 34 5.48 1.86 
Tunnel vision Narrow view, goal focused, obsession 22 5.48 1.65 
Lust Lust, sex, having many women  4 5.46 1.91 
Striving for quality Luxury, wanting the best, wanting new things 24 5.36 1.96 
 Peripheral    
Status Status, famous, respect 15 5.24 1.97 
Vanity Vanity, narcissism 5 5.10 1.77 
Ambitious Ambitious, being driven, wanting to be the best 37 5.09 1.87 
Addiction Addiction, addicted, compulsive 7 5.07 2.08 
Inequality Inequality, not fair, first world against second and third world 26 5.04 2.07 
No empathy Emotionless, no empathy, no sympathy 17 5.00 1.96 
Spending Spending, buying things, having a hole in your pocket  25 4.99 2.18 
Sinful/Bad Bad, sin, negative 102 4.95 1.94 
Pride Pride, being proud, showing off 8 4.91 2.05 
Frustration Frustration, angry when you can’t get what you want 4 4.80 2.02 
Collecting/Saving Collecting, hoarding, saving 14 4.70 2.00 
Non-social behavior Not social, asocial, noisy 38 4.68 2.11 
Unrealistic Unrealistic worldview, wanting more than is realistic 2 4.63 2.19 
Personality trait Trait, universal, all humans have it 19 4.52 1.89 
Unhappy Unhappy, sad, worrying 20 3.97 1.84 
Thriftiness  Thrifty, not wasting, cheap 15 3.86 2.03 
Alone Alone in the world, no friends, lonely 43 3.78 1.97 





 Standing up for yourself Assertive, dominance, survival 17 3.57 2.00 
Sloth Sloth, lazy, taking the easy way out 4 3.52 1.96 
No purpose No purpose, things that have no purpose 2 3.15 1.94 
Poverty Poor, hunger, no money 5 2.24 1.41 
Generous Generosity, presents 6 2.09 1.38 
Note. Features are ordered by mean centrality ratings. Features are ordered based on the centrality ratings in Study 2.2, which used a 
scale from 1 (not at all related to greed) to 8 (extremely related to greed). Features were considered central or peripheral based on a 







Results and discussion 
Mean ratings and standard deviations of each feature are presented in the two 
rightmost columns of Table 2.1.3 We analyzed these data following the procedure 
by Hassebrauck (1997) and Hepper et al. (2011). In order to evaluate the 
reliability of these means we computed the intraclass correlation (ICC4); this is 
the equivalent to the mean of all possible split-half correlations of the 215 subjects 
with regard to the 46 features. In order to do so, we transposed the dataset and 
treated the 46 features as cases and the 215 subjects as items. In general, 
participants’ responses were very coherent (ICC = .99, p < .001, confidence 
interval = .98 to .99). Overall, the mean centrality ratings of Study 2.2 
corresponded with the frequencies found in Study 2.1 (r = .59, p < .001). 
However there were some features that were not mentioned very often in the 
feature generation task in Study 2.1, but that were seen as central to greed in 
Study 2.2 (e.g., lust, manipulation). 
Based on the mean ratings we conducted a median split which labeled the 
highest 23 features as central to greed and the lowest 23 features as peripheral to 
greed. Though we immediately recognize that the centrality of features follows 
more a continuous than a dichotomous scale, a median split allows us to test for 
differences between features that are more prototypical for greed and those that 
are that are less prototypical for greed in subsequent studies.  
In accordance with the results of Study 2.1 and Balot’s (2001) definition of 
greed, a central aspect of greed involves placing oneself before others. Self-interest 
and egocentrism, were seen as very central to greed. Greed is also characterized 
by desiring and acquiring goods and money. Desire, acquisitiveness, striving for 
quality and quantity, never being satisfied, materialism and money were all seen 
as highly characteristic of greed. Envy also seems to be a central characteristic. 
Envy is a catalyst of greed (Kleinberg, 2008), and it seems that we especially want 
                                                   
3 Absolute agreement between the samples was very high (ICC = .93, p < .001, C = .82 to .97), 
indicating that American and Dutch people see greed similarly. We therefore report the combined 
ratings. 





things that belong to others. Immoral behavior was also seen as central to greed, 
which is in accordance with Gino and Pierce (2009) who found that wealth 
triggered greed and envy, which in response led to more immoral behavior. The 
peripheral features of greed that were being alone, having no empathy, and non-
social behavior. Other peripheral features of greed include that it is something 
bad or sinful, that it is a personality trait, that it has no purpose, and that it makes 
people unhappy. 
As in Study 2.1, this study revealed that the prototype of greed consists of 
both positive and negative features. These findings are in line with previous 
observations (Hume, 1739/2001) in which greed is described as a two-edged 
sword. Greed is positive because it helps us to reach our goals and to strive for 
more, however in this process greed often hurts others and sometimes even 
ourselves because it can make us selfish, irrational, and immoral. 
STUDY 2.3 
In Study 2.3 we examined whether the features that were identified as being 
central to greed in Study 2.2 are indeed more important to greed than peripheral 
features. Previous research has found that that the activation of a prototype results 
in heightened accessibility of related features (Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 
2011). The more central a feature is, the easier it comes to mind, and the more 
likely it is that people remember this feature (even when it was not presented). 
We thus expected that people would remember central features better than 
peripheral features, and that they would more often falsely remember central 
features compared to peripheral features. 
Method 
Students (N = 102, 86.3% female, Mage = 19.63, SD = 2.14) participated in 
an online study in exchange for course credit. The 46 features of greed that we 
identified in Studies 2.1 and 2.2 were divided into two sets of 23 features. In each 
set eleven or twelve features were central and eleven or twelve features were 





feature in a sentence (e.g., greed is about striving for more) to activate the concept 
of greed. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two sets. Participants were told 
that they would be presented with each of the statements for four seconds and 
that they should remember each of the characteristics in the statement as good as 
possible. Participants then completed an unrelated study that took approximately 
five minutes. After this distractor, participants had three minutes to recall all 
features of greed that they saw before.5 As a final task, participants received a list 
of all 46 features of greed and were instructed to drag each feature into a box that 
was called “features that you did see before”, when they saw this feature during 
the first part of the experiment, or into a box called “features that you did not see 
before”, when they had not encountered this feature in the first part of the 
experiment. 
Results and discussion  
One participant was excluded prior to the analyses because she indicated that 
she did not pay attention to the greed features. Central and peripheral features 
were compared on each of the four dependent variables (correct free recall, false 
free recall, correct recognition, and false recognition; see Table 2.2 for means and 
standard deviations). 
A paired samples t-test was used to compare the amount of central and 
peripheral features that were correctly freely recalled. Participants freely recalled 
a higher number of central features than peripheral features, t(100) = 4.70, p < 
.001, d = 0.57. Because the false recall data was not normally distributed we 
conducted a Wilcoxon signed rank test. Participants falsely recalled a higher 
number of central features than peripheral features, Wilcoxon’s Z(100) = -2.64, 
p = .008, r = .26.6  
                                                   
5 Sometimes participants wrote down the same feature twice; in those cases we only counted the 
feature once.  





Table 2.2. Mean number of recalled and recognized central and peripheral features (both 





The memory data was normally distributed, allowing for paired sample t-tests. 
Participants recognized more central than peripheral features when they saw a list 
with all the features of greed, t(100) = 4.06, p <. 001, d = 0.88. In addition, 
participants also falsely recognized more central than peripheral features, t(100) 
= 7.71, p < .001, d = 0.93.  
Central features of greed were better recalled and better recognized than 
peripheral features. Furthermore, participants more often recalled and recognized 
central features that they did not see before. This indicates that when the concept 
of greed is activated (by means of the presentation of concepts related to greed), 
central features are more accessible, and therefore people think they saw those 
features, even if this was not the case (Hassebrauck, 1997). In Study 2.4, we 
attempted to replicate this differential information-processing of central and 
peripheral features by studying speed of classification. 
STUDY 2.4 
In Study 2.4, we tried to further test the distinction between central and 
peripheral features of greed. Previous research has found that people are faster at 
classifying features that are central to a prototype (Fehr, Russell, & Ward, 1982; 
Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2011) and are sometimes not able to 
determine whether peripheral features belong to the prototype at all (Fehr et al., 
1982; Fehr & Russell, 1984). We therefore expected that people would be faster 
and better able in classifying central compared to peripheral features of greed.  
 Central Peripheral 
 M SD M SD 
Correct recall 3.47 1.97 2.42 1.66 
False recall 0.21 0.52 0.06 0.24 
Correct recognition 8.55 1.56 7.58 2.24 






Eighty-seven students (75.9% female, Mage = 20.46, SD = 2.06) participated 
in exchange for course credit or €8.00. For all of the 46 features of greed, we 
picked one of the most frequently used exemplars. This resulted in 46 greed 
related stimuli (e.g., for money the stimulus was “money” and for striving for 
quantity the stimulus was “striving for more”. In addition, we came up with an 
equal amount of control stimuli that were unrelated to greed (e.g., “turtle” and 
“window”).  
Participants were informed that they were participating in a reaction time 
study and that they were to respond as quickly as possible. For each trial 
participants received one of the 92 stimuli and were asked to indicate whether 
this word was a feature of greed or not. Before the actual experiment started, 
participants received ten practice trials. In the actual experiment participants 
received all 92 stimuli. For each trial the answer (Is this a characteristic of greed? 
yes or no) and reaction time were recorded.  
Results and discussion  
First we checked the percentages with which central, peripheral, and control 
stimuli were classified as being a feature of greed (see Table 2.3). Because the 
skewedness of the three types of stimuli varied, we used nonparametric tests to 
test for a main effect of feature type on classification, Friedman χ2 (2, N = 87) = 
170.16, p < .001.7 Central features were more often classified as features of greed 
than peripheral features, Wilcoxon’s Z(86) = 7.92, p < .001, r = .85,8  and 
peripheral features were more often classified as features of greed than control 
features, Wilcoxon’s Z(86) = 8.11, p < .001, r = .87.9 
 
                                                   
7 A repeated measures ANOVA gave similar results, F(2, 85) = 1099,85, p < .001, ηp2 = .96. 
8 A paired samples t-test gave similar results, t(86) = 19.744, p < .001, d = 1.72.  





Table 2.3. Percentages and speed in classification of central and peripheral features of 
greed in Study 2.4.  
 
Following recommendations (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), we 
recoded extremely slow (>3000ms) and extremely fast (<300ms) latencies to 
respectively 3000ms and 300ms and did a logarithmic transformation (Hepper 
et al., 2011). We found a significant main effect of feature type on classification 
speed for features that were seen as related to greed (“yes”-responses), F(2, 85) = 
5.79, p = .010, ηp2 = .36. Participants were faster in classifying central features as 
related to greed than peripheral features, t(86) = -5.61, p < .001, d = 0.27. 
Participants were slower in classifying peripheral features than control features, 
t(22) = 3.08, p = .006, d = 0.64. This might be the result of the weaker association 
between greed and the peripheral features. Central features are easy to classify (as 
being part of greed) because they are seen as very much related to greed. Control 
features are also easy to classify (as not being part of greed) because they are not 
related at all to greed. Peripheral features are harder to classify because they are 
to some extent related to greed, but the relationship between greed and these 
peripheral features is more ambiguous.  
Consistent with previous prototype findings (e.g., Hassebrauck, 1997; 
Hepper et al., 2011) this study found that people more often and quicker classify 
central than peripheral features as related to greed, Furthermore, this study found 
that participants were slower in classifying peripheral features compared to 
control features. 
 
 Central Peripheral Control 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Percentage categorized 
as greed (%) 
75.01 15.10 46.08 17.80 1.00 3.00 
Response speed (ms) 1116.79 328.16 1247.40 431.43 952.82 680.84 






Study 2.5 investigated the ecological validity of the greed prototype. 
Participants were asked to recall a real life situation in which they felt greedy. If 
central features are more related to greed than peripheral features, then 
autobiographical events should be better described by central features than 
peripheral features. In addition, central features should be better at 
discriminating between greedy and everyday events.  
Method  
Participants were Americans recruited on MTurk (70.3%) and paid $0.40 for 
their participation and Dutch students approached on the university campus 
(29.7%) and asked to volunteer in this study (N = 144, 55.9% male, 43.4% 
female, 0.7% not specified, Mage = 21.88, SD = 2.06). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions (Greed vs. Control). They were asked to recall 
a situation in which they felt greedy or an everyday situation.10 After describing 
the situation, participants rated to what extent each of the 46 features was present 
in that situation (cf. Hepper et al., 2011). Examples of statements were “I 
behaved selfishly in this situation”, “This situation involved materialism”, and “I 
behaved arrogant in this situation”, and they were all rated on a scale from 1 (not 
at all) to 8 (very much). Analyses were conducted on the averages for central (M 
= 3.90, SD = 1.60, α = .94) and peripheral (M = 3.36, SD = 1.21, α = .88) 
features.  
Results and discussion  
A 2 (Greed vs. Control) × 2 (Central vs. Peripheral) mixed ANOVA revealed 
an interaction effect between situation and centrality of features, F(1, 142) = 
122.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .46.11 See Table 2.4 for an overview of the means. 
Statements about the central features were rated to be more present by the 
participants than peripheral features in the greed condition, t(73) = 11.89, p < 
                                                   
10 The types of situations described in the control condition varied (e.g., having dinner with friends, 
shopping for groceries, cleaning the bathroom).   
11 Because we had Dutch and American participants we controlled for nationality. Nationality did 





.001, d = 1.12, whereas there was no difference between central and peripheral 
features in the control condition, t(70) = -1.10, p = .27, d = 0.07.  
Furthermore, we found that the presence of central features differed stronger 
between everyday and greedy situations, t(143) = -12.042, p < .001, d = 2.09 
than the presence of peripheral features between both conditions, t(143) = -5.44, 
p < .001, d = 0.91. This study showed that central features are more present than 
peripheral features during greedy situations. Furthermore central features could 
differentiate better between greedy and everyday events. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The aim of this research was to obtain a better understanding of what people 
define as greed. While there is much written and said about greed, it is also 
understudied. As Wang and Murnighan (2011) concluded, it is the fuzzy nature 
of the greed concept itself that lies at heart of these problems. Many things are 
related to greed, but none of these is necessarily present in every instance of greed. 
In this research we presented a prototype analysis consisting of a series of five 
studies, allowing a better understanding of how people view greed. People think 
that the desire to acquire more, the dissatisfaction of never having enough, self-
interest, envy, materialism, and a tunnel vision in obtaining more are important 
components of greed. We will discuss each of these features of greed later on, 
after we have summarized the findings.  
 
Table 2.4. Means and standard deviations of central and peripheral features in greedy 
and everyday situations in Study 2.5.  
 
Note. Features were rated on an 8-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 8 = very 
much. 
 Type of situation 
 Greed Everyday 
Type of feature M SD M SD 
Central features 5.03 1.00 2.73 1.22 





In five studies we investigated the prototypical features of greed. Studies 2.1 
and 2.2 identified a list of features that are prototypical for greed and determined 
for each feature whether it was central or peripheral. Consistent with prototype 
theory we found that none of these features alone could describe each instance of 
greed, nor could any single feature be used to categorically discriminate between 
greed and related constructs and emotions. However, taken together, a limited 
number of central features was able to adequately describe greed in a variety of 
situations. In accordance with prototype analyses on other constructs, Studies 2.3 
and 2.4 found that central and peripheral features are processed differently. 
People more readily remembered and classified central features than peripheral 
features (Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2011). In Study 2.5 we showed that 
central features are more prominent in autobiographical greedy situations 
compared to peripheral features, and that those central features were able to 
distinguish everyday situations from greedy situations.  
Towards a working hypothesis of greed 
Based on these findings we propose a new working hypothesis on what greed 
is. Prototype analyses are extremely useful for identifying associations between 
constructs and their components, but remain mute about the nature of such 
associations (e.g., core experiences, concomitant experiences, or consequences). 
Our analysis is no exception to this; although we identify constructs that are 
closely linked to greed in the eye of our participants, some of them are actually 
best seen as other (but related) constructs. For example, we find that envy is a 
central feature to greed. But they are obviously not the same experiences: a person 
can be greedy without being envious, or envious without being greedy (e.g., the 
malicious type envy mainly contains ill will towards the envied person, but no 
coveting; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). Although we cannot 
distinguish which central components of greed are core elements, concomitants, 
or consequences based on the prototype analysis itself, we formulate a working 
hypothesis based on a combination of the results of our prototype analysis and 





research should further establish this definition of greed and its relationship with 
other, related constructs.   
A working hypothesis of greed:  
Greed is the experience of desiring to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of 
never having enough. It is associated with goals of materialism and feelings of 
envy and it may lead to self-interested behavior and tunnel vision.  
Core elements  
We believe that the core of the experience of greed lies in the desire to acquire 
more and the dissatisfaction of never having enough. Participants indicated that 
acquiring as much as possible and as good as possible of any desirable thing, be 
it material or social, is one of the key determinants of greed. Central features 
related to this component are “acquisitiveness”, “striving for quantity”, “striving 
for quality”, and “desire”. Participants also mentioned that “never being satisfied” 
and “being ungrateful” were relevant to greed. This is in line with Levine’s (2000) 
idea of greed as a gap between acquiring or consuming a product and gaining 
satisfaction and confirms the idea that greedy people find themselves on a 
hedonic treadmill (Diener et al., 1999). Note that we consider two other (related) 
central concepts “stinginess” and “not generous” to be part of our definition as 
well, although more implicitly so. Our definition refers to the desire to acquire 
more, it is not just about acquiring things but about acquiring more than one 
currently has. To be able to acquire more than one currently has, it is of course 
also important to keep what one already has.  
The desire to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of never having enough as 
the two core components of greed is in line with dictionary definitions of greed, 
which focus on greed as being an insatiable desire for more. The two components 
also signal the inherent ambiguity of greed: where a desire to acquire is something 
that can typically be seen as a positive thing, never being satisfied with what you 







We believe that there are also central features of greed that can be seen more 
as concomitants than as core elements of greed itself. Experiences of greed are 
often accompanied by other, closely related experiences, and as a result it makes 
sense that these other experiences come easily to mind when people have to write 
down features of greed. One of these is the goal of materialism, exemplified by 
“materialism”, “money”, “wealth”, and “capitalism”. Materialism and greed are 
sometimes used interchangeably, but they are clearly not the same. Although in 
the scientific literature materialism is often defined as a desire to acquire material 
goods (e.g., Belk, 1984), official dictionary definitions see it more as an attitude 
than a motivational drive, and describe it for example as “the belief that having 
money and possessions is the most important thing in life” (Online Cambridge 
Learner’s Dictionary, 2013). This fits the view of Richins (2014) who sees 
materialism as the personal value that acquiring material goods is a central goal 
in life. To us this implies that materialism is the general mindset of people to 
value material goods, where greed is more the motivational force that makes 
people desire to keep wanting more (amongst which are material goods). For 
example, materialists place great value on status display and as a result desire 
products that signal status (Fournier & Richins, 1991). Greed on the other hand 
can also be experienced for things that do not signal status (Tickle, 2004). 
Furthermore, our prototype analysis shows that gluttony and lust (desires for 
experiences) are also seen as central components of greed, suggesting that greed 
is broader than the material domain.  
An emotion that was associated with greed is envy, which involves the feeling 
of lacking something that someone else has (Smith & Kim, 2007). The line 
between greed and envy may sometimes be blurry, but they are clearly distinct 
processes. The main difference is that envy is about the realization that someone 
else is better off than oneself, whereas greed is focused on one’s own insatiable 
desire for more (Maijala et al., 2000). Of course, feelings of envy could be a 
catalyst of greed (Kleinberg, 2008). The common denominator in both emotions 





situation, but the focus is different. Where greed focuses on getting more than 
one currently has, envy focuses on getting what other people have. 
Consequences 
Lastly, we think that besides core elements and concomitants there are also 
features that can be classified as consequences of greed. Based on our prototype 
analysis and the literature, we believe that there are two main consequences of 
the experiences of greed. A social consequence is self-interest, exemplified by 
“selfishness”, “egocentrism, “not caring about the consequences for others”, “not 
being generous”, “stinginess”, “manipulation”, and “immoral behavior”. The 
idea that self-interest is part of greed is consistent with Balot’s (2001) definition 
of greed as self-interest at the cost of others. However, we think self-interest is 
better seen as a consequence of greed, rather than a core of its experience. 
Through the desire to keep acquiring more, one likely focuses too much on 
oneself and too little on others. But selfishness is not greed itself, rather it follows 
from the acquisitiveness and the continuous desire for more. The insatiable desire 
for more may even cause people to behave in immoral ways. Greed has for 
example been related to corporate fraud (Smith, 2003), which has resulted in the 
downfall of large corporations such as Enron and Tyco (Wells, 2011). People also 
mentioned features that were related to superiority (for example “arrogance” and 
“power”). It is likely that because greed is related to superiority they also think 
they can behave more selfishly (cf. Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & 
Bushman, 2004).   
Tunnel vision is another consequence of greed. Greed can cause an obsession 
with an object of desire and can make everything else seem less important. This 
component might explain why greedy people sometimes act in ways that are 
irrational and detrimental for themselves. Focusing too much on one’s own 
immediate benefits may cause people to forget the consequences for society as a 
whole or for their own future situation. For example, greed has been found to be 
associated with higher debts (Lunt & Livingstone, 1991). Though some debts 
can involve wise investments (e.g., a mortgage for a house or a student loan to 





paid for consumer loans (e.g., when buying a new TV or laptop) does not exceed 
the benefits of buying the item now compared to buying the item when one has 
saved for this purchase. So, the excessive focus on acquiring more and more that 
is characteristic of greed may lead people to neglect both their own long-term 
interests (tunnel vision) but also those of others around them (self-interest). 
Furthermore, this prototype analysis revealed that greed is broader than 
material goods (Tickle, 2004). Greed is not only about having more money and 
goods, it also involves wanting to improve oneself and to be better. The two other 
sins of excess, “lust” and “gluttony”, were both seen as central to greed, so greed 
clearly involves much more than mere materialistic desires. It must of course be 
noted that most non-materialistic desires were rated as less central than material 
desires, so they do seem to be less important to greed than their more materialistic 
counterparts.  
Different perspectives on greed 
As was discussed in the introduction, there are different perspectives on the 
evaluation of greed. In the prototype analysis, we have found evidence for both 
positive and negative perspectives on greed, though the majority of greed 
components seem to have negative connotations. One explanation for this 
finding could be that greed is, on average, seen as much more negative than 
positive. However, an alternative explanation could have to do with the 
perspective that people take when thinking about greed. Other people’s greedy 
behavior is evaluated more negatively than one’s own greedy behavior (Wang et 
al., 2011). So, when people think of greed as the property of others when asked 
to describe greed they will tend to come up more with negative features.  
The difference in perspective taking relates to differences in evaluations of 
greed from economic and moral viewpoints. For a long time, economists have 
argued that people are rational agents that act self-interested to maximize their 
own profits (homo economicus). From this perspective, behaving greedy is thus 
good and rational. When people are not the victim of greed but the actor, or if 





opinion of greed. Indeed, several studies have investigated the effects of exposure 
to economic models (people with economic education vs. people without 
economic education) and have found that economists indeed tend to lie more 
(López-Pérez & Spiegelman, 2012), are less cooperative (Frank, Gilovich, & 
Regan, 1993), keep more money to themselves (Carter & Irons, 1991), and are 
more likely to free ride (Marwell & Ames, 1981). These are all types of behavior 
that are associated with being greedy. Whereas economics promotes taking the 
perspective of greed in the actor, negative, moral evaluations of greed often stem 
from taking the perspective of other people in the greedy actor’s surroundings. 
So, the difference in evaluations of greed may not be caused by an intrinsic 
disagreement on the moral nature of greed, but rather by a difference in the 
perspective that people take when evaluating greed (i.e., an actor or observer 
perspective). This is in line with findings of Wang et al. (2011) that found that 
people are more likely to condemn other people’s greed instead of their own. As 
such, exposure to economic models may cause people to become more positive 
towards greed compared to people who are not as familiar with these models.   
Future research  
Besides helping future research by formulating a novel working definition of 
greed, we see two plausible avenues for future research: the development of a 
greed scale that measures dispositional tendencies to experience greed and the 
study of the behavioral consequences of greed. First, the components that we 
identified are a good starting point to create a measure of how greedy individuals 
are. It is likely that individuals differ in their tendency to experience greed, so a 
logical next step in greed research would be to construct an instrument measuring 
individual differences in greed proneness. Such a dispositional greed scale would 
subsequently help to identify personality characteristics or demographics 
associated with greed. 
Another interesting possibility is to study the behavioral consequences of 
greed. We found that people associate greed with self-interest, envy, and 
materialism. It is likely that people who are self-interested, envious, and 





elements that were not explicitly mentioned in this research. Self-control and 
impulsiveness are very likely to play a role in greediness and these elements might 
be related to the irrational nature of greed. In addition, it would be interesting to 
further explore the phenomenological content of greed as an emotion (i.e., not a 
disposition). Experiential content analyses of the feelings, thoughts, action 
tendencies, and emotivations associated with an emotion have proven to be very 
useful for understanding the behavior that follows from an emotion (Zeelenberg, 
Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008).  
Concluding remarks  
In this research we used layperson’s conceptualizations to reveal the prototype 
of greed. This prototype research has identified a set of components that can be 
used to explain why and when people are greedy and how this affects behavior. 
We found that the desire to acquire more and dissatisfaction of never having 
enough are the two most important components of greed. Greed is associated 
with materialism and envy and may lead to self-interested behavior and tunnel 













Greed is an important motive: it is seen as both productive (a source of ambition; 
the motor of the economy) and destructive (undermining social relationships; the 
cause of the late 2000s financial crisis). However, relatively little is known about 
what greed is and does. This article reports on five studies that develop and test 
the 7-item Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS). Study 3.1 (including four separate 
samples from two different countries, total N = 6092) provides evidence for the 
construct and discriminant validity of the DGS in terms of positive correlations 
with maximization, self-interest, envy, materialism, and impulsiveness, and 
negative correlations with self-control and life satisfaction. Study 3.2 (N = 290) 
presents further evidence for discriminant validity, finding that the DGS predicts 
greedy behavioral tendencies over and above materialism. Furthermore, the DGS 
predicts economic behavior: greedy people allocate more money to themselves in 
dictator games (Study 3.3, N = 300) and ultimatum games (Study 3.4, N = 603), 
and take more in a resource dilemma (Study 3.5, N = 305). These findings shed 
light on what greed is and does, how people differ in greed, and how greed can 
be measured. In addition, they show the importance of greed in economic 
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Most people readily recognize instances of greed. For example, greedy people 
are always first in line for food and drinks at a party, repeatedly complain about 
their salaries (even after getting a pay-raise), and continuously buy more stuff 
they do not need. Common to such observations is that greedy people seem to 
be dissatisfied with their current state of affairs and that for them enough never 
seems to be enough. On the other hand, in our everyday lives we also encounter 
many people who seem anything but greedy. Such people are satisfied with what 
they have and who they are. They know when to be happy and to stop striving 
for more. In this chapter, we present the development of an instrument that 
captures such individual differences in greediness and that predicts greed-induced 
behaviors.  
We have recently started investigating the psychology of greed, to better 
understand what it is and what it does (Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, & 
Van de Ven, 2015a). Based on this initial research, we constructed a working 
definition of greed as “the tendency to always want more and never being satisfied 
with what one currently has”. We observed that there appears to be a shared 
intuition that some people are greedier than others, and that this disposition is 
considered to be rather stable. Should such individual differences in greed exist, 
then they should also manifest themselves in greedy behavior. This would be 
particularly interesting because greed is an important construct in economic 
theory and other models of behavior as we explain later. Until now, however, 
there has been only very little empirical research on greed. Together, these 
observations led to the research that we present here, on the development and 
test of a scale that captures individual differences in greed.  
Below, we briefly review what greed is and how it is thought to influence 
behavior. More specifically, we look at historical perspectives on greed in 
philosophy, religion, and economics. Next, we propose a psychological theory of 
greed that is grounded in the idea that greed is dispositional, and that it differs 
from other, related, dispositions. We then turn to the empirical part, where we 
develop the Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS), and examine its reliability, its 





address how differences in the tendency to be greedy relate to other dispositions, 
as well as to behavioral phenomena in everyday life. 
A brief history of greed 
Greed has been with us since the beginning of time, and through the ages, 
scholars have written extensively about the topic (Goldberg, 1994; Robertson, 
2001). Here, we sketch only a limited account of these extensive attempts to 
understand greed, namely those parts relevant for the psychology of greed. We 
refer the reader to Wang and Murnighan (2011), Sutherland (2014), and Oka 
and Kuijt (2014), for more extensive overviews. Although much has been written 
about greed, very little of the work is empirical. Through our research, we hope 
to start filling this gap. 
Greed has been a topic of discussion for as long as the acquisition of wealth 
and power exists. From the earliest ideas about greed, it already becomes apparent 
that greed can be seen as good and as bad, as a virtue and as a vice (see also, 
Sutherland, 2014). Thucydides (460 – 395 BCE) argued that greed is not 
necessarily negative, because it motivates progress (Zagorin, 2009), Plato (427 – 
347 BCE) wrote how greed is the cause of war, civil conflict, and immorality and 
how it is part of human nature (Balot, 2001), and Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE) 
argued that greed is confusion between what we actually need and what we ideally 
want (see Wang & Murnighan, 2011). Later, Hume (1739/2001) argued that 
greed is as a double-edged sword: on the one hand it motivates people to perform 
better, but on the other hand it has destructive consequences for society. Greed 
has thus been related to acquisition of wealth, and is seen as productive on the 
one hand, and as harmful to relationships on the other hand.  
Greed is discussed and condemned in virtually all world religions. In 
Christianity, greed is one of the seven deadly sins. Some even argue that it is the 
matriarch of all sins, with the other sins stemming from greed (Tickle, 2004). 
However, this negative stance towards greed does not mean that Christianity 
condemned the acquisition of wealth. In the Old Testament, the wealth of 





for more wealth is seen as a sin (Baker, 2006). Especially the teachings of Saint 
Paul shifted the idea of greed as something positive and productive, to greed as a 
sin or vice. Saint Paul saw avarice (“greed”) as the “root of all evil”. He also made 
the interesting distinction between philargyria, which is the love for money, and 
pleonexia, which is a general tendency to want more of everything (Newhauser, 
2000; see also Tickle, 2004). This is consistent with our recent findings that greed 
applies not only to a desire for money, but to a general desire for more (Seuntjens 
et al., 2015a). This is also consistent with the ideas of Calvin. He believed that 
life is framed to the will of God, and if one’s work is done honest, one should be 
able to enjoy the perks associated with it. If rich people use their wealth and invest 
in society and others, this benefits the society as a whole. Calvin thus does not 
necessarily say that greed is good, but he argues that the desire to acquire wealth 
can also have positive outcomes for society (Dommen, 2011; Zinbarg, 2001).   
Religions generally have a negative evaluation of greed. In Buddhism, greed 
is one of the three poisons creating bad karma (Nath, 1998). In Hinduism, greed 
is an obstruction to spiritual development (Sivaraman, 1989). According to 
Rafiabadi (2003), Islam as a religion is highly dependent on rewards from 
commercial activities and thus not against the accumulation of wealth. The 
solution for greed in Islam is making generosity and charity obligatory for 
righteous Muslims (Oka & Kuijt, 2014). Judaism condemns greed because 
taking more than one’s own “share robs other people of their opportunity to get 
their due” (Bloch, 1984, p. 154). The various religions thus generally condemn 
greed because it is representative of a bad personality, and because greedy 
behavior can be harmful to others.  
This last element—the potential conflict between personal wealth 
accumulation and the outcomes of others—was central in Adam Smith’s 
thinking (1776/1994) that formed the basis of capitalism and current economic 
theorizing. Smith did worry that wealth accumulation in an unlimited form 
could lead to the rich having advantages and power over the poor, but he also 
argued that self-interested wealth accumulation is an important force behind 





butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard 
to their own interest” (Smith, 1776/1994, p. 15). Classical economic theory 
assumes that people should maximize their own outcomes and that this leads to 
more growth and development that benefits the prosperity of society as a whole. 
This assumption is referred to as the axiom of greed (or axiom of maximization). 
It holds that “If A contains more of one good than B, and at least as much as B 
of all other goods, A will be preferred over B” (Lea, Tarpy, & Webley, 1987, p. 
109). According to the axiom, people should always want more of a desirable 
good, and thus prefer the option that delivers on this desire.  
The idea in economics is that greed is a driving force for economic growth 
and development (Greenfeld, 2001), and that society can benefit from greedy 
individuals. If people have a desire to maximize their outcomes, and hence be 
greedy, this ultimately leads to individuals engaging in activities that benefit 
society as a whole (Oka & Kuijt, 2014). Greed has been associated with positive 
economic outcomes such as more employment, wealth, and well-being 
(Melleuish, 2009). The idea of greed as a driving force is also present in the 
evolutionary perspective on greed. It has been argued that greed promotes self-
preservation, and that people living in environments that exhibit scarcity of 
resources have an evolutionary advantage when feeling the tendency to gain and 
hoard (Cassill & Watkins, 2005; Robertson, 2001). However, greed can also have 
adverse economic consequences. Greed has been related to consumer debts 
(Livingstone & Lunt, 1992) and to lower stockholder returns (Haynes, 
Campbell, & Hitt, 2014). Furthermore, the news often reports on cases where 
greed is linked to financial scandals and bankruptcy cases (Zandi, 2008). 
Brummer (2014) links greed explicitly to the bad banking practices that led to 
the late 2000s financial crisis. Corporate fraud cases such as the Bernie Madoff 
scandal and Enron scandal are all partly ascribed to the greed of its top executives. 
According to Levine (2005), greed causes people to only focus on their own 
fulfillment, ignoring norms and values. This might also explain why greed is 
thought to be related to other types of negative behavior, such as deception 
(Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009), theft (Caudil, 1988), fraud 





In sum, greed has been central in classical philosophy, religious thinking, and 
economic theorizing. Claims have been made about the productive side of greed, 
but also about its potential to harm interpersonal relations. Greed can thus be 
good (constructive) and bad (destructive). In this light, it is remarkable that 
psychologists have paid only little attention to greed. If they write about greed, it 
is usually only in post-hoc explanations of behavior. Greed has not yet been the 
subject of theorizing and thorough empirical investigation. According to Wang 
and Murnighan (2011), one of the reasons for the lack of empirical research on 
greed, is the difficulty people have with defining greed. 
Towards a theory of greed 
Let us start by addressing what we do know about the psychology of greed. 
We recently performed a prototype analysis of greed, in order to provide a better 
conceptualization of how people define this motivational state (Seuntjens et al., 
2015a). Five studies revealed that the core experience of greed consists of both a 
desire to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of never having enough. Put 
differently, greed is an insatiable hunger for more. Specifically, we asked 
participants to write down what they thought greed was. Four independent 
coders categorized these descriptions into features of greed. Follow up studies 
showed these features could be divided into central (core components) and 
peripheral (related, but less important) features of greed. Central to greed is to 
always want more and to never be satisfied. Although greed often involves a 
hunger for money and material goods (think of Scrooge McDuck), the prototype 
analysis further revealed that greed is broader than this. Greed is also experienced 
for non-material desires. For example, greed can also involve desires such as sex, 
food, power, and status. This is in line with the ideas of Saint Paul that we 
described earlier. 
In addition, the prototype analysis provided valuable information about how 
greed is related to other constructs. We found that people associated greed most 
clearly with being self-interested, looking for better opportunities 
(“maximizing”), feeling envious, and being materialistic. We have reasons to 





choices over and above these related motives. Below we explain what these 
reasons are, and why developing a scale assessing dispositional greed can further 
our understanding of individual differences in (economic) behavior. 
Interestingly, scales to measure individual differences have been developed for all 
four other motives (Maximization: Nenkov, Morrin, Ward, Schwartz, & 
Hulland, 2008; Self-interest: Van Lange, Otten, de Bruin, & Joireman, 1997; 
Envy: Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999; Materialism: Richins, 2004). 
These scales have been applied successfully to a wide range of behaviors. In the 
empirical part of our article, we will relate our newly developed DGS to these 
scales (and others). In that way we investigate greed’s nomological network and 
establish discriminant validity. Let us first compare greed to these four other 
motives on the basis of theory. 
Greed is conceptually most clearly related to maximization, which is apparent 
from the fact that the assumption of maximization is sometimes referred to as the 
axiom of greed. Rational economic man, in the words of Simon (1955, p. 99), is 
assumed to have “a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the 
alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these will permit 
him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale”. According to 
Simon, maximization is not realizable in everyday life because of people’s limited 
cognitive capacities and the complex information in the environment. Hence, 
people are often motivated to satisfice instead of maximize. That is, they do not 
strive for the optimal outcome, but for something that is good enough (i.e., just 
above the minimal acceptable threshold). Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, 
Lyubomirsky, White, and Lehman (2002) took the ideas of Simon and developed 
a scale that assesses individual differences in the extent to which people are 
motivated to maximize or rather satisfice (see also, Nenkov et al., 2008). For 
maximizers, the ultimate goal is to make the best decision possible. Greedy people 
just want more. Wanting more does not necessarily involve a rational balancing 
of costs and benefits. A greedy person might go into debt to buy desired products 
(Livingstone & Lunt, 1992), which only under certain circumstances can be seen 





the best outcome, whereas greed leads just to the desire to acquire more 
(Seuntjens et al., 2015a).  
Greed is also clearly related to self-interest. Greedy people want more for 
themselves. The assumption of self-interest in economic theory refers to the fact 
that rational actors are believed to care only about their own outcomes and be 
indifferent with respect to the outcomes of others (e.g., Miller, 1999). However, 
people often do care about the outcomes of others (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). They may want others to have similar 
outcomes to themselves and strive for equality, or they prefer to have more than 
others and show a competitive attitude. There are stable individual differences in 
how self-interested people are and how much they care about the outcomes of 
others. These differences have been studied under the name of Social Value 
Orientation (SVO; Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011; Van Lange et al., 
1997). Some people have argued that greed and self-interest are the same (Balot, 
2001), while others have argued that they are different (Wang & Murnighan, 
2011). We share the latter viewpoint and see greed as different from self-interest. 
Where self-interest is rational, greed certainly does not seem to be a consistently 
rational drive.  
Greed is one of the seven deadly sins, and so is envy. Envy is the emotion that 
arises when someone else is better off than oneself (e.g., Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, 
& Pieters, 2009) Individual differences in greed can be reliably measured (Smith 
et al., 1999). Greed and envy are similar in the way that they both refer to feelings 
of not being happy with the current state of affairs. However, they differ in their 
focus. People who are envious are not satisfied because they compare their own 
situation to that of others who are better off. In contrast, people who are greedy 
are not satisfied because they compare their own situation to an imaginary 
situation of having more. In addition, it requires two people for envy to occur 
(one person being envious, and the other being envied), whereas greed only 
requires one person. Envy is thus inherently more social in the sense that it stems 
from social comparison processes (wanting what others have), while greed is more 





Nikkonen, 2000). Still, both greed and envy are related to being dissatisfied and 
wanting more. We will examine how greed and envy are related, and also their 
separate relations with social comparison orientation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
For example, previous research has found that dispositional envy is positively 
correlated with individual differences in social comparison (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 
2007). We believe that such a relationship for greed and social comparison will 
be absent.  
Finally, our prototype analysis related greed to materialism. Materialism refers 
to the importance that people attach to worldly possessions (Belk, 1984; Pieters, 
2013). For people who are materialistic, the acquisition of goods plays a central 
role in their life, and they believe that they need material goods to be happy and 
signal their success (Richins & Dawson, 1992). People differ in the extent to 
which they are materialistic; whereas some people see the acquisition of goods as 
extremely important, others do not care as much. Although greed and 
materialism are related, they are not the same. Greed is the broader concept and 
does not only apply to material goods (Tickle, 2004). One can also be greedy for 
non-materialistic things such as food, sex, power, or success (Seuntjens et al., 
2015a).  
Thus, we propose that greed is a distinct motive that is related to, but different 
from, maximization, self-interest, envy, and materialism. We will examine this 
proposition empirically and relate greed to a selection of other relevant constructs 
that have shown stable individual differences. For example, we believe that greed 
should be related to people’s dispositions to spend money or save money. A scale 
that measures individual differences in the extent to which people are spend 
thrifty or miserly is the tightwads-spendthrifts scale (Rick, Cryder, & 
Loewenstein, 2008). We believe that people scoring high on dispositional greed 
spend their money more easily and should thus be more represented on the 
spendthrift end of the scale.  
Greed should also be related to impulsiveness and self-control. When people 
have willpower they can resist the urge to act upon their impulses. However, 





2002). Impulsiveness is thus the outcome of a conflict between desires and 
willpower (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). As greed is characterized by strong 
desires, it is likely that these desires beat willpower and lead to more 
impulsiveness, more temporal discounting, and less self-control. In addition, 
greed is often associated with increased risk taking and recklessness. For example, 
in the popular press it is often argued that one of the reasons for the financial 
crisis is that greedy bankers took too many unnecessary risks (Brummer, 2014; 
Papatheodorou, Rosselló, & Xiao, 2010). Therefore, dispositional greed should 
be related to less risk aversion (Holt & Laury, 2002).  
Furthermore, our prototype analysis revealed that people often see greed as an 
antisocial trait (Seuntjens et al., 2015a); greedy people often do not care about 
the consequences of their behavior for others. If this is the case, dispositional 
greed should be positively related to antisocial behavior, such as psychopathy 
(Williams, Nathanson, & Paulhus, 2003) and psychological entitlement 
(Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004), and negatively related 
to prosocial behavior such as empathy and perspective taking (Davis, 1980). 
Lastly, because greedy people are never satisfied with their current state of 
affairs, it is likely that this affects their well-being in a negative way. This should 
also influence how happy they are with themselves (self-esteem: Rosenberg, 
1965) and their satisfaction with life in general (Pavot & Diener, 1993). All these 
suggested associations are examined in Study 3.1.  
Overview of the current research 
The current chapter took the discussed theoretical insights into the 
psychology of greed as a starting point to construct a valid and reliable scale that 
measures people’s dispositional tendency to be greedy. We adopted the following 
strategy in developing the DGS. In Study 3.1, we developed a 7-item scale and 
determined its factorial structure, reliability, internal consistency, temporal 
stability, and construct validity. We used four different samples from the USA 
and the Netherlands, with a total of more than 6000 participants. Next, in Study 





materialism, because Study 3.1 found that materialism appeared empirically most 
related to greed. Then, we related dispositional greed to a variety of behavioral 
decisions. We examined how dispositional greed influences choice in a dictator 
game (Study 3.3) and in an ultimatum game (Study 3.4). In Study 3.5, we related 
the DGS to harvesting behavior in a forest management game (a resource 
dilemma). Overharvesting in such a game represents the Tragedy of the 




Four samples completed the Dispositional Greed Scale and a number of other 
questionnaires (total N = 6092). The first sample completed the initial 20 items 
that we developed for the DGS. Based on Principal Components Analysis that 
we describe below, we came to the final 7-item version of the DGS (see Tables 
3.1 and 3.2). All other samples completed this 7-item scale.  
Sample 3.1.1 
 Participants were first year Tilburg University psychology students (autumn 
2011) who filled out an on-line questionnaire at home, in return for course credit 
(N = 167, 82.0%, female, 18.0% male, Mage = 19.25, SD = 3.16). They did this 
during an annual testing session, called the “test week”. Our main aims with the 
first sample were to create a scale, to test its internal consistency and temporal 
stability, and to investigate its discriminant and construct validity. Participants 
completed a first questionnaire with 20 items that were constructed to capture as 
many individual differences in greediness as possible (see Appendix 3.1). All items 
were based on our prototype analysis of greed (Seuntjens et al., 2015a), which 
revealed that “greed is the experience of desiring to acquire more and the 
dissatisfaction of never having enough” (p. 14). Responses were measured on a 
5-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. With 
the 7-item DGS, we also tested temporal stability with a subsample of 59 
participants who completed the DGS again, 20 to 50 days after the first 





relationship of greed with other measures that were administered during the “test 
week”. Table 3.3 presents these measures. 
Sample 3.1.2 
Participants were first year Tilburg University psychology students (autumn 
2012) who filled out the on-line questionnaire in the lab in return for course 
credit (N = 236, 69.9%, female, 19.9% male, 10.2% not specified, Mage = 19.55, 
SD = 2.15). This sample was also administered during the annual “test week” 
and DGS scores were related to a variety of other measures to test the 
discriminant and construct validity of the scale. For an overview of these 
measures, see Table 3.3. The main goal of the second sample was to replicate the 
factor structure of Sample 3.1.1 and to further test the reliability, temporal 
stability, and construct validity of the scale. Participants in this sample completed 
the 7-item DGS. Again, after two to three weeks, a subsample (N = 101) 
completed the DGS a second time to investigate the temporal stability of the 
scale.  
Sample 3.1.3  
Participants were U.S. based MTurk-workers who received $0.35 in return 
for their participation (N = 345, 46.4% female, 53.6% male, Mage = 33.26, SD = 
11.85). The main aim of Sample 3.1.3 was to replicate the findings of Samples 
3.1.1 and 3.1.2 using a U.S. sample. We further investigated validity by relating 
the scale to other measures (see Table 3.3).  
Sample 3.1.4 
Participants were members of the LISS panel,12 a representative panel of the 
Dutch population (N = 5344, 54.0% female, 46.0% male, Mage = 50.50, SD = 
17.63). We wanted to investigate how greed is related to a variety of demographic 
variables (e.g., age, gender, income, education) in a representative sample of the 
Dutch population. We further established validity by relating dispositional greed 
to other measures (see Table 3.3).   
                                                   






Our plan for the analyses was as follows. We started with an exploratory 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) on the 20 items in the first sample, which 
resulted in the 7-item DGS. The latter three samples were used to confirm that 
the seven items that we retained in Sample 1 had the same factor structure. We 
used all four samples to assess the reliability and internal consistency of the scale. 
Samples 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 filled out the DGS at two points in time, which enabled 
us to assess temporal stability. All four samples filled out measures for other 
constructs, allowing us to examine the discriminant and construct validity of the 
scale. In addition, we had information about several demographic variables in 
Sample 3.1.4 providing us the opportunity to investigate how demographic 
variables such as age, gender, and income predicted dispositional greed.  
Principal Components Analysis 
 We conducted an exploratory PCA on the answers to the initial 20 items in 
Sample 3.1.1. The PCA suggested a solution with either one or three components 
(component 1: Eigenvalue = 4.95 with 24.72% variance explained; component 
2: Eigenvalue = 2.04; 10.21%, component 3: Eigenvalue = 1.83; 9.15%). 
Inspection of the pattern matrix (see Appendix) shows that eight items were 
uniquely loading on the first factor. There were four items that were uniquely 
loading on the second factor, three items uniquely loading on the third factor, 
and four items loading on more than one factor (loadings > .30).  
Inspection of the scree plot and the fact that the first component consisted of 
the items most related to the desire to acquire more and never being satisfied 
(which we consider to be the core of greed), led us to select the items that loaded 
high on the first component. From the original eight items we left out the one 
item that was reverse coded and scored lowest on this factor, which resulted in 
the selection of seven items. A PCA on these seven items resulted in a 
unidimensional solution with an eigenvalue of 3.41 that explained 48.71% of the 
variance. The reliability of this scale was good (α = .82). Samples 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 





the scale proved to be reliable (α ranged from .82 to .90) and retained the same 
factor structure (see Table 3.1).  
Internal consistency and temporal stability 
Corrected item-total correlations were computed to investigate the internal 
consistency of the scale (see Table 3.2). Across all four samples, these ranged 
between .43 and .78, which indicates that all items have acceptable internal 
consistency (ITC > .30; see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  
The temporal stability of the scale was assessed in Samples 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, by 
computing correlations between scores at Time 1 and Time 2. The correlation 
between Time 1 and Time 2 was r = .66 in the first sample, a satisfactory 
reliability.13 In this sample the situation of administration was quite different 
(once at home and once in the university lab), which might have negatively 
influenced test-retest reliability. In Sample 3.1.2 the circumstances were more 
similar, as both measurements were administered in the same lab. For this sample 
we found a correlation of r = .77 between Time 1 and Time 2.14  
Discriminant and construct validity 
To investigate if dispositional greed is different from maximization, self-
interest (measured with Social Value Orientation), envy, and materialism we 
conducted a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). We tested whether a 
unidimensional model (where one factor would represent greed and the related 
construct) fitted the data better than a two-factor model (where greed and the 
other construct were represented by separate factors). If dispositional greed is 
different from the related constructs, the two-factor model would result in a 
better fit than a unidimensional model.  
                                                   
13 When we controlled for the number of days between administration of the scale at Time 1 and 
Time 2 (ranging from 20 to 50 days) the temporal stability was .66. 
14 When we controlled for the number of days between administration of the scale at Time 1 and 







Table 3.1. The seven items of the Dispositional Greed Scale, including factor loadings and reliability in Study 3.1. 
Note. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. Responses were 
measured on 5-point Likert-scales ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree 
  
  
  Samples 
  3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 
  N = 167 N = 236 N = 345 N = 5344 
  Dutch Dutch American Dutch 
 Items Students Students MTurk Representative 
1 I always want more. .80 .69 .85 .79 
2 Actually, I’m kind of greedy. .65 .73 .80 .79 
3 One can never have too much money. .63 .56 .65 .63 
4 As soon as I have acquired something I start to think about the next thing I 
want. 
.62 .76 .82 .83 
5 It doesn’t matter how much I have. I’m never completely satisfied. .71 .71 .85 .79 
6 My life motto is ‘more is better’. .78 .72 .84 .78 
7 I can’t imagine having too many things. .67 .74 .72 .82 
Eigenvalue 3.41 3.46 4.39 4.22 
Explained variance 48.71% 49.44% 62.72% 60.33% 





 Table 3.2. Means, standard deviations, and corrected item-total correlations of the items of the Dispositional Greed Scale in Study 3.1. 
Note. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. Responses were 




   Samples 
  3.1.1 
N = 167 
3.1.2 
N = 236 
3.1.3 
N = 345 
3.1.4 
N = 5344 
 Item M SD ITC M SD ITC M SD ITC M SD ITC 
1 I always want more. 2.35 0.98 .68 2.90 1.09 .56 3.03 1.11 .77 2.29 1.05 .71 
2 Actually, I’m kind of greedy. 2.92 1.02 .52 2.67 1.04 .61 2.62 1.16 .71 2.06 0.99 .70 
3 One can never have too much money. 3.28 1.14 .49 3.15 1.17 .43 3.30 1.26 .55 2.85 1.12 .53 
4 As soon as I have acquired something I 
start to think about the next thing I 
want. 
2.66 1.11 .49 2.39 1.07 .63 2.76 1.20 .73 1.90 0.95 .74 
5 It doesn’t matter how much I have. I’m 
never completely satisfied. 
1.98 1.04 .57 1.89 0.87 .57 2.56 1.18 .77 1.63 0.82 .69 
6 My life motto is ‘more is better’. 2.17 0.83 .66 1.89 0.84 .58 2.41 1.13 .78 1.72 0.86 .68 
7 I can’t imagine having too many things. 2.31 0.96 .53 2.14 0.98 .62 2.71 1.28 .62 1.63 0.82 .72 





Maximization. Maximization and greed were measured in Samples 3.1.1, 
3.1.2, and 3.1.3. In all three samples, the CFAs revealed that the two constructs 
were distinct. In all samples, the two-factor model fit better (had a significantly 
lower χ2) than a unidimensional scale, ∆χ2(1) ≥ 21.74, ps < .001.  
Self-interest. Self-interest was measured in Samples 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. In both 
samples, the two-factor model fit better than a unidimensional scale, ∆χ2(1) ≥ 
294.96, ps < .001. CFA for both samples indicated that the measure of greed is 
different from the measure of self-interest. 
Envy. Envy was measured in Samples 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. In both samples, the 
two-factor model fit better than a unidimensional scale, ∆χ2(1) ≥ 218.24, ps < 
.001. CFA for both samples indicated that the measure of greed is different from 
the measure of envy. 
Materialism. Materialism was measured in all four samples. In all samples, the 
two-factor model fit better than a unidimensional scale, ∆χ2(1) ≥ 33.58, ps < 
.001). CFA for all four samples indicated that the measure of greed is different 
from the measure of materialism. 
The results of the CFAs provide first empirical evidence for the discriminant 
validity of greed. In the next section we report about the construct validity of 
greed and further test the discriminant validity of greed. A measure has good 
construct validity if it correlates with other constructs that one would expect 
based on the theory, and if it has no relationship with constructs that one would 
theoretically not expect it to be related to. The further examination of the 
discriminant validity investigated how greed correlated differently with the other 
constructs compared to maximization, self-interest, envy, and materialism. To 
accomplish these goals, we correlated the DGS to a variety of other measures 
(Table 3.3). 
Although greed is different from maximization, self-interest, envy, and 
materialism (as was found in CFA), we expected that greed would correlate 





scoring high on greed are more likely to maximize, to be self-interested, to feel 
envious, and to be materialistic. 
Relations with other relevant constructs 
 Here we discuss the findings depicted in Table 3.3 concerning the relation 
of dispositional greed with a large number of constructs that are theoretically 
relevant. We expected dispositional greed to be associated with people’s spending 
patterns. Some people easily spend money, whereas others are thrifty and 
experience pain when they have to spend (Rick et al., 2008). We expected and 
found that greedy individuals spend their money more easily, and more often are 
spendthrifts compared to tightwads.  
We also included several measures related to impulsiveness, because we 
expected greedy individuals to be more impulsive. We found a negative 
correlation between dispositional greed and self-control and positive correlations 
between dispositional greed and impulsiveness and buying impulsiveness. This 
shows that greedy individuals are in general also more impulsive. Interestingly, 
there was no relationship between greed and temporal preferences (accepting 
higher future outcomes over lower current ones). This is strange as impulsiveness 
is a typical explanation of temporal preferences (Loewenstein & Elster, 1992). 
To further differentiate between greed and maximization, we looked at the 
partial correlations of these constructs with (buying) impulsiveness and self-
control. A difference between greed and maximization is that maximizers want 
to choose the best possible outcome, whereas greedy people just want more. This 
means that, whereas greed should correlate positively with (buying) 
impulsiveness, maximization should correlate negatively or not at all with 
impulsiveness. We found that if we controlled for dispositional greed, 
maximization was not associated with these constructs (rs < .10, ps > .135). 
Importantly, when we controlled for maximization, we still found significant 






Table 3.3. Correlations of the Dispositional Greed Scale with other measures for Samples 3.1.1 to 3.1.4 in Study 3.1. 
  Samples 
Construct α 3.1.1 
N = 167 
3.1.2 
N = 236 
3.1.3 
N = 345 
3.1.4 
N = 5344 
Maximization Scale (Nenkov et al., 2008) .43; .45; .55 .29*** .25*** .35***  
Social Value Orientation (Van Lange et al., 1997)1 .73; .69 .21** .17**   
Dispositional Envy Scale (Smith et al., 1999) .84; .80 .34*** .33**   
Material Values Scale (Richins & Dawson, 1992; Richins, 2004)2 .71; .78; .88; .82 .56*** .64*** .72*** .69*** 
Tightwads-spendthrifts Scale (Rick, Cryder, & Loewenstein, 2008)3 .80   .36***  
Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) .74; .71 -.26** -.21**   
Impulsiveness7 (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985)4 .85; .86 .24**  .32***  
Buying Impulsiveness Scale (Rook & Fisher, 1995) .95   .46***  
Temporal preferences (Mahajan & Tarozzi, 2011)5   -.09   
Risk aversion (Holt & Laury, 2002)   .04   
Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell et al., 2004) .76 .33***    
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Williams et al., 2003) .89; .90 .32*** .23**   
Perspective taking - (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980) .78 -.33***    
Emphatic Concern - (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980) .66 -.21**    
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) .89; .89  -.21**  -.23*** 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (Pavot & Diener, 1993) .79; .89  -.18**  -.11*** 
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967) .84  .09   
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999) 





 Social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) .52    -.24*** 
Extraversion (TIPI: Gosling et al., 2003; IPIP: Goldberg, 1992)6 .87 -.03 .02  -.03 
Agreeableness (TIPI: Gosling et al., 2003; IPIP: Goldberg, 1992) .78 -.11 -.13*  -.24*** 
Conscientiousness (TIPI: Gosling et al., 2003; IPIP: Goldberg, 
1992) 
.77 -.12 -.10  -.22*** 
Emotional Stability (TIPI: Gosling et al., 2003: IPIP; Goldberg, 
1992) 
.89 -.17* -.14*  -.27*** 
Openness (TIPI: Gosling et al., 2003; IPIP: Goldberg, 1992) .76 -.22** -.10  -.02 
Note. * p <.05; ** p <.01; ***p <.001. Correlations are only reported if the measure was in the sample.  
1 This measure consists of a sum score of the proself choices, with a higher score reflecting more proself choices. In Sample 3.1.2 we also measured 
social value orientation with the Social Value Orientation Slider (Murphy et al., 2011). The correlation between the two SVO measures was .53 (p < 
.001), and the correlation between the SVO slider and dispositional greed was .12 (p = .07). 
2 In Sample 3.1.1 we used nine items that loaded highest on the three components of materialism in the original paper; in the other samples we used 
the short version of the scale by Richins (2004).  
3 Higher scores reflect more spendthrift behavior. 
4 We used the nine items of the scale that loaded highest in the original paper. 
5 We used the first four choices used in the original paper. Participants made four decisions between €100 in one month and €100 (or €120, or €140, 
or €160) in four months. The measure consists of a sum score of the times the participant chose the option to wait for the higher amount. A higher 
score reflects more patience. 
6 In Samples 3.1 and 3.2 we measured the Big Five with the Ten Item Personality Inventory. In Sample 3.4 the Big Five was measured with the 
International Personality Item Pool. We only report the alphas of the IPIP. We do not report the alphas for the five dimensions of the TIPI, as the 






Unexpectedly, we did not find a relationship between dispositional greed and 
risk taking. This is surprising because greed is often seen as an important factor 
for the risky behavior of bankers that ultimately led to the financial crisis. We 
return to these unexpected findings in the General Discussion. 
Because greed is often related to interpersonal harm and antisocial behavior, 
we investigated the relationship between greed and several relevant measures. We 
found that dispositional greed is associated with more psychopathy, psychological 
entitlement, and with less empathy and less concern for others. 
 One of the characteristics of greed is dissatisfaction with one’s current 
position. Hence, we expected that greedy individuals would score lower on 
measures related to well-being. Greed correlated negatively with self-esteem and 
life satisfaction, but we did not find a relationship between greed and depression.  
We expected that social comparison would be related to envy, but not to 
greed. In Sample 3.1.1, we included all three measures and found a significant 
relation between envy and social comparison (r = .34, p < .001), but no relation 
between greed and social comparison. Unexpectedly, we did find a significant 
correlation between greed and social comparison in Sample 3.1.3.  
Lastly, there were also measures concerning general dispositions included in 
our dataset that had been added by other researchers for purposes other than our 
study. In Samples 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 the TIPI (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) 
was included to measure the Big Five, and in Sample 3.1.4 the IPIP (Goldberg, 
1992) was included to do so. We found that in all three samples dispositional 
greed was associated with less emotional stability, and in two out of the three 
samples with a lesser agreeableness. Furthermore, in Sample 3.1.1 we found that 
dispositional greed was associated with less openness/intellect, and in our large 
Sample 3.1.4 we found that greed was associated with lower conscientiousness. 
We did not find a relationship between greed and extraversion.  
  
 




Sample 3.1.4: Demographics, desirability and financial behavior 
The fact that the participants in our largest sample were members of the 
representative LISS panel allows for a number of additional analyses. We 
conducted a two-step multiple linear regression analysis to investigate what 
demographics were related to dispositional greed. In the first step we entered age 
and gender. In the second step we added income, education, political orientation, 
and religiousness. The results of these analyses can be found in Table 3.4. 
Younger people, males, people with a lower level of education, and people with 
a right-wing political orientation tended to be greedier. Income and religiosity 
did not relate to dispositional greed. 
Sample 3.1.4 also allowed us to relate dispositional greed to the tendency to 
give social desirable answers, as this data was available in the panel. We found 
that people that have a tendency to give desirable answers score lower on greed. 
This makes sense, as greed is an undesirable trait. The correlation was r = -.24, p 
< .001, which means that social desirability explains about 6% of the variance in 
the DGS. 
 
Table 3.4. Linear regression analyses of demographics on dispositional greed in Sample 
3.1.4 of Study 3.1. 
  
Variable B s.e. β t p 
Step 1      
 Age -0.02 .00 -.37 -24.09 < .001 
 Gender (0 = female; 1 = male) 0.18 .02 .13 8.33 < .001 
Step 2      
 Income (net income per month in €’s) 0.00 .00 -.00 -0.11 .913 
 Education (1 = elementary school; 6 = 
university) 
-0.02 .01 -.05 -3.25 .001 
 Political orientation (0 = left; 10 = right) 0.03 .01 .10 6.76 < .001 






As greed is often felt in the financial domain, we wanted to investigate how 
greed affects people’s financial situation. Sample 3.1.4 gave us the opportunity to 
test how dispositional greed was related to their (perceived) financial situation. 
We expected and found that greedy individuals would be less satisfied with their 
financial situation, r = -.17, p < .001. In addition we found that they also 
indicated more often that they had problems with making ends meet, r = .07, p 
< .001.  
Discussion 
Using four samples, and over 6000 participants, we developed a reliable, valid, 
and temporally stable 7-item scale to measure individual differences in greed. As 
expected, we found weak to moderate correlations between dispositional greed 
and the tendencies to be self-interested (SVO), to maximize, and to be envious, 
when we investigated the discriminant and construct validity of our scale. More 
remarkably were the high correlations between the DGS and MVS; we found 
correlations between .56 and .72, indicating that they share between 31% and 
51% of the variance. Although we expected the two to be related, we did not 
expect the correlations to be this high. Whereas our DGS measures the general 
tendency to have insatiable desires to acquire more (Seuntjens et al., 2015a), 
materialism is defined as “the importance people attach to worldly possessions” 
(Belk, 1985, p. 265). Materialism should thus only be related to the specific 
desire to acquire more material possessions. The greed motive is broader and 
should predict other behaviors as well. In order to test this idea, and to further 
differentiate between greed and materialism, we conducted Study 3.2. After that, 
we report three studies that related greed to a variety of economic behaviors. 
STUDY 3.2 
Study 3.1 found in four Confirmatory Factor Analyses that a model with 
separate factors for greed and materialism fit the data better than a one-factor 
model. Nevertheless, Study 3.1 also found substantial correlations between the 
DGS and the Material Values Scale (MVS; Richins, 2004). Therefore we thought 
it was worthwhile to obtain more insight into how greed and materialism relate 
to each other. We expected greed, and not materialism, to also predict desires for 
 




non-material goods such as food and sex (Seuntjens et al., 2015a; Tickle, 2004). 
Study 3.2 was set up to examine this prediction. 
Method  
MTurk workers (N = 290, 57.2% male, 42.8% female,15 Mage = 30.43, SD = 
9.29) from the U.S. completed this study in return for $0.20. They were first 
asked to rate the four behavioral inclinations in Table 3.5 (1 = strongly disagree, 
5 = strongly agree). These inclinations were: 1) When I am eating a bag of 
chips, I don't want to stop until the bag is finished; 2) When I am single, I like 
to have casual sex with as many people as possible; 3) When I am using social 
networking sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn), I want to have as many friends as 
possible; and 4) When I see a newer model of my phone I immediately want to 
have it. Next they filled out the DGS (M = 2.71, SD = 0.89, α = .88) and the 
MVS (M = 3.01, SD = 0.78, α = .87) the order of which was randomized 
between participants.  
Results and discussion  
The findings are shown in Table 3.5. We first replicated the Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis and found again that a model separating the DGS and the MVS 
fit better than a unidimensional model, ∆χ2(1) = 210.27, p < .001. Next we 
computed correlations and partial correlations between greed and materialism 
and the four behavioral inclinations. We see that the DGS correlates with all four 
behavioral inclinations, and MVS with three of them. The more important test 
for differentiating the two constructs is how dispositional greed and materialism 
uniquely predict these four behaviors, controlling for each other. We can see that 
materialism was best at predicting the desire for a material good while 
dispositional greed better predicted the other three behavioral intentions.  
                                                   
15 We tested for dispositional greed-gender interactions in Studies 3.2 to 3.5. We only found a 
significant interaction between dispositional greed and gender for Proposers in Study 3.3. A higher 
score on greed was associated with proposing lower offers in males, but not in females (β = .51, 







Table 3.5. (Partial) Correlations of greed and materialism with non-materialistic and materialistic desires in Study 3.2. 
Note. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. Responses were 
measured on 5-point Likert-scales ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. 
  
 
 Descriptives Correlations Partial correlations 








When I am eating a bag of chips, I don't want to stop until the 
bag is finished. 
2.89 1.21    .19***        .06    .21***        -.10 
When I am single, I like to have casual sex with as many 
people as possible. 
2.21 1.26    .28***        .15*    .24***        -.05 
When I am using social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, 
LinkedIn), I want to have as many friends as possible. 
2.24 1.03    .25***        .25***    .12*        .11 
When I see a newer model of my phone I immediately want to 
have it. 





Study 3.2 shows that whereas materialism is mostly associated with the desire 
for materialistic goods, greed is also associated with the desire for non-
materialistic goods. Note that greed also correlated with the desire for the material 
good, but it is no surprise that the scale for materialism predicts better than 
dispositional greed does. A more specialized scale is likely to predict exactly 
materialistic behavior better than a broader scale does. We were surprised that 
materialism also correlated (even when not controlling for greed) with the 
preference for having many sex partners and many friends on social networking 
sites. These preferences are theoretically unrelated to materialism, but are 
empirically related to it. Perhaps the strong association of the materialism scale 
with what we now call dispositional greed could be a reason for these correlations. 
Another possibility is that materialism is actually related more to a desire for 
status than the definition implies. In any case, we found that the DSG was better 
at predicting the general desire for more than materialism.  
The current study corroborates our expectations and unveiled more insights 
into the discriminant validity of the DGS. Materialism proved to be mostly 
associated with the desire for material goods, while greed was also associated with 
the desire for non-material goods. This indicates that greed is broader concept 
and involves the desire for more than just material goods, such as food, sex, and 
friends.  
STUDY 3.3 
In the final three studies in this chapter, we examined the predictive validity 
of the DGS. Therefore, we related the DGS to behavioral decisions in a variety 
of experimental economic games, and we predicted that greed results in choices 
that ensure people of larger outcomes, even at the expense of other. In Study 3.3, 
we related dispositional greed to people’s offers in a dictator game (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). The dictator game is a two-player game (in a strict 
sense it is not a game because it involves a single, unilateral decision) where one 
player (the dictator) gets to split a certain amount of money (e.g., $10) between 
him/herself and a second player (the receiver). The receiver has no say in the 






dictator offers. The dictator is thus free to allocate as much to oneself as one 
desires (leaving nothing or only a little for the other), or opt for more fair 
allocations where the money is more evenly split. Typically, a dictator offers the 
receiver about 20% of the endowment (Camerer, 2003). Greed has been named 
as one of the motivations for dictators to give lower offers to the receiver 
(Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005; Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011). We 
examine whether dispositional greed predicts the behavior of the dictators in this 
game.  
Method 
A total of 300 MTurk workers (61.0% male, 39.0% female, Mage = 31.74, SD 
= 10.64) from the U.S. completed this study in return for $0.30. Participants 
first filled out the DGS (α = .88) and participated in an incentivized dictator 
game. Participants indicated how they would divide $10 between themselves and 
another person. At the end of the experiment, we randomly selected ten 
participants as dictators, paired them with ten other randomly selected 
participants, and paid both according to the proposed distribution. All 
participants knew this in advance. 
Results and discussion 
The DGS had a mean score similar to our previous samples (M = 2.81, SD = 
0.87). On average the dictators kept $6.31 (SD = 1.97) and gave $3.69 to the 
receiver. As expected, a regression analysis revealed that the more greedy an 
individual was, the more money they allocated to themselves in the Dictator 
Game, β = .24, t(299) = 4.24, p < .001, thereby creating more unfair offers that 
left less money for the other person. An individual who scored -1SD on the DGS 
on average kept $5.84, whereas an individual who scored +1SD on the DGS kept 
$6.77.  
STUDY 3.4 
In Study 3.4, we related dispositional greed to people’s behavioral intentions 
in an ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Just as in the 





bids in the ultimatum game (e.g., Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). The 
ultimatum game is similar to the dictator game, with one important difference. 
Whereas in the dictator game the receiver has no influence whatsoever on the 
outcome of the negotiation, in the ultimatum game the responder can choose 
either to accept or reject the proposal. If a responder rejects the offer made by the 
proposer, both players receive nothing. If the responder accepts the offer of the 
proposer, both players receive the offer as it was made. The average offers are 
typically in the regions of 30–40%, with a 50–50 split often as the mode. Offers 
of less than 20% are frequently rejected (for an overview, see Camerer & Thaler, 
1995). The fact that the responder can reject the offer makes the ultimatum game 
a clear case of strategic decision making. Proposers who want to get as much 
money as possible have to make a tradeoff between keeping as much money to 
themselves and the increased risk of rejection by the responder.  
The aim of Study 3.4 was to investigate whether and how greed was related 
to behavior in an ultimatum game. In this study we used a strategy method (see 
Brandts & Charness, 2011) for studying decisions in the ultimatum game. This 
entails that we asked participants to provide binding decisions for each offer they 
could encounter in the negotiation. Similar to our expectations for the dictator 
game, we expected that in the ultimatum game greedy proposers would be more 
likely to propose unfair distributions favoring themselves, as they are focused on 
getting as much as possible for themselves. We did not have clear predictions for 
the effect of greed on the responders. On the one hand, one could argue that 
greedy responders should accept any offer made by the proposer because by 
rejecting unequal proposals they would end up with nothing. On the other hand, 
one could argue that greedy responders are more likely to reject unequal offers 
because they are less easily satisfied with the offer of the proposer.  
Method 
A total of 603 MTurk workers (64.7% male, 35.3% female, Mage = 29.42, SD 
= 9.93) from the United States completed this study in return for $0.30. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either being a proposer or a responder in 






they participated in an ultimatum game. Participants in the Proposer condition 
(N = 302) indicated how they would divide $10.00 between themselves and 
another person. Participants in the Responder condition (N = 301) indicated for 
each possible proposal (stated in terms of integers) whether they would reject or 
accept this proposal (a $10.00-$0.00 split, a $9.00-$1.00 split, etc.). At the end 
of the study, participants were asked about the motivations that played a role 
when making their decision. Motivations about greed were measured by “I 
wanted to get the most money I could” and “I did not want to end up with no 
money at all” and motivations about fairness were measured by “I wanted a fair 
division of the money” and “I wanted an equal division of the money” (all on a 
5-point scale ranging from 1 = totally unimportant to 5 = totally important). 
Results 
Proposers 
Across all proposers, the mean score on dispositional greed was 2.85 (SD = 
0.85). On average proposers indicated that they would propose to keep $5.36 
(SD = 0.97) to themselves, and give $4.64 to the responder. A regression analysis 
was conducted to investigate how greed was related to people’s proposals in an 
ultimatum game. As expected, people scoring high on dispositional greed 
proposed offers in which they kept more money to themselves, β = .19, t(301) = 
3.33, p = .001. A person who scored -1SD on the DGS on average proposed to 
keep $5.18 (and give $4.82), while a person who scored +1SD on the DGS 
proposed to keep $5.54 (and give $4.46).  
On average, proposers scored 3.44 (SD = 0.94) on the greed motivation scale 
and 3.82 (SD = 1.16) on the fairness motivation scale. We conducted a mediation 
analysis following the bootstrapping procedure of Preacher and Hayes (2008), 
using bias corrected intervals and 10000 samples. Figure 3.1 contains the 
standardized regression coefficients. The confidence intervals (CI) for both greed 
and fear did not include 0. This means that the effect of dispositional greed on 
the offer made to the responder was completely mediated by higher greed-driven 
motivations (95% CI: lower = .02, upper = .14) and lower fairness-driven 






 Across all responders, the mean score on dispositional greed was 2.85 (SD = 
0.84). A total of 44 responders (14.6%) gave inconsistent answers in the 
Ultimatum Game, such as claiming that they would accept an offer in which the 
proposer would get $8 and they would get only $2 split, but would reject a $7 - 
$3 split. Because such data cannot be interpreted in terms of stable preferences 
for monetary divisions, these people had to be excluded from the analyses.16 
On average, responders indicated that they would reject offers lower than 
$2.70 (SD = 1.85). A regression analysis was conducted to investigate how greed 
was related to people’s responses in the ultimatum game. A regression analysis 
revealed that people who were greedier are less likely to accept low offers, β = .13, 
t(256) = 2.07, p = .040. A person scoring -1SD on the DGS accepted offers 
higher than $2.44 on average, whereas a person scoring +1SD on the DGS 
accepted only offers higher than $2.91 on average. More greedy individuals were 
thus more likely to reject lower offers.  
On average, responders scored 3.60 (SD = 0.98) on the greed motivation scale 
and 3.37 (SD = 1.16) on the fairness motivation scale. We conducted a mediation 
analysis to investigate how the motivations of greed and fairness influenced 
people’s decisions to accept or reject offers. Results showed that the effect of 
dispositional greed on rejecting offers could be completely mediated by 
motivations of greed (95% CI: lower = .03, upper = .23), but not by motivations 
of fairness (95% CI: lower = -.14, upper = .12). See Figure 3.1 for a visual 
representation of the mediation analysis.  
STUDY 3.5 
The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) is perhaps the most often used 
example of how greedy behavior can harm a society (Wilke, 1991). This tragedy 
describes the behavior of medieval herders in the UK. These herders had, besides 
their private parcel of land, a common parcel on which they could let their 
                                                   
16 DGS is related to making inconsistent decisions, b = .44, Wald = 4.84, p = .03. There seems to 






livestock graze. From an individual perspective, letting one’s livestock graze on 
these ‘commons’ was the most rational choice. Because all herders did this, it led 
to overgrazing, making these commons useless in the end. Also in modern times 
this tragedy takes place, for example, in the form of overfishing (Kraak, 2011) 
and environmental pollution (Good & Beatty, 2011). These situations in which 
there is a common resource or common pool and one‘s own interest and the 












* p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001; ns = not significant.   
Figure 3.1. Mediation analysis of dispositional greed on proposing and rejecting offers 
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The aim of Study 3.5 was to investigate if dispositional greed predicts people’s 
harvesting behavior in a resource dilemma. We know from previous research that 
harvesting is related to social value orientation (Van Lange et al., 1997), and we 
thus examine the effect of greed in combination with that of SVO, so that we can 
estimate the relative impact of both. We used the forest-management game 
(Sheldon & McGregor, 2000), which is modeled after the Tragedy of the 
Commons.  
Method 
Participants were 303 MTurk workers (56.9% male, 43.1% female, Mage = 
31.66, SD = 10.03) from the U.S. who received $0.30 in return for filling out 
the DGS, the SVO scale, and a one-shot resource dilemma.  
Participants first played the forest-management game (Sheldon & McGregor, 
2000) and then filled out the DGS (α = .90) and SVO scale. In this dilemma, 
participants imagine that they are owners of a timber company and that they bid 
against three other companies to harvest timber in the national forest. They 
receive information about both the advantages and disadvantages associated with 
either making small or large bids. Large bids are associated with more profit, but 
if the joint bids of all players are too high, this would lead to the forest being 
depleted (ruining future profit potential). After participants read the dilemma, 
they rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) the extent to which 
they would like to profit more than the other companies (referred to as 
acquisitiveness or greed by Sheldon & McGregor) and the extent to which they 
expected the other companies to cut large amounts of forest (referred to as 
apprehensiveness or fear). Then, participants indicated how much of the forest 
they wanted to cut themselves (ranging from 0 to 10 hectares). If participants 
would harvest more than five hectares, this would imply that they are 
overharvesting and are depleting the resources faster than they can regrow, 
causing the Tragedy of the Commons. For further details of the procedure, see 







Results and discussion 
On average, participants indicated that they wanted to cut 5.63 (SD = 2.55) 
hectares of forest. The mean score for acquisitiveness motivation was 5.09 (SD = 
1.48); the mean score for apprehensiveness motivation was 5.42 (SD = 1.56). 
The mean dispositional greed score was 2.79 (SD = 0.93). For SVO, we did not 
classify participants as either proself or prosocial, but rather used the number of 
self-interested choices made out of the possible nine answers.17  On average, 
participants made 3.21 (SD = 3.91) self-interested choices. 
A regression analysis in which harvesting was predicted by both the DGS and 
SVO revealed that the more greedy individuals were, the more forest they wanted 
to cut, β = .20, t(302) = 3.52, p < .001. For SVO we found a significant effect 
that the more self-interested individuals would cut more forest, β = .12, t(302) = 
2.09, p = .04 . A person scoring -1SD on dispositional greed on average harvested 
5.07 hectares of forest, whereas a person scoring +1SD on the DGS on average 
harvested 6.17 hectares of forest (controlling for SVO).  
To validate the effects of the dispositional greed measure with the idea of 
Sheldon and McGregor (2000) that greed is an important motive in this forest 
harvesting game, we related the DGS to their motivational measure of why 
participants overharvested. A mediation analysis revealed that the effect of 
dispositional greed on harvesting could be completely mediated by the 
motivation of acquisitiveness (“the desire to obtain as much of the resource as 
possible for oneself”, p. 388; 95% CI: lower = .29, upper = .63) and not by the 
motivation of apprehension (“the expectation that others will be trying to obtain 
as much as possible for themselves”, p. 389; 95% CI: lower = -.04, upper = .02). 
See Figure 3.2 for a visual representation of the mediation analysis.  
 
 
                                                   











* p <.05; ** p <.01; ***p <.001; ns = not significant.   
Figure 3.2. Mediation analysis of dispositional greed on harvesting behavior in Study 
3.5. 
So, participants scoring high on greed take more from a common pool than 
less greedy individuals do. Interestingly, participants in general had a tendency 
to overharvest (the optimal amount of hectares on should harvest is 5, but in 
general people harvest more) but greedy individuals tended to overharvest even 
more. Greedy people are thus more likely to deplete a common resource. 
Furthermore, people who have greedy dispositions are more likely to overharvest 
due to acquisitiveness motivations, rather than due to the expectancy that others 
will overharvest.    
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This article reports on the development and validation of the Dispositional 
Greed Scale (DGS), a 7-item measure for individual differences in greed. Five 
studies with in total over 7500 participants from both the USA and The 
Netherlands established the reliability, construct validity, discriminant validity, 
and predictive validity of the DGS. Study 3.1 reported on four different samples. 
Dispositional greed was found to correlate with maximization, self-interest, envy, 
and materialism, all constructs that are often associated with greed. Confirmatory 
Factor Analyses showed that greed is also distinct from these four constructs. In 









a1 = .58*** 
a2 = .09(ns) b2 = -.02 (ns) 
b1 = .74*** 
c = .65*** 






impulsiveness (lower self-control; higher impulsivity; higher buying impulsivity), 
lower well-being (lower self-esteem; lower satisfaction with life), and having less 
concern for others (higher psychological entitlement; higher psychopathy; lower 
perspective taking; lower empathic concern).  
Because dispositional greed was highly correlated with materialism in Study 
3.1, we further assessed the differences between the two constructs in Study 3.2. 
We found that whereas materialism was more predictive of inclinations for 
material goods, greed was more predictive of inclinations for non-material goods 
such food, sex, and friends. Studies 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 demonstrated that the DGS 
reliably predicts greedy behavior in economic dilemmas. We obtained this 
predictive validity in a dictator game, in an ultimatum game, and in a resource 
dilemma. Taken together, these findings suggest that the DGS captures 
individual differences in dispositional greed in a psychologically and behaviorally 
valid manner. Below, we will first summarize our findings and explain what we 
have learned about greed. In doing so, we explain what greed is, what greed is 
related to, and what greed does. We also discuss the moral character of greed. 
Finally, we point to promising lines for future research on the basis of our 
findings. 
The studies presented here were needed to develop the DGS. But we believe 
they are also valuable beyond that purpose. These studies also teach us something 
about the psychology of greed. The pattern of correlations displayed in Table 3.3 
provides insight into the nomological network of greed (Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955). These correlations, especially when they are replicated in different 
samples, show lawful relations between greed and corresponding constructs. As 
such, they help us in finding out what greed precisely is and what it is not. Wang 
and Murnighan (2011) noted that empirical research on greed is scarce and a 
clear definition of greed is lacking. Seuntjens et al. (2015a) provide a definition 
based on an extensive prototype analysis that was the basis of the current DGS. 
The current findings corroborate this definition: greed is the dissatisfaction of 





Working from this definition, we can see how greed relates to other relevant 
constructs. In line with laymen’s conceptions, classical economic theory, and 
previous theorizing (Lea et al., 1987; Seuntjens et al., 2015a; Wang & 
Murnighan, 2011), greed was associated with higher dispositional tendencies to 
maximize, to behave self-interestedly, to experience envy, and to be materialistic. 
So, our data are supportive of these earlier ideas. Let us now describe how we 
think greed is related to these four focal constructs. 
In economic theory the axiom of greed is often referred to as the axiom of 
maximization (Lea et al., 1987), suggesting that people see greed and 
maximization as the same thing. Data from the first three samples in Study 3.1 
revealed significant correlations between greed and maximization, but CFAs 
provided support for discriminant validity. The pattern of correlations of greed 
and maximization provides more insight in how these constructs differ. Greed 
was associated with more impulsiveness, while maximization was not. This makes 
sense; if a decision maker wants to maximize, impulsivity does not come in 
handy. Maximization is characterized by the motivation to make the best possible 
decision (Schwartz et al., 2002). Maximizers have to engage in elaborative 
decision processes. They have to weigh all possible alternatives and their 
outcomes (and take into account the associated probabilities) to find the best one. 
Impulsivity would stand in the way of that. Greedy people do not maximize, they 
just want more of things. And then impulsivity may prove its worth. 
Greed is also related to self-interest. Greed results in people wanting more for 
themselves. As such it predicts similar tendencies as self-interest. Research on self-
interest typically investigates how much value people place on their own 
outcomes and on the outcomes of others. Greed is unrelated to the outcomes of 
others because people only focus on their own need to acquire more. What did 
we find concerning the relation between these two constructs? Study 3.1 revealed 
significant correlations between the DGS and SVO (our measure of self-interest). 
Note, however, that these correlations were rather low. Moreover, the CFAs 
demonstrated the distinctness of these constructs. More discriminant validity was 






modeled after the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). They had the role 
of owner of a timber company and had to decide how much to harvest in the 
national forest. Both greed and self-interest would lead decision makers to harvest 
more, creating the risk of collective overharvesting. We found that both greed 
and self-interest predicted this behavior independently.  
The relation between envy and greed goes further than the fact that they are 
two of the seven deadly sins. Greed and envy both reflect dissatisfaction with 
one’s current state, and the motivation to act on that dissatisfaction. A clear 
difference between the two is the intrinsically social nature of envy. Envy is felt 
when someone else has something valuable that I lack and want. Envy comprises 
an upward social comparison (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Greed in its pure form 
is individualistic. Greed is felt when one lacks and wants something valuable, 
irrespective of what others have. Our data again underscore the relation and 
distinctness. In Study 3.1 we find that dispositional envy and the DGS correlate 
significantly (Samples 3.1.1 and 3.1.3), but the CFAs show that they are distinct 
constructs. We also find that dispositional envy is related to social comparison in 
Sample 3.1.1 (replicating Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). In that sample, the DGS 
did not correlate with social comparison. In Sample 3.1.3 of Study 3.1 we did 
find a correlation between the DGS and social comparison, suggesting that 
greedy people may sometimes use social comparison to find out what they are 
missing. 
Of all focal constructs, materialism was most closely related to greed. 
Although the theoretical relation between greed and materialism was not entirely 
clear, the relationship is intuitively plausible given that materialism refers to the 
extent to which people think the acquisition of material possessions is important 
(Belk, 1984; Pieters, 2013). In the domain of material possessions, greed will also 
lead to an increased desire to acquire possessions, which is suggestive of a 
relationship. Our prototype analysis also clearly pointed to such a relation 
(Seuntjens et al., 2015a). Across all samples in Study 3.1 and in Study 3.2, we 
found high correlations between materialism and greed. In all samples, we also 





they were separate constructs. We designed Study 3.2 to obtain more insight in 
how greed and materialism are different. Whereas materialism appeared to be 
more specific to the domain of possessions, the desire present in greed appeared 
broader, extending to the domains of food, sex, and social relations. This finding 
corroborates early intuitions of Saint Paul, who argued that greed is not just a 
desire for more money, but is a more general tendency to desire more 
(Newhauser, 2000). 
To summarize, the findings presented in this article did not only help us to 
answer the question what greed is, but also what greed is related to. The data 
clearly show that greed is related to and distinct from maximization, self-interest, 
envy, and materialism. These findings provide support for important ideas that 
were present in the literature, but never empirically tested. The findings also 
point to interesting avenues for future research. Before discussing these, however, 
let us address the moral character of greed. 
As we explained in the Introduction, there are very pronounced and 
contrasting views with regard to the moral nature of greed, with some 
philosophers and religions condemning greed’s negative consequences for other 
people and other philosophers and economists stressing greed’s positive 
consequences for progress and the accumulation of wealth. Rather than arguing 
one of these positions to be more or less true, our data and definition of greed 
suggest an alternative possibility. This is that greed as a motivational state is in 
itself not intrinsically related to morality; it are the consequences of greed that 
can be qualified as more or less moral. This follows from the definition of greed 
as the dissatisfaction of not having enough, combined with the desire to acquire 
more. In situations where our behavior affects the outcomes of other people, such 
as in the economic games that we used in this article, greedily striving for more 
for oneself could easily lead to worse outcomes for the people around us. Indeed, 
it is especially because greed may be harmful to others that many religions and 
philosophers have condemned greed. However, in situations where no such 
interdependencies exist, greed can actually be beneficial. For example, in 






excellence, such as athletes striving to ever improve their performances, scientists 
striving to ever further our understanding of the world, or artists striving to 
achieve ever higher peaks of expression, greed may be productive. In addition, 
greed may lead individuals to create economic surplus because they aggregate 
more goods or wealth than they need. However, our definition of greed and its 
operationalization in the DGS are non-evaluative and remains mute with respect 
to the nature of the consequences, positive or negative. As such, we do not view 
greed as intrinsically moral or immoral.  
Future research on greed 
In the course of data collection for the development and validation of the 
DGS we also encountered several interesting leads for future research. The first 
has to do with an unexpected result, namely the absence of a relationship between 
greed and risk taking in Study 3.1. After the financial crisis, the media often 
hinted at excessive greed in bankers as an explanation. The fact that we did not 
find that greedy people were more risk seeking could mean that these constructs 
are unrelated. But it could also mean that the relationship is more complicated 
than typically portrayed. From the perspective of the definition of greed given 
above, predictions about greed and risk could go in different directions. One 
possibility would be that greedy people’s continual striving for more would make 
them more sensitive to the magnitude of outcomes and less to the associated 
probabilities, leading to more risk taking. However, one could also argue that 
greed’s striving for more would make people choose the option that gives the 
most certain outcome to (temporarily) satiate this need, leading to more risk 
aversion. Another explanation is that there is a relationship between greed and 
risk that our study was not able to pick-up. We used the Holt and Laury (2002) 
measure of risk attitudes, which deals with personal gains and personal risks. It 
could be that that greed only leads to more risk-taking in situations where the 
gains are for the individual, but the losses are shared with a group of people (as is 
the case in the example with the bankers). In cases where risk is shared, personal 





suggestions to this effect can be found in the results of the harvesting game, where 
the negative consequences of over-harvesting are shared among all participants.  
A second suggestion for future research follows from extensions of the positive 
and negative consequences of greed. One evident extension would be to study 
how greed affects people’s financial decision making. We found in Sample 3.1.3 
of Study 3.1 that the disposition to be greedy was associated with spendthrift and 
(buying) impulsiveness. We also found in Sample 3.1.4 of Study 3.1 that greedy 
people were less satisfied with their financial situation and indicated problems 
with making ends meet. This relates to previous research that greed is often seen 
as a cause of debts (Livingstone & Lunt, 1992). It would be worthwhile to see 
whether greed as measured by the DGS relates to decisions to save, spend, and 
borrow. As a case in point, in a recent study of financial behavior in high-school 
students, we found dispositional greed to be related to more spending and less 
saving (Seuntjens, Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Van der Schors, 2016a). Another 
extension would be to see whether the seemingly insatiable need to acquire more 
in greed also relates to stronger goal striving, persistence, and enhanced 
performance. If feelings of greed imply that people always feel that they are below 
their reference point, then we could expect them to work more and harder than 
people who are more easily satisfied (e.g., Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999). 
An interesting avenue for future research with respect to more negative 
behavior would be to relate greed to morally questionable behavior. For example, 
greed is often argued to be a cause of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), theft 
(Caudil, 1988), and fraud (Smith, 2003). As we argued before, these findings are 
most likely not due to any proclivity for negative behavior induced by greed, but 
rather by the myopic focus on wanting to acquire more. We recently started a 
research project exploring this possibility, finding that people high on 
dispositional greed had more accepting attitudes towards transgressions (e.g., 
lying in your own interest, and accepting bribes) and engaged more in corruption 
(Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, & Breugelmans, 2016c). 
Future research could also focus on the observation that some groups of 






we found that younger people were greedier than older people. This finding could 
have to do with the observation that younger people tend to display more 
egocentrism than older people (cf. Elkind, 1967). But cohort effects could also 
cause it, with greed being more prevalent among those who grew up in a world 
where the emphasis on progress, social mobility, and personal development was 
larger (cf. Inglehart, 1997). We also found relationships between greed and levels 
of education and between greed and gender, but, interestingly, we did not find 
relationships with income or religiosity. The latter finding may be a bit surprising 
because most religions strongly condemn greed.  
As a final suggestion, we think that an application of the DGS in other, 
preferably non-Western cultures would be interesting, not only to test for validity 
but also to test for potential differences in the endorsement of greed due to 
different economic systems. Previous studies reporting notable cross-cultural 
variation in behavior in economic games, like the ones we used in the current 
article (e.g., the ultimatum game), suggest that this is an interesting avenue for 
future research (Henrich et al., 2005).  
Concluding remarks 
Greed is important. It features prominently as an explanation for both 
economic growth and economic crises, and is a major source of concern for most 
religions. But not all people are equally greedy. Like most psychological traits, 
individuals differ in the extent to which they are dissatisfied with what they have 
and in their drive to acquire more and more. This chapter presents the 
Dispositional Greed Scale, which captures those individual differences. We hope 
that this short, valid, and reliable scale will prove useful to other researchers, in 






Appendix 3.1. Pattern matrix of the factor analysis on the initial 20-item pool of the 
Dispositional Greed Scale. 
  1 2 3 
1. My life motto is: ‘more is better’. .77   
2. I always want more. .72   
3. As soon as I have acquired something I start thinking about 
the next thing I want. 
.68   
4. It doesn’t matter how much I have, I’m never completely 
satisfied. 
.66   
5. I can’t imagine having too many things .65   
6. One can never have too much money. .61   
7. Actually, I’m kind of greedy. .60   
8. If I have to choose between two products I rather buy them 
both. 
.53 .36  
9. I’m satisfied with what I have. (R) -.44   
10. I think that happiness is not about the possessions that you 
have. (R) 
   
11. I like to give. (R)  .73  
12. I’m a generous person. (R)  .67  
13. I prefer to spend my money on myself rather than on 
others. 
 -.59  
14. I prefer to buy too much instead of taking the risk to have 
not enough. 
.34 .50  
15. I’m kind of stingy.   -.42  
16. As soon as I possess something, I don’t want to lose it.    .72 
17. What is mine stays mine.   .69 
18. I think it’s awful to lose my stuff.   .63 
19. I like to keep everything for myself.  -.36 .57 
20. I don’t like sharing my possessions with others.  -.47 .55 
Note. Entries are factor loadings after OBLIMIN rotation. Participants are asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. 
Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree 


























Greed and Adolescent Financial Behavior 
 
Financial problems in adolescents have increased over the last decades. We 
investigated if individual differences in greed relate to financial behavior. Greed 
is an important motive for economic behavior and refers to the tendency to never 
be satisfied and to always want more. We developed a short version of the 
Dispositional Greed Scale (Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, & Breugelmans, 
2015b), which we then used in a large survey with adolescents (N = 3899). 
Dispositional greed is associated with them having more income, spending more, 
saving less, and having more debt. Identifying what personality characteristics 
influence financial behavior at a young age is important, as the financial habits 
that people learn during adolescence persist in adulthood. We find that greed has 
both positive effects (having a higher income), but also negative effects with the 
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Financial problems in adolescents and young adults are common in Western 
countries. It has been argued that these problems have increased substantially 
over the last decades (Dwyer, McCloud, & Hodson, 2011; Hoeve et al., 2014). 
For example, credit card debt among young American adults increased with 
104% in the period of 1992 to 2001 (Draut & Silva, 2004); 27% of the Dutch 
adolescents have debts other than study debts (Nibud, 2015); 32% of young 
Europeans indicate they have trouble making ends meet (Intrum Justitia, 2014); 
and 39% of the Dutch high school students indicate that they are sometimes or 
often short of money (Nibud, 2014). This development is worrisome, as previous 
research has found an association between being in problematic debt and the 
existence of mental problems and withdrawal of social interaction (Jenkins et al., 
2008). In addition, financial problems are associated with lower academic 
performance (Scott, Lewis, & Lea, 2001). Arguably, engaging in social contact 
and academic performance are most important early in one’s career and setbacks 
in those domains in adolescence are likely to have long term effects on personal 
development and employability.  
Although demographic and standard economic variables explain a substantial 
amount of variance in financial problems, more factors account for differences in 
financial troubles (Lea, Webley, & Levine, 1993). Other research confirms these 
findings, factors such as financial attitudes and skills are good predictors for 
financial problems (Nibud, 2012). Research also suggests that some people are 
better in handling their financial situation than others. For example, students 
who are bad at delaying gratification are more likely to have credit card debts 
(Norvilitis & Merwin, 2006), people with self-control problems take greater 
financial risks and have more income shocks and unforeseen expenses 
(Gathergood, 2012), impulsive people have more expensive consumer credits and 
other types of debts (Gathergood & Weber, 2014; Nibud, 2015), and emotional 
stability, introversion, materialism, and the need for arousal are all positively 
associated with more credit card misuse (Pirog & Roberts, 2007; Watson, 2003). 
More recently, Xu, Beller, Roberts, and Brown (2015) found that 
conscientiousness and neuroticism are associated with more financial distress in 
young adults. There are thus quite some psychological processes that play an 
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important role in financial behavior. In the current research we aim to contribute 
to the understanding of psychological factors in financial behavior. Specifically, 
we focus on the psychology of greed. We investigate if individual differences in 
greed are predictive of financial behavior in adolescents. 
Greed  
Greed is an important topic. Early scholars such as the Greek antiquity already 
wrote about greed, and also today greed is often discussed and debated 
(Robertson, 2001). Although greed is a popular topic and much is written about 
its causes and consequences, there is little empirical research actually investigating 
greed. Only in the last five years researchers have started to gain more interest in 
this topic and investigate what greed is and what greed does. This is visible from 
recent publications in various fields related to economic psychology, such as 
management (Gilliland & Anderson, 2011, 2014; Haynes, Campbell, & Hitt, 
2014; Haynes, Hitt, & Campbell, 2015; Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011; 
Wang & Murnighan, 2011), marketing (Krekels, 2015), and neuroscience 
(Mussel, Reiter, Osinsky, & Hewig, 2015).  
One reason for the neglect of greed in empirical research is that there is no 
consensus on how to define greed (Wang & Murnighan, 2011). In order to deal 
with this problem, a prototype analysis was conducted to gain more insight into 
how people define greed (Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, & Van de Ven, 
2015a). Prototype analysis uses laypeople’s conceptualizations of a construct to 
get a better idea of how to define and thus use that construct. The prototype 
analysis of greed revealed that greed is best defined as the “experience of desiring 
to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of never having enough” (p. 518), which 
thus is an insatiable desire for more of something.   
This prototype analysis also found that people often associate greed with 
related constructs, such as maximization, materialism, and self-interest (Seuntjens 
et al., 2015a). However, theoretically one can argue that they are distinct 
constructs. In the case of materialism, this distinction lies in the types of things 





people value worldly possessions (Belk, 1984). Materialistic people thus find the 
acquisition of material goods important. Although greed also involves the 
acquisition of goods, it is less restricted towards the object one wants to acquire. 
Materialism centers on actual products that signal status or success (Richins & 
Dawson, 1992). Greed can also be felt towards nonmaterialistic desires, such as 
food, sex, or power (Seuntjens et al., 2015a).  
The difference between greed and maximization lies in its end goal. Although 
both maximization and greed motivate people to attain their goal, the outcomes 
are not always the same. For a maximizer, the ultimate goal is to get the best 
outcome (Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 
2002). For a greedy person the ultimate goal is to get the most of a certain 
outcome. Thus, although greed and maximization might both motivate people’s 
decisions, they do not necessarily lead to the same outcomes.  
Lastly, greed is often confused and confounded with self-interest (Balot, 
2001). In economic theory, self-interest pertains the idea that rational man 
should only care about his own outcomes and be indifferent about the outcomes 
of others (Miller, 1999). Indeed greed and self-interest might often disregard the 
consequences of others. However, the difference between the two is that self-
interest should lead to rational outcomes, whereas this is not always the case for 
the outcomes of greed.  
Greed is thus related, but different, from other motivations. Until recently, 
there was no means to assess individual differences in greed. However, recently 
the Dispositional Greed Scale by Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, and 
Breugelmans (2015b) has been developed that measures greed as a stable 
personality trait. This scale is reliable, valid, stable over time, and scores on this 
scale predict behavior at a later moment (see also Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van de 
Ven, & Breugelmans, 2016b). In the current research, we relate individual 
differences on the DGS to financial outcomes in adolescents.  
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Independently from the DGS three related scales have been developed to 
measure individual differences in greed (Veselka, Giammarco, & Vernon, 2014; 
Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015; Mussel et al., 2015). All these authors argue for 
stable individual differences in greediness and thus see greed as a disposition or 
trait. There are two main reasons why we selected to use the DGS. First and 
foremost, we were not aware of these other scales at the time we collected our 
data. Second, the DGS is firmly grounded in empirical work and its predictive 
validity is tested elaborately. This we will explain below. 
The DGS (Seuntjens et al., 2015b) builds upon earlier findings from the 
prototype analysis (Seuntjens et al., 2015a), and sees dispositional greed as 
individual differences in the tendency to always want more and to never be 
satisfied. This scale with seven items about always wanting more and never having 
enough was constructed and validated by using over 7500 participants. The DGS 
has good internal consistency and is highly reliable. In addition, it has good face 
and construct validity. For example, dispositional greed correlates with related 
constructs such as maximization, dispositional envy, materialism, and self-
interest. Importantly, it is also different from these constructs. For example, 
whereas materialism is focused on the acquisition of status goods, dispositional 
greed is a more general desire for more. Lastly, greed has good predictive validity. 
Dispositional greed predicts behavior in a variety of economic games. For 
example, it predicts how much people keep in a dictator game, how much they 
offer in an ultimatum game, and how much people take in a harvesting game. 
Even if self-interest is included, greed predicts how much people take above and 
beyond self-interest. In sum, greed is a stable trait that can be measured in a valid 
and reliable way by the DGS.  
Dispositional differences in greed are also able to predict other types of 
behavior. For example, greed is often thought to lead to unethical behavior. And 
indeed people scoring high on dispositional greed tend to behave more 
unethically and find a variety of transgressions more acceptable (Seuntjens, 
Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, & Breugelmans, 2016c). Greedy people are more easily 





find the possible rewards so tempting. To summarize, dispositional greed is a 
stable personality variable that has been shown to predict various types of 
behavior.  
Greed and financial behavior 
In the current research we relate greed to another type of behavior with which 
it is often associated. We look at how greed influences adolescents’ financial 
outcomes. Greed is a universal motive in economic theorizing. One of the 
assumptions in economic theory is the axiom of maximization, also called the 
axiom of greed, which holds that “if A contains more of one good than B, and at 
least as much as B of all other goods, A will be preferred over B” (Lea, Tarpy, & 
Webley, 1987, p. 109). In other words, from a rational viewpoint, people should 
take as much as possible (Smith, 1776/1994). This will eventually not only 
benefit the actor, but is also thought to benefit society as a whole as it fuels 
economic growth (Greenfeld, 2001). On the other hand, greed is also often 
related to negative financial outcomes. People see greed as a cause of the financial 
crisis (Zandi, 2008) and see it as a potential cause of financial problems and debt 
(Lunt & Livingstone, 1991; Livingstone & Lunt, 1992). To the best of our 
knowledge, these assumptions have however not been tested directly, which is 
what we will do in the current study. 
Greed and income 
Although there is a lot of theorizing about greed and its financial 
consequences, the empirical research on how greed affects people’s financial 
outcomes is scarce and inconclusive. As greed is characterized by an insatiable 
desire for more, one would expect that greedy people at least want a higher 
income. Mussel et al. (2015) did indeed find that greedy people would like to 
have a higher income. However, this does of course not mean that they also are 
able to secure more income. Seuntjens et al. (2015b) did not find a relationship 
between greed and income. Van Muijen and Melse (2015) on the other hand, 
found that the relationship between greed and income is complex. Sometimes 
they found a positive relationship between greed and income, sometimes a 
negative relationship, and sometimes no relationship at all. They found no 
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relationship between greed and income for people under the age of 36 and a 
negative relationship for people older than 35. However, if they look at specific 
occupations they find that for some occupations greed pays of while for others it 
does not. For example, for sales managers they do find that greed is associated 
with more income. It thus seems that there has to be a fit between one’s greed 
and occupation. For some types of occupations it might help to be greedy, 
whereas for others it seems to backfire.  
Other research that suggests that there might be a link between greed and 
financial behavior has investigated the link between greed and overearning. 
Overearning is the tendency to give up on leisure and work and earn more than 
one can spent (Hsee, Zhang, Cai, & Zhang, 2013). Research suggests that greedy 
people are more likely to overearn (Seuntjens et al., 2016b). In this research, 
participants first had five minutes to earn chocolates, and then had five minutes 
to eat the chocolates that they earned. All left over chocolates were taken away by 
the experimenter. The more left over chocolates participants had to return, the 
more they overearned. Greedy participants worked harder, and as a result earned 
more. But they earned more than they could actually consume, resulting in more 
overearning. Even when participants had the opportunity to learn from 
overearning, and participated in the same study three weeks later (and thus knew 
how much they could or wanted to consume), greed at Time 1 predicted how 
much they would overearn at Time 2. This thus further illustrates the point that 
greed is a stable individual difference and shows that greedy people are more 
focused on the acquisition of resources. Related to this is research by Krekels 
(2015), who found that greedy people are more productivity oriented, which 
means that they are more focused on achievements and try to use their time more 
efficiently. Combined, these studies suggest that there likely is a link between 
greed and the motivation to acquire more income.   
Greed and spending 
In the current research we are not only interested in how greed influences 
generating income, but also in how greed influences spending. Seuntjens et al. 





validation of the DGS. One of these measures was the Tightwads-Spendthrifts 
scale (Rick, Cryder, & Loewenstein, 2008). This scale measures the extent to 
which people find it painful to spend money. Tightwads experience high pain of 
paying, and ideally should spend more money. Spendthrifts experience little pain, 
and typically should spend less money. Greedy people typically tend more to the 
spendthrift side and thus often spend too much money. Moreover, greed was also 
positively related to the Buying Impulsiveness Scale (Rook & Fisher, 1995). This 
scale measures the extent to which people think and plan before they buy 
something. Based on these findings it is likely that greedy people spend more as 
they experience less pain of paying and are more impulsive.  
Greed, savings, and debt 
If greedy people are more focused on generating income, but also more easily 
spend money, this raises the question if they have money left to save or if they 
typically fall short on money. Greed is both seen as a potential cause of wealth 
accumulation (Seuntjens et al. 2016b) and financial problems (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 1991; Livingstone & Lunt, 1992). Previous research found that 
greedy people are less satisfied with their financial situations and that they more 
often have problems making ends meet. This suggests that although people might 
generate more income, they likely spend even more, leading to more financial 
problems.  
In sum, greed seems to be an important motive for economic behavior. On 
the one hand, greed is associated with generating more resources, which could 
lead to a higher income. On the other hand greed is expected to be related to 
spending more, which can cause financial problems such as saving less and having 
higher debt. Although the link between greed and financial problems is often 
assumed, it is, to the best of our knowledge, not been tested before with financial 
outcomes. Based on the reasoning above, we expected that dispositional greed 
would be associated with more income, but also with more expenses, less savings, 
and more debt.   
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Greed and adolescent financial behavior 
In addition to greed being a core economic construct, we think there is 
another important reason to focus on greed when studying the financial behavior 
of adolescents. Younger people tend to be greedier than older individuals 
(Seuntjens et al., 2015b). Research shows that children usually start to develop 
financial skills (e.g., saving) between the ages of six and twelve (Sonuga-Barke & 
Webley, 1993). Personality traits and financial behaviors acquired during 
adolescence and young adulthood are usually maintained during adulthood and 
thus influence financial decisions in the rest of life (Eccles, Ward, Goldsmith, & 
Arsal, 2013). For example, Ashby, Schoon, and Webley (2011) find that saving 
behavior at age 16 predicts saving behavior at age 34. Studying the relationship 
between greed and financial behavior in adolescents can thus give us insight in 
how greed is associated with positive financial outcomes such as generating more 
income, but also how greed is associated with negative financial outcomes in 
adolescents (spending too much, saving too little, and debts). Especially when 
the negative consequences of greed outweigh the positive consequences, having 
these insights is important and can help develop interventions that deal with the 
underlying causes of the undesired behavior.  
Taken together, we expected that greed influences financial behavior, and 
would lead more income, but also to more troublesome financial outcomes. The 
relationship with these negative financial outcomes would especially be 
problematic for adolescents, because they tend to be greedier than older people 
and because early adopted behavior usually persists in adulthood. We report on 
a large scale survey with almost 4000 adolescents concerning their financial 
behaviors. We expected that dispositional greed would be associated with more 
income, more expenses, less savings, and more debt. 
STUDY 4.1 
Method 
These data were collected by Nibud, the Dutch National Institute for Family 
Finance Information. They conducted a large survey study amongst high school 





opportunity to include items in this questionnaire in order to examine how 
individual differences in greed relate to the financial outcomes of these 
adolescents.  
A total of 3899 high school students from different levels of education 
(ranging from preparatory lower-level vocational education to pre-university 
secondary education) completed the survey.18 Mean age of the participants was 
15.15 years19 (SD = 1.64) and 65.2% of the participants was female. In return 
for their cooperation, five gift certificates of €50 were allotted. 
Before we analyzed the data we inspected the data of the 3899 participants for 
extreme values, which are not uncommon in such large datasets. We removed 
scores of adolescents that indicated that they earned, spend, or saved more than 
€10.000 a month or said that they currently had more than €10.000 in debts.20 
We did this as these are very unlikely numbers for these adolescents and are 
therefore likely unreliable. This resulted in the exclusion of sixteen cases for 
expenses and two cases for debts. Because there were still several extreme values, 
we did an outlier analysis and excluded cases that scored more than 3 SD above 
the mean (income: 39 cases; expenses: 37 cases; savings: 7 cases; debts: 12 cases).  
The Dispositional Greed Scale 
Individual differences in greed were assessed using the Dispositional Greed 
Scale (DGS) (Seuntjens et al., 2015b). The original scale consists of seven items. 
Because of a constraint on the number of items in the survey, we could only 
include three items of the DGS. On the basis of theoretical considerations and 
                                                   
18 In total there were 7888 high school students that started the questionnaire. A total of 3986 did 
not complete the survey and were removed from the analyses. In addition, we removed three other 
students that clearly did not fill out the questionnaire seriously (based on their responses to open-
ended questions). This left us with the final sample of 3899 students. The completion rate is 49.4%, 
which is typical for surveys including adolescents (see for example Caskey, Lindau, & Alexander, 
2009). 
19 Participants indicated their age, with those under 12 years old choosing the option “under 12” 
and those older than 18 years choosing “older than 18”. For ease of analysis, responses were recoded 
to a continuous scale ranging from 11 (participants that indicated that they were younger than 12; 
0.3%) to 19 (participants that indicated that they were older than 18; 2.0%).  
20 Note that participants are high school students and cannot have study debt yet.  
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statistical analyses we created a 3-item version that comprises of the items: 
“Actually, I’m kind of greedy”, “I always want more”, and “As soon as I have 
acquired something I start to think about the next thing I want”. In the Appendix 
we present a reanalysis of the data of Seuntjens et al (2015b) for the 3-item 
version of the DGS. We perform the same tests as we did with the original seven 
items, but now with the 3-item version. The 3-item Dispositional Greed Scale 
produces similar results and has good reliability, temporal stability, and validity.  
The 3-item scale also turns out to perform well in the dataset used for the 
analyses in this research. It is unidimensional and Principal Components Analysis 
shows that it explains 74.67% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.24). On average, 
participants score 2.41 (SD = 0.99) on this scale that ranges from 1 to 5. Internal 
consistency and reliability of the scale were good (ITC > .60; α = .83). See Table 
4.1 for an overview of the scale properties.  
Financial indicators 
We use four indicators for the financial behavior of the adolescents. Both the 
income and expenses measure consisted of multiple types of income or expenses. 
We chose to combine the different types of income or expenses, as previous 
research suggests that broad constructs (such as dispositional greed) are better at 
predicting comprehensive behavior than single types of behavior (Weigel & 
Newman, 1976).  
 Table 4.1. Properties of the 3-item Dispositional Greed Scale.  
Note.  Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items 
were descriptive of themselves. Responses are measured on 5-point Likert-scales ranging 
from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. A factor analysis produces a one factor 
solution that explains 74.67% of the variance (Eigenvalue is 2.24). The 3-item scale is 
reliable (α = .83) 
 Loading M SD ITC 
1. I always want more. .86 2.50 1.12 .68 
2. Actually, I’m kind of greedy. .90 2.48 1.15 .75 
3. As soon as I have acquired something I start to think 
about the next thing I want. 
.83 2.25 1.16 .64 





Income per month. The income measure consisted of the sum of how much 
money participants received from their parents (pocket money and clothing 
allowance), the income they earned with jobs, and other monthly income. Mean 
monthly income was €81.62 (SD = €83.43).  
Expenses per month. The expenses measure consisted of the sum of a variety 
of expenses on several categories (food and drinks, clothing and shoes, personal 
hygiene, jewelry and accessories, recreation, going out, alcohol, smoking, online 
games, paid apps, computer and computer accessories, books and magazines, 
subscription for magazines, music and movies, mobile phone, insurance, 
contribution for sports/instruments, other hobbies, bicycle/moped/car, public 
transport, presents, school supplies and books, accessories for room, charity, pets, 
and other expenses). Mean expenses were €97.68 (SD = €101.67).21  
Savings per month. The savings measure consisted of the question how much 
participants saved per month. Mean savings were €37.39 (SD = €52.74). A 
substantial amount of participants indicated that they did not save any money 
each month (17.7%). For participants that did save money each month, the 
average was €45.45 (SD = €54.91).  
Total debt. The debts measure consisted of the question how much debt 
participants had at the moment. Because these high school students are not 
allowed to take out loans yet, debt was measured as the amount of money they 
had borrowed from family or friends. On average, participants had outstanding 
debts of €3.66 (SD = 31.48). Most participants indicated that they did not have 
debts (89.9%).  For participants that indicated they had borrowed money the 
mean debt was €36.32 (SD = €93.15).  
  
                                                   
21 Note that expenses are in general higher than income. In the analyses we focus on the effects of 
greed on income and expenses separately from each other and given that we are mainly interested 
in whether changes in greed would predict changes in income or expenses, we do not think it is 
problematic. However, it does signal that the actual estimates of financial behavior are unlikely to 
be completely accurate. 
 




There are several ways to model the data in this study. One could make one 
joint model in which greed predicts all four financial indicators or one could do 
separate analyses for all financial indicators. We chose the latter approach for two 
reasons. First, not all financial indicators are measured in the same magnitude. 
Income, expenses, and savings are measured per month, whereas debt is the total 
outstanding debt. Second, we are interested in whether greed relates to these 
financial outcomes, not in the exact estimate of the effect of for example scoring 
a scale point higher on greed on how much additional euro of income that would 
generate. Note that expenses are higher than income in the current data, which 
suggests that the estimates are not completely accurate. It is possible that 
adolescents forget to report some of the income they receive, or report expenses 
that are actually paid by their parents (for example, they might not have reported 
money received to buy food at school as income, but did report those expenses). 
Third, there are large differences in the distributions between the four indicators, 
which leads to different tests being more appropriate for different financial 
indicators (as we explain below).  
To investigate the relationship between greed and income and expenses we 
conducted linear regression analyses. As is often the case with monetary data, the 
data for income and expenses was positively skewed. In order to deal with the 
skewedness, we conducted log-transformations to normalize the data.22 Because 
the data of savings and debt was strongly censored (with many respondents 
indicating to either not to save or not to have debts) a Tobit regression was most 
appropriate. Tobit is useful in these cases, as linear regression analysis will lead to 
biased coefficients. To further investigate the relationship between greed and 
monthly savings and total debt, we conducted logistic regression analyses to see 
whether greed predicted if people saved or had debt at all (yes or no), and if this 
was the case, we investigated if greed predicted the amount of savings and debt 
                                                   





using linear regression analyses.23  Based on these considerations we chose to 
analyze the effects of greed on each of the four indicators separately.  
Results 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics and zero-order 
correlations between dispositional greed, the financial indicators, age, and 
gender. Linear regression analyses tested the relationship between dispositional 
greed and income and expenses per month. As Table 4.3 shows, dispositional 
greed was significantly related to having more income (β = .10) and to spending 
more money (β = .18).24 Because the data for savings per month and total debt 
was censored (17.7% of the participants indicated that they saved €0 per month; 
89.9% of the participants indicated they had €0 debt), we analyzed these variables 
with Tobit regression analyses. Participants scoring high on dispositional greed 
had significantly less savings per month (β = -.09), and a higher total debt (β = 
.20).25  
To further explore the relationship between dispositional greed and savings 
per month and total debt we conducted binary logistic regression analyses to see 
if greed predicts whether adolescents are more likely to save and have debts and 
linear regression analyses to investigate how high their savings per month and 
total debt are (given that they save and have debts in the first place). Dispositional 
greed predicted if people saved money each month, odds ratio = 0.68, Wald = 
55.33, p < .001. As an indication of the effect size, this implies that an increase 
of 1 point on the Dispositional Greed Scale (which is also approximately +1 SD) 
results in a 47% decrease in the odds that someone saves money each month. 
However, for those who save, dispositional greed did not predict how much 
people saved per month, b = 0.01, β = .01, t = 0.53, p = .597.  
  
                                                   
23 Again, we conducted log transformations to normalize the data.  
24 If we also include income as a covariate, we find similar results. 







Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations in Study 4.1. 
Note. Correlation is significant at the (***) .001 level, (**) .01 level, or (*) .05 level. Gender was coded as a dummy variable with 0 = 
female and 1 = male. Correlations are computed with log-transformed variables. If we run the analyses on the untransformed data we 
find a similar pattern.  
1 If we include participants who do not save each month average savings are Mdn = 20.00, M = 37.39, SD = 52.74. 
2 If we include participants who do not have debts average debts are Mdn = 0.00, M = 3.66, SD = 31.48. 
 
  
 N % yes Mdn M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Dispositional greed 3899 - 2.33 2.41 0.99 -      
2. Income per month 3716 - 60.82 81.62 83.43 .12*** -     
3. Expenses per month 3707 - 69.40 97.68 101.67 .19*** .51*** -    
4. Savings 2568 82.3% 25.00 45.451 54.91 -.11*** .14*** .11*** -   
5. Debts 3575 10.1% 6.40 36.322 93.15 .12*** .03* .10*** -.05 -  
6. Age 3899 - 15.00 15.15 1.64 .04* .42*** .38*** .27*** .01 - 






0 Table 4.3. Linear regression analyses of income per month and expenses per month on dispositional greed and Tobit regression analyses 
of savings per month, and total debt on dispositional greed (controlled for age and gender). 
Note: Linear regression analyses are conducted on the transformed variables.   
 Income per month Expenses per month 
 b s.e. β t p b s.e. β t p 
Dispositional greed 0.10 0.01 .11 7.42 < .001 0.21 0.02 .18 11.80 < .001 
Age 0.23 0.01 .41 27.83 < .001 0.27 0.01 .38 25.16 < .001 
Gender  -0.03 0.03 -.02 -1.13 .260 0.01 0.04 .00 0.20 .842 
 Savings per month Total debt 
 b s.e. β t p b s.e. β t p 
Dispositional greed -4.97 1.17 -.09 -4.25 < .001 24.87 3.70 .20 6.72 < .001 
Age 12.01 0.69 .21 17.45 < .001 -0.72 2.23 -.01 -0.32 .746 
Gender  9.58 2.39 .17 4.00 < .001 2.97 7.56 .02 0.39 .694 
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The second binary logistic regression analysis found that dispositional greed 
also predicted if people had a debt or not, odds ratio = 1.47, Wald = 48.39, p < 
.001. Thus, an increase of 1 point on the Dispositional Greed Scale resulted in a 
47% increase in the odds of having debts. For people who did have a debt, it also 
predicted how high that debt was, b = 0.16, β = .11, t = 2.14, p = .033.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The aim of the current research was to investigate the relationship between 
adolescents’ financial behavior and dispositional greed. In order to investigate 
this, we first constructed a shortened, 3-item version of the Dispositional Greed 
Scale. Then we related this 3-item Dispositional Greed Scale to four financial 
indicators. We found that adolescents who scored higher on dispositional greed 
had more expenses, were less likely to save, and had more debt. On the bright 
side, dispositional greedy adolescents also have a higher income.  
Implications for understanding adolescent financial behavior 
Understanding adolescent financial behavior is important. The personality 
traits and behaviors that people acquire during adolescence often persist in 
adulthood and thus have important consequences for the rest of life (Eccles et al., 
2013). Although previous research suggests a relationship between greed and 
financial behavior (Lunt & Livingstone, 1991; Seuntjens et al., 2015b, 2016b), 
this is, to our knowledge, the first study that actually investigated the relationship 
between greed and actual financial outcomes in adolescents. 
In the current research we found that greed was associated with positive 
financial outcomes on the one hand (more income), and negative financial 
outcomes on the other hand (more expenses, less savings, more debt). Although 
the data is cross-sectional, which makes drawing strong conclusions about 
causality difficult, there is quite some past research (Seuntjens et al., 2015b, 
2016b) that shows that dispositional greed is a stable personality trait. 
Theoretically, it thus makes sense to interpret the data that the stable personality 





We found that greedy adolescents had a higher income than less greedy 
adolescents. The income measure consisted of pocket money, clothing allowance, 
and their own generated outcome from side jobs. One could argue that people 
that are greedy also share this priority with their children, and as a result their 
children likely become greedier. However, previous studies have consistently 
found that people that are brought up in low socioeconomic environments are 
actually greedier than people that grew up in families with high socioeconomic 
status (SES) (Krekels, 2015; Poluektova, Efremova, & Breugelmans, 2015). It is 
argued that people develop the dispositional tendency to be greedy to deal with 
the resource scarcity and uncertainty that is associated with low SES. Based on 
this reasoning one would predict that if adolescents’ greed is formed based on 
their family situation, adolescents with high income (who are more likely to come 
from wealthy families) would be less greedy. However we do not find this. We 
believe this suggests that greedy adolescents might receive more pocket money 
and clothing allowance because they ask for more, and hence adolescents that are 
greedy generate more income in this way. These findings corroborate earlier 
findings that have found that greedy people work harder and are more focused 
on acquisition of resources (Seuntjens et al., 2016b).  
Despite dispositional greed being associated with more income, the other 
three financial indicators show the more problematic effects of greed. People 
often associate greed with negative financial outcomes (Lunt & Livingstone, 
1991). In line with this reasoning and our expectations, we found that greed was 
indeed associated with spending more per month, being less likely to save, and 
having a higher debt. Previous research (Seuntjens et al., 2015b) suggests that 
greedy people have more problems making ends meet, and that greedy 
individuals are more impulsive and have lower self-control (characteristics that 
have previously been related to all types of financial problems; Gathergood, 2012; 
Gathergood & Weber, 2014). It seems that greedy adolescents’ tendencies to 
choose short term pleasure over beneficial long term consequences makes them 
more likely to get into financial troubles.  
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Individuals’ financial situation is thus both positively and negatively 
influenced by their disposition to be greedy. Although the effects of greed on 
financial behavior might be small, they can have large consequences over a life 
time. Although we should interpret the exact numbers with care, as they are based 
on self-report data that does not seem fully accurate, we do see that dispositional 
greed has effects that are quite serious. For example, if we look at expenses, we 
see that, in our sample, a 15 year old male scoring -1SD on the DGS spends an 
estimated average of €85.29 euros a month, whereas adolescents with the same 
age and gender who score +1SD on the DGS spend an estimated average of 
€116.27 per month. Assuming that the same trend persists in adulthood, and 
individuals earn more as adults, this means that greedy individuals will spend 
thousands of euros more per year than less greedy individuals. Especially for the 
negative consequences of greed, in this case spending more, being less likely to 
save, and having more debts, it is thus important to identify which people are at 
risk.  
Previous research suggests that the disposition to be greedy is formed at an 
early age (Krekels, 2015). According to Krekels, a possible explanation for the 
development of greed is that it helps people deal with resource uncertainty. In 
addition, younger people tend to be greedier than older people (Seuntjens et al., 
2015b). Thus, younger people seem more likely to get into trouble because of 
their greediness. Knowing that especially greedy people are more likely to get into 
financial trouble can help with the prevention of financial problems, as it gives 
the opportunity to target those people for intervention programs.  
Implications for greed research 
Our research thus shows a duality in the consequences of greed. On the one 
hand we find that greed is associated with positive outcomes (generating more 
income), while on the other hand we find that greed is associated with negative 
outcomes (having more expenses, being less likely to save, having more debts). 
The idea that greed is ambivalent is common. Early scholars such as Thucydides 
(460–395 BCE) argued that greed can be both positive and negative (Zagorin, 





it can motivate people to attain their goals, but also can have destructive 
consequences for society. Typically the duality in consequences of greed is 
depicted as positive consequences for the individual and negative consequences 
for others surrounding the greedy individual. An interesting finding of the 
present research is that the duality in greed also exists at the intra-individual level, 
meaning that greed can have positive and negative consequences for the same 
individual.    
For the current research we constructed a reliable and valid shortened version 
of the DGS. Having a 3-item version of the DGS can be useful in situations 
where there are time limits, restraints on the number of questions, or when greed 
is not the main focus of the research. We refer again to the Appendix for the re-
analysis of the original data to demonstrate the validity and reliability of this short 
version of the Dispositional Greed Scale.  
Conclusion 
Greed is often seen as an important motive for economic behavior. In this 
research we found that individual differences in greed predicted adolescents’ 
financial behavior. Dispositional greed was associated with generating more 
income, but also with more expenses, less savings, and higher debt. In line with 
common conceptions about greed, this research thus found that greed can have 
positive as well as negative consequences for financial behavior.   
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Appendix 4.1. Re-analysis of the data of Chapter 3 with the 3-item Dispositional 
Greed Scale. 
In this appendix we describe how we came from our 7-item Dispositional Greed 
Scale—DGS (Seuntjens et al., 2015b) to the 3-item version that we used in this 
research. The reason for this shortening was that the NIBUD (the organization that 
allowed us to include questions in their survey) only allowed us to include three 
additional questions. We came to the three items on the basis of theoretical reasons 
(in our view these items capture the core of greed best, cf. Seuntjens et al., 2015a), 
and statistical reasons. These latter are reported below. 
To investigate if the shortened 3-item version of the DGS worked correctly we 
reanalyzed all the data in our original scale construction paper (Seuntjens et al., 
2015b). As is apparent from Table A1 and A2 in this Appendix, the three items 
together form a unidimensional scale with good reliability, internal consistency, and 
temporal stability (see Tables A1 and A2). In Table A3 and A4 we find that the 3-
item version of the DGS has similar construct validity than the original scale. Table 
A5 shows that, as the 7-item DGS, the 3-item version of the DGS is different from 
materialism. Lastly, in Table A6 we find that the 3-item DGS predicted behavior in 
a similar way than the 7-item version. The three item DGS predicted how much 
money people kept for themselves in a dictator game and an ultimatum game. We 
also found a marginal significant trend for greedy people rejecting lower offers more. 
Lastly, we found that greed predicted how much forest participants harvested in a 







6 Table A4.1. Re-analysis: The three items of the Dispositional Greed Scale, including factor loadings and reliability for Samples 3.1.1 
to 3.4.1 in Study 3.1.  
Note. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. Responses were 
measured on 5-point Likert-scales ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. 
 
  
  Samples 
  1 2 3 4 
  N = 167 N = 236 N = 345 N = 5344 
  Dutch Dutch American Dutch 
 Items Students Students MTurk Representative 
1. I always want more. .78 .82 .90 .88 
2. Actually, I’m kind of greedy. .72 .83 .87 .89 
3. As soon as I have acquired something I start to think about the next thing I want. .81 .83 .85 .85 
Eigenvalue 1.78 2.04 2.23 2.28 
Explained variance 59.40% 68.11% 76.26% 76.06% 
Cronbach’s α .65 .77 .84 .84 







Table A4.2. Re-analysis: Means, standard deviations, and corrected item-total correlations of the items of the 3-item Dispositional 
Greed Scale for Samples 3.1.1 to 3.1.4 in Study 3.1.  
Note. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. Responses were 
measured on a 5-items Likert-scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree
  Samples 
  1 
N = 167 
2 
N = 236 
3 
N = 345 
4 
N = 5344 
 Item M SD ITC M SD ITC M SD ITC M SD ITC 
1. I always want more. 2.35 0.98 .51 2.90 1.09 .60 3.03 1.11 .76 2.29 1.05 .72 
2. Actually, I’m kind of greedy. 2.92 1.02 .47 2.66 1.04 .60 2.62 1.16 .69 2.06 0.99 .74 
3. As soon as I have acquired something I start 
to think about the next thing I want. 
2.66 1.11 .42 2.37 1.06 .60 2.76 1.20 .68 1.90 0.95 .67 





Table A4.3. Re-analysis: Correlations of the 3-item Dispositional Greed Scale with other 
measures for Samples 3.1.1 to 3.1.4 in Study 3.1.  
 Samples 
Construct 3.1.1 
N = 167 
3.1.2 
N = 236 
3.1.3 
N = 345 
3.1.4 
N = 5344 
Maximization Scale  .22** .22** .34***  
Social Value Orientation  .23** .13*   
Dispositional Envy Scale  .35*** .25**   
Material Values Scale  .55*** .56*** .69*** .63*** 
Tightwads-spendthrifts Scale    .36***  
Self-Control Scale  -.31*** -.20**   
Impulsiveness7  .23**  .33***  
Buying Impulsiveness Scale    .45***  
Temporal preferences  -.07   
Risk aversion   -.01   
Psychological Entitlement Scale  .29***    
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale .30*** .21**   
Perspective taking  -.30***    
Emphatic Concern  -.21**    
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale   -.13  -.20*** 
Satisfaction With Life Scale   -.07  -.07*** 
Beck Depression Inventory   .02   
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison 
Orientation Measure  
.13  .39***  
Social desirability     -.26*** 
Extraversion  -.03 .08  -.02 
Agreeableness  -.09 -.13*  -.21*** 
Conscientiousness  -.115 -.04  -.21*** 
Emotional Stability  -.19* -.06  -.25*** 
Openness  -.17*  .00   .03 
Note. * p <.05; ** p <.01; ***p <.001. Correlations are only reported if the measure was 
in the sample. 
 




Table A4.4. Re-analysis: Regression analyses of demographics on the 3-item 













Variable b s.e. β t p 
Step 1      
   Age -0.02 .00 -.37 -24.09 < .001 
   Gender (0 = female; 1 = male) 0.18 .02 .13 8.33 < .001 
Step 2      
   Income (net income per month in €’s) 0.00 .00 .10 0.65 .516 
   Education (ranging from 1 = elementary  
education; 6 = university) 
0.01 .01 .02 1.03 .304 
   Political orientation (0 = left; 10 = right) 0.03 .01 .09 5.77 < .001 





0 Table A4.5. Re-Analysis: (Partial) Correlations of the 3-item Dispositional Greed Scale and Materialistic Value Scale with non-
materialistic and materialistic desires in Study 3.2.  
Note. * p <.05; ** p < .01 *** p <.001. Dispositional greed was measured on a 5-items Likert-scales, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree 
to 5 = strongly agree (M = 2.70, SD = 0.96). Reliability of the scale was good (α = .80). 
  
 Descriptives Correlations Partial correlations 








When I am eating a bag of chips, I don't want to stop until the bag 
is finished. 
2.89 1.21 .12*** .06 .24*** -.11 
When I am single, I like to have casual sex with as many people as 
possible. 
2.21 1.26 .24*** .15* .18** -.00 
When I am using social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn), 
I want to have as many friends as possible. 
2.24 1.03 .25*** .25*** .12* .12* 
When I see a newer model of my phone I immediately want to have 
it. 
2.49 1.21 .36*** .44*** .11 .30*** 




Table A4.6. Re-analysis: The 3-item Dispositional Greed Scale as a predictor of behavior 
in a Dictator game, Ultimatum game, and Harvesting dilemma (Studies 3.3, 3.4, and 
3.5). 
 Greed Relationship with 
DV 
DV M SD α β t p 
Study 3.3: Dictator Game:  
Keeping Money 
2.87 0.93 .81 .20 3.48 .001 
Study 3.4: Ultimatum Game - Proposers: 
Keeping Money 
2.95 0.89 .79 .15 2.60 .010 
Study 3.4: Ultimatum Game – Responders: 
Rejecting Offers 
2.99 0.89 .75 .12 1.85 .066 
Study 3.5: Harvesting Game:  
Harvesting Trees 
2.84 0.99 .83 .20 3.47 .001 
Note. Responses were measured on a 5-items Likert-scales, ranging from 1 = strongly 












Enough is Never Enough: Greed, Work, and 
Overearning 
 
Overearning is the tendency to forgo leisure and earn more than is needed and 
can be spent. Hsee, Zhang, Cai, and Zhang (2013) developed a paradigm to 
measure overearning; we build upon their findings by examining an explanation 
of overearning in terms of greed. Study 5.1 found that dispositional greedy 
individuals showed a higher level of overearning than less greedy individuals did. 
Greedy people worked harder and earned more chocolates than they consumed. 
Study 5.2 suggests that greedy people overearn more because they find the pursuit 
of wealth more important, not because they find labor less aversive. Finally, Study 
5.3 replicated and extended the results of Study 5.1 and earlier findings by 
measuring overearning twice, with a four-week interval. We again found that 
dispositional greedy people overearn more. We also found that people who 
overearn are less satisfied with their outcomes and that they learn from 
overearning in the past (overearning is reduced at Time 2). However, even at 
Time 2 we found overearning, and greedy people still overearn more. In sum, 
people have a general tendency to overearn, but for greedy people this tendency 





This chapter is based on Seuntjens, T. G., Zeelenberg, M., Van de Ven, N., & 






Modern economics owes much to John Stuart Mill (1844), who was among 
the first to present a coherent view of economics as a science (Heukelom, 2014). 
Mill believed that, in order to understand economics, one needs to assume a few 
general principles of human behavior. The most important of these were the 
pursuit of wealth and the aversion to labor. Based on the assumed aversion to 
labor, John Maynard Keynes (1963) predicted that around 2030 people would 
enjoy “the good life”. He expected people to work some fifteen hours a week, as 
the result of increasing technological developments and higher earning rates. This 
prediction will most likely not come true. Despite a major increase in economic 
growth and massive technological innovations, people are still working 
considerably more than fifteen hours a week, including a large share of people 
who earn substantially more than would strictly be needed for “the good life”. 
There may be many explanations for this observation. One of these could be that 
the pursuit of wealth is apparently so strong that people overcome their aversion 
to labor and continue to work, even if they already have earned enough. Hsee, 
Zhang, Cai, and Zhang (2013, p. 852) labeled this “tendency to forgo leisure and 
earn beyond one’s needs” overearning. 
Of course there are good reasons for people to work hard and to earn more 
than they need. People might want to earn more so they have a buffer in case of 
an emergency, or because they want to bestow money on their children (Hsee et 
al., 2013). People can like their work and feel fulfilled by it, they can enjoy the 
contacts with others that work brings, and can feel like they help others and the 
world. In addition, work can make people feel autonomous and give them 
meaning (Schwartz, 2015). However, all these benefits of work can also be 
received when working a bit less: would you feel less fulfilled if you were to spend 
four hours a week less on work? Would you really feel less accomplished or 
autonomous? 
Overearning, generating more income than strictly necessary, does bring 
various costs. Working too hard has been associated with poor health, poor social 
relationships, and burnout (e.g., Shaufeli, Taris, & Van Rhenen, 2008). 
Overearning also entails opportunity costs. People who work too much have less 
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time for hobbies, friends, and family, an observation that is prevalent in regret 
research (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Specifically, one of the top-five regrets 
reported on people’s deathbed is having worked too hard, and as a result, not 
having spent enough time with loved ones (Ware, 2011). Cozzolino, Sheldon, 
Schachtman, and Meyers (2009) investigated the idea that “at the end of life, 
nobody wishes they had made more money” (p. 399). When people know they 
are running out of time, they shift their priorities from material motivations to 
more intrinsically meaningful motives, such as self-acceptance and affiliation. 
This was especially the case for people who are usually extrinsically motivated, 
and normally focus on things like money and beauty.  
Besides regret over not spending enough time on loved ones there are also 
other opportunity costs of overearning. For example, overearning stands in the 
way of pursuing other activities that pay-off in the future, such as taking advanced 
education. In addition, overearning has costs at the societal level, because it is 
wasteful when resources that could be conserved or used by others are acquired 
but not used.  
So why does overearning occur? Hsee et al. (2013) developed an elegant 
paradigm to study overearning in the laboratory, under controlled circumstances. 
This paradigm stays close to Mill’s assumptions in the sense that labor is aversive 
and wealth cannot be stored or transferred. As such, it controls for normative 
reasons for overearning, such as job satisfaction, uncertainty about the future, 
and the desire to bequeath money to others. In the paradigm participants perform 
tedious tasks (work) with which they earn chocolates or jokes (rewards). 
Thereafter, they have a limited time to consume these rewards (consumption). 
Even in this minimalistic paradigm, Hsee et al. observed that many people work 
too much and earn more than they can consume. They argued that overearning 
occurs as a result of mindless accumulation: people tend to work until they are 
tired, instead of stopping when they have accumulated enough. We propose that 
motivational factors play a role too. Specifically, we examine whether greed is a 





Greed as a cause of overearning 
Greed is defined as “desiring to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of never 
having enough” (Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, & Van de Ven, 2015a, p. 
518; see also Wang & Murnighan, 2011). It is related to, but different from, 
materialism and feelings of envy. Greed may lead to self-interested behavior and 
tunnel vision in the pursuit of acquiring more. Economic theory assumes people 
to be greedy, as is expressed by the assumption of maximization (also called “the 
axiom of greed”; Lea, Tarpy, & Webley, 1987). People are assumed to always 
prefer more of a desirable good, as getting more of something positive improves 
their position. Striving for the maximization of one’s outcomes is seen as a virtue 
that leads to economic development and prosperity (Smith, 1776/1994). Not 
surprisingly, greed is often argued to be a driving force behind economic growth 
and wealth (Melleuish, 2009). The motive of greed represents the pursuit of 
wealth as Mill described it, and as such we expect it to be an important factor in 
overearning.  
Greed also manifests itself in other ways. Greed can be exploitative when it 
causes people to claim more than their fair share, such as in the Tragedy of the 
Commons (Hardin, 1968) and other resource management situations (Wilke, 
1991; Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, & Breugelmans, 2015b). In addition, 
greed has been associated with financial scandals and the recent financial crisis 
(Wang & Murnighan, 2011), employee fraud (Wells, 2001), lower stockholder 
returns (Haynes, Campbell, & Hitt, 2014), consumer debts (Livingstone & 
Lunt, 1992), and immoral behavior (Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, & 
Breugelmans, 2016c). We expect overearning to be another consequence of 
greed.  
The tendency of people to be greedy can be measured with the Dispositional 
Greed Scale (DGS), which reliably and validly assesses individual differences in 
the propensity to be greedy (Seuntjens et al., 2015b; see Krekels & Pandelaere, 
2015, for a similar approach). Differences on the DGS predict behavioral 
decisions in resource dilemmas, dictator games, and ultimatum games. The DGS 
consists of seven items (e.g., “I always want more”, and “Actually, I’m kind of 
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greedy”) that are measured on 5-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). In the present research, we expected that these individual 
differences in greed would be related to overearning. 
The present studies 
To summarize our main idea, we expected that overearning exists because 
people value the pursuit of wealth more than they are aversive to labor. We 
expected greed to amplify the pursuit of wealth, but not necessarily to weaken 
the aversion to labor, and therefore predicted that greed would lead to more 
overearning. Study 5.1 tested this prediction by relating individual differences in 
greed (Seuntjens et al., 2015b) to people’s behavior, using Hsee et al.’s (2013) 
overearning paradigm. Study 5.2 examined in more detail whether the 
relationship between greed and overearning can be explained because greed 
increases the desire to pursue wealth or whether greed might also be associated 
with a decreased aversion to labor. 
Our final Study 5.3 further investigated the relationship between 
dispositional greed and overearning. One might argue that the overearning 
paradigm we used in Study 5.1 confronts participants with an unfamiliar and 
hence weak situation (Mischel, 1968). “It has been well known for some time 
that dispositional effects are likely to be strongest in relatively weak situations and 
weakest in relatively strong situations” (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989, p. 387). 
Put differently, greed may be more likely to manifest itself and result in 
overearning, when participants are not sure what to do, and thus did what they 
typically do. In order to eliminate this possibility, we used a design with repeated 
measures in Study 5.3. Offering participants the opportunity to engage in the 
work-task twice, makes it possible for them to learn more about the specifics of 
the task, to learn about their own behavior, and about how they evaluate the 
outcomes (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). If participants still overearn at Time 2, 
and this overearning is again predicted by dispositional greed, this gives even 
stronger support for our hypothesis that greed causes overearning. In addition, in 
Study 5.3, we explored the relationship between regret and (dis)satisfaction with 







A total of 156 Tilburg University students participated in this study. We ran 
this study for one week in the laboratory, which typically gives 140-180 
participants.26 Students received course credit or a €8.00 show up fee. For three 
participants we did not receive correct ID numbers, so we could not match the 
chocolates earned and consumed with their greed scores. Mean age of the 
remaining 153 participants was 20.33 (SD = 2.38), 69.3% of the participants 
was female.  
Participants came into the lab and were seated in front of the computer with 
headphones on. They read the instruction and started with the study. We 
employed the overearning paradigm by Hsee et al. (2013). This consisted of two 
phases that each lasted five minutes. In the Work Phase, participants could relax 
and listen to classical piano music or they could “work” by pressing a key that 
interrupted the music with white noise for the duration of 0.2 seconds. A pretest 
(N = 49) showed that participants rated the music as being significantly more 
pleasant (M = 4.53, SD = 0.79) than the noise (M = 1.67, SD = 0.92), t(48) = -
16.80, p < .001, d = 3.34 (1 = very unpleasant, 6 = very pleasant). For each 20 
times the participant chose to interrupt the music and expose themselves to the 
white noise, they earned a chocolate (the number of chocolates earned is the 
measure of work). In the Consumption Phase participants had five minutes to 
eat the earned chocolates (the number of chocolates consumed is the measure of 
consumption). Participants knew beforehand that both phases lasted five minutes 
and that any remaining chocolates would be taken away by the experimenter. 
The amount of chocolates earned, but not consumed, is the measure of 
overearning. After participants completed the procedure, they were asked to fill 
out the DGS and rated how much they liked chocolate in general (1 = not at all, 
7 = a lot). 
                                                   
26 We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all 
measures in all studies. 
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Results and discussion 
Overearning 
Because the number of chocolates earned and consumed was not normally 
distributed, we conducted a non-parametric paired samples sign test to see if 
participants overearned. On average, participants earned significantly more 
chocolates (M = 5.29, SD = 7.33, Mdn = 3) than they consumed (M = 2.47, SD 
= 3.06, Mdn = 2), Z = -7.55, p < .001.27 This means they overearned on average 
2.82 chocolates (SD = 5.51, Mdn = 0), replicating Hsee et al. (2013). To 
summarize; 38.6% of participants overearned and had chocolates left after the 
experiment, indicating they had worked more than needed. 
Greed and overearning 
Because of the skewed distribution, we conducted over-dispersion corrected 
Poisson regression analyses in which we regressed dispositional greed on the 
amount of chocolates earned, consumed, and overearned, while controlling for 
liking chocolate.28 As expected, greedy individuals earned more chocolates than 
less greedy individuals, b = 0.37, SE = 0.15, t(152) = 2.47, p = .015. The effect 
of greed on the amount consumed was marginally significant, b = 0.24, SE = 
0.13, t(152) = 1.87, p = .06. Most importantly, overearning was also predicted 
by greed, b = 0.49, SE = 0.21, t(152) = 2.27, p = .025.29 Figure 5.1 plots the 
results of the Poisson regression analyses making the relation visible between 
greed and earning, consumption, and overearning. 
STUDY 5.2 
Study 5.1 established the relationship between dispositional greed and 
overearning, showing that in Hsee et al.’s (2013) paradigm greedier people work 
more, but also overearn more. Study 5.2 adds to this the relationship between 
dispositional greed and Mill’s (1844) two core principles of economic behavior, 
the pursuit of wealth and the aversion to labor, in order to investigate how greed 
                                                   
27 A paired samples t-test yielded similar results, t(152) = 6.32, p < .001, d = 0.50. 
28 Not controlling for liking chocolate yielded similar results across the analyses. 
29 Linear regression analyses yielded similar results. Earning: β = .19, t(152) = 2.43, p = .02; 





relates to overearning. We expected that greed would be related to the pursuit of 
wealth, because greed is characterized by an insatiable desire for more. We did 
not expect a relation between greed and the aversion to labor. Greedy people are 
motivated to obtain more and are ambitious in doing so, but we see no reasons 
why greedy people would like working more.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. The amount of chocolates earned, consumed, and overearned as a function 
of dispositional greed in Study 5.1 (N = 156). 
 




US-based MTurk workers (N = 297, Mage = 33.28, SD = 10.93, 39.7% 
female) participated in return for $0.30. Beforehand, we aimed for 300 
participants, which would imply a power of .94 based on the effect size found in 
Study 5.1. Participants read the overearning paradigm instructions, listened to 
the music and white noise and saw a picture of the chocolates used in Study 5.1. 
They then answered questions about how they would experience the task. 
Aversion to labor was measured with: “How attractive or unattractive would the 
white noise be?” We also included the question: “How attractive or unattractive 
would the music be?” Pursuit of wealth was measured with: “How attractive or 
unattractive would it be to earn chocolates?” All questions were answered on 7-
point scales (-3 = very unattractive, 3 = very attractive). Participants completed 
the DGS either before or after answering the questions on how they would 
experience being part of the overearning study. At the end of the study 
participants rated how much they liked chocolate (1 = not at all, 7 = a lot). 
Results and discussion 
The white noise was rated significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 0, M 
= -1.99, SD = 1.16, t(296) = -29.53, p < .001, d = 1.71, indicating that the labor 
was indeed experienced as aversive. Both the music, M = 1.74, SD = 1.28, t (296) 
= 23.53, p < .001, d = 1.37, and the option to earn chocolates, M = 1.07, SD = 
1.63, t(296) = 11.37, p < .001, d = 0.66, were rated to be attractive (i.e., 
significantly higher than 0). Thus participants indicated to appreciate leisure 
(listening to the music), and the opportunity to pursue wealth (earn the 
chocolates).  
To test how greed relates to aspects of overearning. We regressed dispositional 
greed on the aversion to labor and the pursuit of wealth, while controlling for the 
general tendency to like chocolates. 30  There was no relationship between 
dispositional greed and the aversion to labor (the [un]attractiveness of the white 
noise), β = .07, t(296) = 1.22, p = .22. Greedier people seemed to find the noise 
                                                   





(the work) equally unpleasant as less greedy people did. There was also no 
relationship between dispositional greed and the [un]attractiveness of the music, 
β =.04, t(296) = 0.721, p = .47. There was, however, the expected relationship 
between dispositional greed and the pursuit of wealth (the [un]attractiveness of 
the of earning chocolates), β = .14, t(296) = 2.18, p = .02. In addition, the 
relationship between dispositional greed and liking chocolates was not 
significant, r(295) = .06, p = .332. To summarize, greedier people found it more 
attractive to pursue rewards. They did not find work to be less aversive. 
Furthermore, greedier individuals did not necessarily find the specific reward that 
was used in our studies (chocolate) to be more interesting. These findings suggest 
that greed leads to more overearning because greedy people value the pursuit of 
wealth more.  
STUDY 5.3 
Our final study addresses the relationship between dispositional greed and 
overearning using a repeated measures design. This allows participants to 
familiarize themselves with the procedure and to learn about how their actions 
influence their outcomes (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). In Study 5.1, it might be 
argued that overearning was the result of participants not fully understanding the 
paradigm, and that the relationship with greed could be explained by the 
uncertainty of the situation making people rely more on their greedy inclinations 
(Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Mischel, 1968). Using repeated measures in Study 
5.3, we can address this possibility. Hence, if we still find overearning at Time 2, 
this is not likely to be the result of uncertainty. Study 5.3 thus provides a stronger 
test of our hypothesis that greed causes overearning. In addition, Study 5.3 offers 
the opportunity to investigate the role of regret and (dis)satisfaction. It is well-
known that regret can lead to learning (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007); people who 
overearn more, probably regret more, and should thus learn more.  
Method 
In order to test our hypotheses, we measured overearning and greed at two 
moments in time, four weeks apart. We ran this study for one week in the 
laboratory, which resulted in 185 participants completing the study at Time 1. 
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The mean age of the participants was 19.74 (SD = 2.14) and 81.6% of the 
participants was female. At Time 2, 239 Tilburg University students (Mage = 
19.96, SD = 2.52, 79.7% female) completed the study, of whom 133 participants 
(Mage = 19.63, SD = 2.12, 86.5% female) also participated at Time 1. Participants 
received course credit or a €5.00 show up fee per session. 
Our method was similar to that of Study 5.1. At Time 1, participants 
completed the overearning paradigm (Hsee et al., 2013) and the DGS (Seuntjens 
et al., 2015b), the order of these two measures was counterbalanced. We now 
also included questions about regret and satisfaction with the outcome. After 
participants had earned chocolates we asked them “How satisfied are you with 
the number of chocolates that you have earned in comparison to how hard you 
had to work?”. After the experimenter had taken away the left over chocolates we 
asked them “How satisfied are you with the number of chocolates that were left 
over in comparison to how hard you had to work?” (both -3 = very dissatisfied, 
3 = very satisfied). In addition, we asked them about how much they regretted 
the amount of work they did “If you look at the number of chocolates that you 
have left, how much do you regret all the work you did?” (1 = no regret at all, 7 
= a lot of regret) and whether they would have liked to have done it differently 
“In hindsight, would you want to work less, equal, or more?” (-3 = much less, 3 
= much more). In addition, participants rated how much they liked chocolates 
(1 = not at all, 7 = a lot). At Time 2, the procedure was identical to the procedure 
at Time 1. 
Results and discussion 
Time 1  
Overearning. Replicating the results from Hsee et al. (2013) and Study 5.1, 
participants earned significantly more chocolates (M = 7.72, SD = 10.75, Mdn = 
4) than they consumed (M = 2.52, SD = 2.64, Mdn = 1), Z = -7.55, p < .001.31 
This means they overearned on average 5.20 (SD = 9.71, Mdn = 2) chocolates. 
                                                   





In total 54.1% of participants overearned and had chocolates left at the end of 
the experiment. 
Greed and overearning. Three over-dispersion corrected Poisson regression 
analyses were conducted with dispositional greed as predictor and amount of 
chocolates earned, consumed, and overearned as dependent variables.32 Greedy 
individuals earned more chocolates than less greedy individuals, b = 0.36, SE = 
0.13, t(184) = 2.67, p = .008 . We did not find an effect of greed on the amount 
of chocolates consumed, b = 0.03, SE = 0.10, t(184) = 0.27, p = .79 (we had 
found a marginally significant effect here in Study 5.1). Most importantly, we 
replicated that overearning was predicted by greed, b = 0.50, SE = 0.17, t(184) = 
2.96, p = .003.33 See Figure 5.2 for a graphical representation of the analyses. 
(Dis)Satisfaction and regret. We were also interested in people’s emotional 
reactions to overearning. We asked how (dis)satisfied participants were after they 
earned and overearned (-3 = very dissatisfied, 3 = very satisfied). Participants were 
satisfied after they earned chocolates (M = 2.23, SD = 1.12), but satisfaction 
dropped after the consumption phase (M = 1.83, SD = 1.41), paired-t(183) = 
4.38, p < .001, d = 0.31. Participants who had earned more, were more satisfied 
with their chocolates than participants who had earned less, β = .15, t(183) = 
2.08, p = .039. However, as soon as left-over chocolates were taken away at the 
end of the consumption phase, and earning became overearning, participants 
who had overearned more, were less satisfied than participants who had not 
overearned as much, β = -.18, t(184) = 2.41, p = .017.
                                                   
32 We controlled for liking chocolate. Not controlling for liking chocolate yielded similar results. 
33 Linear regression analyses yielded similar results. Earning: β = .20, t(184) = 2.72, p = .007, p = 







Figure 5.2. The amount of chocolates earned, consumed, and overearned as a function of Dispositional Greed in Study 5.3 at Time 1 





 There was no direct effect of greed on (dis)satisfaction after overearning, β = 
.01, t(184) = 0.06, p = .95. Interestingly, conducting a mediation analysis (with 
bias corrected intervals and 10,000 iterations; see Preacher & Hayes, 2008), we 
found that the relationship between greed and satisfaction is mediated by 
overearning (95% CI: lower = -.19; upper = -.01). Thus, although greed did not 
directly lead to less satisfaction, it did lead to more overearning, which led to 
reduced satisfaction.  
For regret, we found a similar pattern. Participants who had overearned more, 
regretted the amount of work more than participants who had not overearned as 
much, β = .32, t(184) = 4.64, p < .001. We did not find a direct effect of greed 
on regret, β = .09, t(184) = 1.26, p = .21. Mediation analysis revealed that the 
relationship between greed and regret was mediated by overearning (95% CI: 
lower = .04; upper = .21). In addition, participants who indicated that they 
regretted the amount of work they did indicated that, in hindsight, they should 
have worked less, β = -.45, t(184) = 6.72, p < .001. 
Time 2 
Overearning. At Time 1 we found that greedy people overearned more than 
less greedy people, and that people who overearned were less satisfied with their 
outcomes. We tested whether people’s behavior changed at Time 2 when put in 
the same situation again. We found that participants who had participated at 
Time 1 still overearned at Time 2 (Mearning = 4.35, SD = 6.58, Mdn = 3; Mconsumption 
= 2.41, SD = 2.19, Mdn = 2; Moverearning = 1.95, SD = 5.66, Mdn = 0), Z = -6.93, 
p < .001,34 but overearning was significantly lower at Time 2 (M = 1.95, SD = 
5.66, Mdn = 0) compared to Time 1 (M = 4.65, SD = 8.92, Mdn = 2), Z = -
4.05, p < .001.35 At Time 2, 37.6% of the participants still overearned. Table 5.1 
shows all the difference scores between Time 1 and Time 2 for participants that 
participated at both times.  
                                                   
34 A paired samples t-test yielded similar results, t(132) = 3.97, p < .001, d = 0.40. 
35 A paired samples t-test yielded similar results, t(132) = 3.71, p < .001, d = 0.41. 
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We also compared participants (N = 99) who participated for the first time at 
Time 2 with those who participated for the second time (N = 13636) using a 
Mann-Whitney U test. Participants who participated for the first time (M = 3.27, 
SD = 7.26, Mdn = 0) overearned significantly more than participants that did 
the study for the second time (M = 1.91, SD = 5.60, Mdn = 0), U = 5555.00, p 
= .011. 37  Of the participants who participated for the first time, 49.5% 
overearned, whereas of the participants that did the study for the second time 
only 36.8% overearned. It is thus clear that participants learn from prior 
overearning, and overearn less a second time, though overearning still exists.  
Greed and overearning. We conducted over-dispersion corrected Poisson 
regression analyses with dispositional greed as predictor and amount of chocolates 
earned, consumed, and overearned as dependent variables, while controlling for 
liking chocolate.38 Similar to Study 5.1 and Time 1 in Study 5.3, we found that 
greedy individuals earned, b = 0.48, SE = 0.15, t(132) = 3.30, p = .001, and 
consumed, b = 0.26, SE = 0.09, t(132) = 2.91, p = .004 more chocolates than 
less greedy individuals did. Most importantly, we replicated that also at Time 2 
overearning was predicted by greed, b = 0.74, t(132) = 2.68, SE = 0.28, p = .008 
(see Figure 5.2 for a graphical representation).39 
                                                   
36 Note that the number of participants who indicated that they participated for the second time is 
one person higher than the number of participants that we actually have data of at two times. It is 
possible that we could not link the data of one participants because he/she made a typo when we 
asked for the identification number.  
37 An independent samples t-test found a trend in the same direction, albeit not significant, t(233) 
= 1.62, p = .11. 
38 We used greed at Time 1 as a predictor. There was no difference between greed at Time 1 and 
Time 2, t(132) = 1.39, p = .166, r(132) = .83. Using greed at Time 2 yielded similar results. If we 
do not control for liking chocolate, we find similar results. 
39 Linear regression analyses yielded similar results. Earning: β = .26, t(132) = 3.07, p = .003; 





8  Table 5.1. Comparison of dependent variables at Time 1 and Time 2 in Study 5.3. 
Note. We counted the number of chocolates earned, consumed and overearned. Satisfaction with earned and left over chocolates was 
measured on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 = very dissatisfied to 3 = very satisfied. Regret was measured on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 = no regret at all to 7 = a lot of regret. Work in hindsight was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 = much less to 3 = 
much more.  
 Time 1 
N = 185 
Time 2 
N = 133 
Time 1 – Time 2 
N = 133 
Variable M SD Mdn % > 0 M SD Mdn % > 0 Z / t p d 
Number of chocolates            
Earned 7.72 10.75 4 82.2 4.35 6.58 3 87.2 -3.18 .001  
Consumed 2.52 2.64 1 77.8 2.41 2.19 2 83.5 -0.42 .675  
Overearned 5.20 9.71 2 54.1 1.95 5.66 0 37.6 -4.05 .001  
Ratings            
Satisfaction with earned chocolates 2.22 1.12   2.35 0.81   -.0.94 .348 0.13 
Satisfaction with left over chocolates 1.82 1.41   2.20 0.98   -2.78 .006 0.31 
Regret about work 1.72 1.19   1.38 0.85   3.29 .001 0.33 
Amount of work in hindsight -0.37 1.16   -0.16 0.91   -1.67 .097 0.20 
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(Dis)Satisfaction and regret. Just as at Time 1, at Time 2 participants were 
more satisfied after they had earned the chocolates, but before they consumed 
them (M = 2.34, SD = 0.81), than after they consumed them and returned the 
left over ones (M = 2.20, SD = 0.98), t(132) = 2.14, p = .035. However, there 
was no effect of overearning on satisfaction, β = -.06, t(132) = 0.64, p = .53, nor 
of greed on satisfaction after overearning, β = .04, t(132) = 0.06, p = .70. In other 
words, the number of chocolates participants had to return and their greediness 
did not influence satisfaction after they had to return the chocolates. There was 
no effect of overearning on regret, β = .05, t(132) = 0.57, p = .57, but, there was 
an effect of greed on regret, β = .19, t(132) = 2.22, p = .028. Greedy individuals 
regretted their behavior more than less greedy individuals.  
Participants overearned less at Time 2 than they had done at Time 1. If we 
look at possible reasons for this, we find that the more participants indicated at 
Time 1 that, in hindsight, they had wanted to work less, the less hard they worked 
at Time 2, b = -.43, SE = 0.20, t(132) = -2.18, p = .031.40 However, satisfaction 
after overearning at Time 1 did not predict overearning at Time 2, b = -.06, SE 
= 0.17, t(132) = -0.33, p = .740.41 Nor did regret after overearning at Time 1 
predict overearning at Time 2, b = 0.17, SE = 0.19, t(132) = 0.90, p = .373.42  
To conclude, in Study 5.3 we replicated that greedier people overearn more. 
We also found that people learn from prior overearning; when they have 
overearned in the past they tend to overearn less a second time. Above all, we find 
that also when doing the overearning paradigm twice, greedy people still overearn 
more. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This research replicates and extends the pioneering work of Hsee et al. (2013) 
on overearning, by examining the role of individual differences in greed and the 
role of regret and satisfaction in understanding overearning. Study 5.1 found that 
                                                   
40 A linear regression analysis yielded similar results, β = -.18, t(132) = -2.07, p = .040. 
41 A linear regression analysis yielded similar results, β = -.03, t(132) = -0.34, p = .736. 





greedy people are more susceptible to overearning. Study 5.2 suggests that this 
effect is driven by greedy people having a stronger desire to pursue wealth, not 
because they have less aversion to labor (Mill, 1844). Study 5.3 replicates Study 
5.1, finding that greedy individuals overearned more than less greedy individuals. 
Study 5.3 reveals a number of additional findings. First, the relationship between 
greed and overearning remains after participants have had the opportunity to 
learn, giving stronger support for the relationship between greed and overearning. 
Second, overearning was associated with more regret and (dis)satisfaction, and 
people who said that they would work in hindsight less at Time 1, actually did 
so at Time 2. In general, we found that people learn from prior overearning and 
do so less a second time.  
Contributions and implications 
Hsee et al. (2013) argued for mindless accumulation of goods (working until 
one is tired, instead of until one has enough) as a possible explanation of 
overearning. Accordingly, overearning might be the result of some sort of 
functional heuristic. Historically earning rates have been low, meaning that 
overearning was not a frequently occurring problem, as people often could not 
earn too much. In addition to the mindless accumulation explanation, our point, 
that greed is associated with overearning, proposes that more motivational 
processes play a role in overearning as well. Greedy people overearn more than 
less greedy people, and they do so because they like earning more, not because 
they like working more than others do. Greed is often seen as a survival 
mechanism in situations of scarcity (Robertson, 2001), and, indeed, previous 
research has found that people who grew up in situations with scarcity are 
greedier than people who grew up in situations with abundance (Krekels, 2015). 
It might be that, especially for people who are used to having little, greed is a 
strategy to make sure that they have enough in the future, even if they have no 
immediate use for this surplus.  
In Study 5.3 we wanted to see if the effect of dispositional greed on 
overearning would remain after people had the opportunity to learn from their 
previous behavior. Although we did indeed find that dispositional greedy people 
 
Greed, Work, and Overearning 
151 
 
still overearned more the second time, the overall overearning effect decreased. 
We found that this was especially the case for participants who indicated at Time 
1 that they would want to work less a second time. It thus seems that participants 
do not accurately predict how much they want to earn, and learn from that 
mistake when confronted with a possible overearning situation a second time. A 
possible explanation for this is that people make incorrect predictions, which is 
in line with a vast body of research that has found that people are not good at 
predicting their future feelings and often make incorrect affective forecasts 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). Another possibility is that people do not make 
erroneous predictions, but do not make predictions at all. Hsee et al. (2013) 
found that participants were pretty accurate at making predictions about how 
much they would consume when asked to make such a prediction, but normally 
did not make any predictions. Either way, this research suggests that people do 
not make accurate predictions at first, but learn to do so, after they have received 
feedback on their prior behavior.  
Our research could have various practical implications. From an 
organizational perspective, it is interesting that dispositional greed is associated 
with more work and overearning. Greedy employees might be more productive, 
because they want to pursue positive outcomes more. However, there is also the 
risk of these employees investing effort in tasks that will ultimately lead to waste. 
More broadly speaking, our research could have implications for people’s general 
well-being. When greedy people spend too much time working, this will result 
in having little time for other social interactions and enjoying the good things in 
life. At the end of life, people often regret the time they have invested in their 
work, instead of family, friends, and free time (Ware, 2011). Greedy people often 
have a lower satisfaction with life (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015; Seuntjens et al., 
2015b). They may maximize wealth, but do not appear to maximize well-being.  
Lastly, our findings speak to more general ideas about the productive nature 
of greed in economics. We found that greedy people worked harder, earning 
more rewards. This finding corroborates ideas in economics about greed being 





best of our knowledge, our findings in Studies 5.1 and 5.3 constitute the first 
empirical demonstration of this productive power of greed. At the same time, 
however, the finding that greed can result in working more than needed (even 
when the work is unattractive) clearly demonstrates the potential inefficiency of 
greed and indicates a limit to its productivity. The positive and negative effects 
of greed are two sides of the same coin. In many cases in life, earning a surplus 
actually yields economic benefits for others, for example when the surplus can be 
used by others. As such, greed can lead to both wasteful and productive 
overearning, depending on what can be done with the surplus that is generated. 
We believe that greed may be an important explanation for overearning.  
Finally, we think it is important that our research also shows that overearning 
may be reduced. Often, people only find out that they worked too much when 
it is too late. If people would get feedback earlier about their work and earning 
patterns and realize that they are overearning, they could still change their 
behavior.  
Limitations and directions for further research 
The reader may have noticed that we found an unexpected difference in the 
amount of chocolates overearned in Studies 5.1 and 5.3. This effect was not 
caused by the number of chocolates consumed by participants, but rather by the 
number of chocolates earned. We believe there are different possible explanations 
for this finding. One explanation might be that the Study 5.1 was conducted in 
spring, whereas Study 5.2 was conducted in the fall. Maybe people were more 
concerned with their diet in the spring (Study 5.1) as a preparation for the 
summer and as a result earned less. A second explanation is that we used different 
chocolates in Study 5.1 and 5.3, and that the ones in Study 5.3 looked more 
attractive.43 However, both explanations do not inform us why consumption was 
the same in both studies. Fortunately, since both studies found the same pattern 
of behavior and a link between dispositional greed and overearning, we believe 
                                                   
43 The chocolates in Study 5.3 were slightly more expensive, but also slightly larger.  
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that these across study differences do not influence the validity of our 
conclusions. 
We used the overearning paradigm developed by Hsee et al. (2013). Although 
this is a good paradigm, controlling for normative reasons for overearning, it is 
very different from overearning in real life, which limits the external validity of 
our findings. According to Cialdini (1980) scholars should test natural 
observations first in a laboratory setting and then further test these hypotheses in 
the field (the so called full-cycle approach). A logical next step would thus be to 
investigate the relationship between greed, learning, and overearning in real life. 
For example, it would be interesting to look at elderly people and ask them how 
much time they have spent on work, and if this is predicted by individual 
differences in greed. If we indeed find this relationship, it would be interesting to 
see if we could change overearning in the working population, by giving feedback 
about earning patterns, so people can learn from their actions.  
Another interesting question for follow-up research would be to look at 
overearning in a more competitive situation. Greedy individuals are more 
competitive than less greedy individuals and competition might exacerbate greed 
(Krekels, 2015). In situations of competition greed might thus be more likely, 
and overearning might also become more likely. An interesting prediction is thus 
whether competitive settings (e.g., the financial services industry) increase the 
likelihood of overearning.  
Concluding remarks 
In three studies we investigated the relationship between overearning and 
greed. We found consistent support for a general tendency to overearn, which is 
amplified for individuals high in greed. Greedy people overearn not because they 
like working more, but because they find acquiring goods more desirable. 
However, people who overearn are less satisfied with their outcomes than people 
that do not overearn. Finally we find that people learn from prior overearning 










Greedy Bastards: Greed and Unethical Behavior 
 
Greed is often seen as immoral, and although the assumption that greed elicits 
unethical behavior is widespread, there is surprisingly little empirical research that 
has tested this relationship. We present a series of three studies investigating the 
association between greed and unethical behavior, using different methodologies 
and samples from the USA, The Netherlands, and Belgium. Study 6.1 (3 
samples, with total N = 3413) reveals that more greedy individuals find a variety 
of transgressions more acceptable and justifiable than less greedy individuals do, 
and indicate that they have more often engaged in a variety of transgressions. 
Study 6.2 (N = 172) replicated these findings in an incentivized behavioral 
laboratory study in which participants made a decision to accept a bribe or not. 
Greedy people were more likely to take a bribe and preferred higher ones. Study 
6.3 (N = 302) examined the potential underlying process by which greed may 
lead to unethical behavior. Greedy people were found to be more likely to 
transgress because they find the positive outcomes associated with the 
transgression more desirable, and therefore have lower self-control. Implications 
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“For the love of money is the root of all evil.” 
– Timothy 6:10 
“Fraud is the daughter of greed.”  
        – Jonathan Gash 
As the quotes above illustrate, greed is often seen as something bad and 
unethical. Being greedy is taking more than needed, and may hurt others 
especially in situations of scarcity. That may be the reason why classic 
philosophers like David Hume and Immanuel Kant considered greed as immoral 
and inappropriate (Wang & Murnighan, 2011). All major religious traditions 
approach greed as something evil. In Christianity greed is one of the seven deadly 
sins (Tickle, 2004), in Buddhism it is one of the three poisons that create bad 
karma (Nath, 1998), and in Hinduism it stands in the way of spiritual 
development (Sundararajan, 1989). Judaism condemns greed because it stands 
in the way of other people’s opportunity to get what they deserve (Bloch, 1984). 
In Islam precautions against greed are taken in the form of mandatory generosity 
and charity for Muslims (Oka & Kuijt, 2014). Greed is thus often seen as 
something negative. 
Not only philosophers and religions relate greed to immorality and unethical 
behavior. Greed is widely discussed as one of the causes of financial scandals and 
the late 2000s financial crisis. As Gilliland and Anderson (2014, p.99) put it: 
“greed has become synonymous with Wall Street, big banks, and indeed much 
of what is wrong with corporate America.” For example, Jordan Belfort, whose 
actions inspired the movie ‘The Wolf of Wall Street’, later said that it was greed 
that drove him to commit fraud and swindle millions of dollars through his firm 
Stratton Oakmont (Belfort, 2014). Likewise, in other scandals, such as the Enron 
Scandal and the Bernie Madoff Investment Scandal, greed has been argued to be 
one of the causes (Sarna, 2010). 
Furthermore, greed has been argued to be a factor related to corrupt mortgage 
lending (Morgenson & Rosner, 2011) and employee theft (Caudil, 1988). 
Haynes, Campbell, and Hitt (2014) report data that show that CEO greed has a 
 




negative relationship with shareholder return. All-in all, greed has had a bad press 
when it comes to the financial world. 
In spite of arguments in favor of a relationship between greed and unethical 
behavior, there are reasons to doubt whether greed in itself is inherently 
unethical. In economics people are assumed to be rational, self-interested, utility 
maximizers. The idea that it is rational to strive for an optimal outcome for 
oneself is sometimes referred to as the axiom of greed (Lea, Tarpy, & Webley, 
1987). Greed could be seen as a form of ambition that makes people strive for 
better outcomes for themselves. Krekels and Pandelaere (2015) found that greed 
is related to productivity orientation (Keinan & Kivetz, 2011), which is the 
continuous striving to use time productively, to make progress, and to reach 
accomplishments. This corresponds with greed being seen as a central motive 
spurring economic growth and development (Greenfeld, 2001). 
There are also instances of greed where notions of ethics do not apply, for 
instance when others are not negatively affected by greedy behavior. When 
someone is greedy for new clothes or shoes this is not necessarily unethical and is 
arguably good for the economy. There may be instances in which greed can be 
good for others, for example when greedy behavior is associated with generating 
surpluses (Oka & Kuijt, 2014) which can be used by other people in society. As 
a case in point, a greedy person who keeps striving to make more money also pays 
more taxes, which can be allocated to create or maintain public services.  
A recent prototype analysis of the concept of greed and its usage in colloquial 
language confirmed the idea that greed is not necessarily immoral (Seuntjens, 
Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, & Van de Ven, 2015a). On the basis of this analysis 
greed was best defined as an insatiable desire to have more of something. Greedy 
people are seen as continuously striving for more and never being satisfied with 
their current state of affairs. Greed was found to be broader than material goods, 
and can also be felt for non-material desires such as power, status, or sex. 
Although the Dutch and U.S. participants in this prototype analysis did not 





others often came to mind when they were asked to write down characteristics of 
greed.  
Taken together, the association between greed and unethical behavior seems 
to be widely shared, but becomes more blurry at closer scrutiny. Furthermore, 
situations can be envisaged in which there is no relationship between greed and 
unethical behavior, or even the opposite relationship as greed can lead to behavior 
that is beneficial for society (as for example argued by economists who see greed 
as a positive motivator that causes economic growth). One way to solve this 
confusion is to empirically study the relationship between greed and unethical 
behavior. This is what we do in the present research. More specifically, we 
investigate if individual differences in greed predict immorality and unethical 
behavior and why this is the case.  
Not all people are equally greedy, there are clear and stable individual 
differences in people’s tendency to be greedy. Recently, a reliable and valid 
instrument has developed to assess an individual’s dispositional greed (Seuntjens, 
Zeelenberg, Van de Ven, & Breugelmans, 2015b). This Dispositional Greed 
Scale (DGS) consists of seven items that are measured on 5-point Likert scales 
(1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Extensive testing with over 6000 
participants revealed that dispositional greed correlated positively with 
maximization tendencies, envy, materialism, and having a proself orientation. It 
correlated negatively with self-control, perspective taking, and empathic concern 
(for similar findings see Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015). These patterns of 
correlations provide face validity for the DGS. Seuntjens et al. (2015b) further 
tested DGS’s predictive validity in a series of economic dilemmas. They found 
that greedy individuals were more likely to propose unfair offers in both dictator 
games and ultimatum games. In a forest management-game (Sheldon & 
McGregor, 2000) greedy individuals were more likely to overharvest; giving 
evidence for the idea that greed plays a role in the Tragedy of the Commons 
(Hardin, 1968). Note that the behavior in these economic dilemmas, at least 
from a rational, economic perspective, is not necessarily unethical, as every 
individual is assumed to strive for optimal individual outcomes in these 
 




dilemmas. In the current research we use the DGS and relate these individual 
differences in greediness to a variety of unethical behaviors. 
Greed and unethical behavior  
The relative paucity in empirical research on greed in general, as noted by 
Wang and Murnighan (2011), also applies to the specific relation of greed and 
unethicality. We found only a small number of articles that address the effects of 
greed. Unfortunately, because of measurement problems and definitional issues 
these studies could not appropriately examine the relation between greed and 
unethical behavior. Let us explain below why we think this is the case.  
Several studies on social decision making argue that greedy people display 
more unethical behavior. For example, Steinel and de Dreu (2004) argued that 
greedy people were more likely to withhold information from others in a 
negotiation setting. Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, and Murnighan (2009) argued that 
groups were greedier than individuals and as a result were more likely to lie. 
Studies in these papers were typically set up to test multiple motivations such as 
fear and greed. Greed is then typically assessed with a single item asking 
participants if they were motivated by “enhancing one’s outcomes”. Of course, 
this item may pick up an element of greed but it is also likely to also pick up or 
other motives such as need or self-interest. Such statements do not pick up the 
excessive and insatiable elements in greed and therefore they cannot be taken as 
valid operationalizations of the unique motive of greed.  
In other studies greed was not measured but rather inferred from people’s 
behavioral decisions (Poppe & Utens, 1986; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 1989). For 
example, Gneezy, Saccardo, and Van Veldhuizen (2015) argued that greed is a 
reason for people to accept bribes. Because greed was not measured in their study 
this claim cannot be verified. By defining the accepting of bribes as the motive of 
greed, we cannot test if greed actually leads to unethical behavior. Put differently, 
motives and behaviors need to be independently assessed if any statement about 
their relationships (be it causal or correlational) can be tested. We provide such a 





In addition, a few other research projects have found that inducing people 
with a calculative mindset leads to greed and unethical behavior. Wang, 
Malhotra, and Murnighan (2011) found that enhancing economic principles 
such as maximizing utility induces greed. In other work Wang, Zhong, and 
Murnighan (2014) investigated how a calculating mindset influences ethical 
decisions. Participants were repeatedly exposed to calculations, and as a result 
were more likely to adopt a mathematical approach to solve problems. 
Participants also displayed more selfish and dishonest behavior to gain higher 
payoffs. Related to this are findings by Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, and Sousa 
(2013), who found that the mere exposure to money resulted in adopting a 
business decision frame and more unethical behavior. These studies point in the 
direction of greed being associated with unethical behavior, however, this 
relationship was not tested directly. Perhaps manipulations of a mathematical 
mindset of money primes also have other effects that could have led to unethical 
behavior. 
Lastly, the research that is most widely cited as showing that greed leads to 
unethical behavior is work by Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, and 
Keltner (2012). They found that those in higher social classes acted more 
unethically, and found that this relationship was mediated by “attitudes towards 
greed”. People from a higher social class had more favorable attitudes towards 
greed and were more likely to engage in unethical behavior. Note that replications 
of this work failed to find the effect of social class on unethical behavior so more 
research is needed to see whether this effect is robust (Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, 
& Zeckhauser, 2013). More importantly for our argument, is that attitudes 
towards greed (whether it is good or bad) are different from the experience of 
greed (being greedy) itself. To illustrate this point by means of an analogy: seeing 
love as good or bad is clearly different from being in love. 
Taken together, these earlier findings are important as they hint at a possible 
relationship between greed and unethical behavior (see also Seuntjens et al., 
2015a) but they cannot provide clear evidence that this is indeed the case. None 
of the aforementioned studies actually measured greed as the tendency of people 
 




to never be satisfied and to always desire more. Rather, greed was inferred from 
behavior or measured as the extent to which people had favorable attitudes 
towards greed. In the current research, we investigate if individual differences in 
greed can predict unethical behavior. We do this in survey studies with multiple 
samples (Study 6.1) and in laboratory studies with incentivized behavior (Study 
6.2). In addition, Study 6.3 investigates why greedy people may be more likely 
to transgress. More specifically, we explore the role of self-control, a psychological 
factor often associated with unethical behavior. Let us explain below how we 
conceptualize this relation between greed, self-control, and unethicality.   
Greed, self-control, and unethical behavior 
There is a vast body of research on the relationship between unethical 
behavior and self-control (Baumeister & Alghamdi, 2015). Self-control (also 
known as self-regulation) is often seen as a battle between willpower and desire 
(Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991), with willpower being used to restrain acting upon 
desire. If self-control is indeed the battle between will-power and desire, then 
both these processes are likely to affect unethical behavior. Greedy people have 
stronger desires, which creates a tougher battle for will-power to win and 
therefore giving in to temptation becomes more likely. For example, Seuntjens et 
al. (2015b) found that dispositional greed is negatively related to self-control and 
positively to impulsivity. Krekels and Pandelaere (2015) found that greed is 
positively related to egoism and defined as “the excessive concern with one’s own 
pleasure or advantage at the expense of community well-being” (p. 44). We 
expect that this preoccupation with fulfilling one’s own desires makes greedy 
people more likely to behave unethically.  
Note that existing literature on self-regulation and unethical behavior has 
typically focused on low will-power (instead of high desire) as the reason for self-
regulatory problems. For example, Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, and Ariely (2011) 
found that if participants’ self-control was depleted, they were more likely to 
cheat on a test and falsely report better performance levels. In similar vein, Barnes, 
Schaubroeck, Huth, and Ghumman (2011) found that sleep deprivation led to 





work. We suggest that a focus on the other element in the equation, namely 
stronger desire in the form of greed, is equally important to understand unethical 
behavior. We believe that greed leads to lower self-control, not because it limits 
will-power, but because it amplifies desires.  
Some research suggesting that increasing desire may lead to more unethical 
behavior. Gino and Pierce (2009) investigated the influence of wealth on 
unethical behavior, finding that people were more likely to cheat when they were 
confronted with abundant wealth compared to scarcity. It might be the case that 
the exposure to large amounts of cash increases desire (maybe even via greed), 
which makes it harder to exert self-control, and consequently led to more 
cheating.  
In the present research we use various methodologies and different samples to 
test the prediction that greed is related to immorality and unethical behavior. 
Moreover, in two of the three studies we test if this relation is mediated by self-
control. In Study 6.1 we used survey data (three samples) to investigate the 
association between dispositional greed and a variety of self-reported 
transgression or attitudes towards these and investigated if this relationship was 
mediated by self-control. In Study 6.2 we tested if dispositional greed predicted 
the acceptance of bribes in an incentivized corruption game. In Study 6.3 we 
investigated the hypothesized underlying process that greedy people behave more 
unethically because their heightened desire makes it harder to keep self-control. 
STUDY 6.1 
As a first step we collected correlational data on the relationship between 
dispositional greed and unethical behavior. In Sample 6.1.1 we asked people how 
often they engaged in different types of unethical behavior. In Samples 6.1.2 and 
6.1.3 we asked people to rate how acceptable or justifiable different types of 
unethical behavior were. See Table 6.1 for an overview of the descriptive statistics 







Table 6.1. Mean scores and standard deviation of the items of the Dispositional Greed Scale for all samples in Study 6.1. 
Note. In Samples 6.1.2a and 6.1.2b greed was assessed with the short 3-item version of the DGS. Participants were asked to indicate 
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  Items M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1.  I always want more. 2.89 2.89 2.14 1.04 2.27 1.09 2.12 1.02 2.20 0.98 
2.  Actually, I’m kind of greedy. 2.55 2.55 2.25 1.07 2.20 1.08 1.93 0.94 1.99 0.94 
3.   One can never have too much money. 3.34 3.34 -- -- -- -- 2.69 1.13 2.79 1.10 
4.  As soon as I have acquired something I start to 
think about the next thing I want.   
2.73 2.73 2.01 1.05 1.94 1.05 1.74 0.85 1.82 0.87 
5. 
  
It doesn’t matter how much I have. I’m never 
completely satisfied.   
2.53 2.53 -- -- -- -- 1.52 0.74 1.58 0.76 
6.  My life motto is ‘more is better’.  2.48 2.48 -- -- -- -- 1.70 0.88 1.70 0.83 
7.   I can’t imagine having too many things.  2.59 2.59 -- -- -- -- 1.57 0.76 1.58 0.75 
 Mean dispositional greed 2.73 2.73 2.13 0.93 2.14 0.98 1.89 0.72 1.95 0.70 





Table 6.2. Correlations of the DGS with unethical behavior in Study 6.1, Sample 6.1.1. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Participants were asked to indicate how often they engaged in each transgression on a 5-
point scale ranging from 1 = never to 5 = very often.  
 
Results and Discussion 
We found clear support for the idea that higher dispositional greed was 
associated with more unethical behavior. In Sample 6.1.1, eight out of ten 
transgressions showed a positive correlation between dispositional greed and the 
extent to which participants indicated that they engaged in that particular 
transgression. For one transgression we did not find a relationship, and for one 
we found only a marginally significant positive association. Averaging scores 
across all transgressions also yielded a positive correlation. See Table 6.2 for an 
overview of descriptive statistics and correlations.  
Samples 6.1.2a and 6.1.2b also showed a positive association between 
dispositional greed (measured by the 3-item version of the DGS) and unethical 
behavior. In both samples, we found a positive correlation between greed and the 
three transgressions, as well as a positive correlation between greed and the mean 
score of the transgressions (see Table 6.3).  
 
 
Unethical behavior M SD r 
Evading fare on public transit 1.40 0.77 .08 
Not mentioning that cashier gave too much change 2.10 1.15 .20*** 
Cribbing on an exam 1.51 0.82 .25*** 
Cheating on partner  1.46 0.82 .15* 
Illegally downloading movies 2.70 1.36 .16* 
Call in sick when not feeling like working 2.24 0.90 .10† 
Bullying kids in school 1.78 0.87 .13*** 
Spreading gossip 2.32 0.82 .17*** 
Running a red light by car 1.91 0.76 .12* 
Discriminating others (for example on gender, race, or sexuality) 1.81 0.86 .23*** 
Average unethical behavior (α = .73) 1.92 0.50 .29*** 
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Table 6.3. Correlations of the DGS with unethical behavior in Study 6.1, Samples 6.1.2a 
and 6.1.2b. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Participants were asked to indicate how acceptable the transgressions were on 5-point 




Table 6.4. Correlations of the DGS with unethical behavior in Study 6.1, Sample 6.1.3a. 
* p < .05; *** p < .001.  
Participants were asked to indicate how justifiable it is to engage in these behaviors on 5-
point scales ranging from 1 = never justifiable to 5 = always justifiable.  
 
  




Unethical behavior M SD r M SD r 
Not returning a wallet  2.28 1.28 .25*** 1.95 1.18 .19*** 
Not mentioning extra income on tax 
return  
2.81 1.34 .12*** 2.97 2.97 .08* 
Buying alcohol for a 16-year old in 
return for €10. 
1.34 0.88 .27***    
Buying marihuana for a foreigner in 
return for €10. 
   2.38 2.38 .16*** 
Average unethical behavior  
(α = .38; α = .50) 
2.16 0.79 .30*** 2.43 0.96 .20*** 
Unethical behavior M SD r 
Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to  1.47 1.28 .06 
Cheating on tax if you had the chance  2.25 1.78 .14* 
Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else  1.34 0.97 .22*** 
Lying in your own interest  3.20 1.78 .28*** 
Married men/women having an affair  2.48 1.84 .13* 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties  1.75 1.46 .30*** 
Avoiding a fare in public transport  2.54 2.07 .31*** 





Samples 6.1.3a and 6.1.3b also showed a positive correlation between 
dispositional greed and unethical behavior. In Sample 6.1.3a, six out of seven 
transgressions were positively correlated with dispositional greed (see Table 6.4.). 
In Sample 6.1.3b all twelve transgressions were positively associated with 
dispositional greed (see Table 6.5). In both Samples 6.1.3a and 6.1.3b, and 
aggregated transgression measure also showed a positive association with 
dispositional greed.  
 
 
Table 6.5. Correlations of the DGS with unethical behavior in Study 6.1, Sample 6.13b. 
† p < .10; * p <.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
Participants were asked to indicate how acceptable the transgressions were on 5-point 
scales ranging from 1 = entirely unacceptable to 5 = entirely acceptable.  
 
Unethical behavior M SD r 
Lying that you precisely observed a diet to lose weight 2.76 0.93 .17*** 
Buying imitation brand clothing and pretending it's the real 
thing 
2.70 0.96 .17*** 
Dishonestly calling in sick to work for one day 2.00 0.91 .16*** 
Using computer software or games without paying for it 2.86 1.04 .17*** 
Downloading or copying films or music from the Internet 
without paying for it 
3.20 1.04 .18*** 
Keeping quiet when a chain store accidentally charges too little 
for a product 
2.73 0.99 .21*** 
Not notifying the bank after it accidentally transfers money into 
your account 
2.27 0.96 .26*** 
Pretending to others that the price of a product is more than 
what you actually paid for it 
2.41 0.85 .19*** 
Claiming a guarantee on a product for which the term of the 
guarantee has actually expired 
2.90 0.96 .15*** 
Switching price tags in a supermarket in order to get something 
more cheaply 
1.58 0.66 .15*** 
Dishonestly reporting something as stolen to a travel insurance 1.60 0.67 .16*** 
Taking along a towel or another 'souvenir' from an international 
hotel or restaurant 
2.05 0.86 .17*** 
Average unethical behavior (α = .86) 2.41 0.58 .28*** 
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Figure 6.1. Forest plot of the mean correlations between dispositional greed and 
unethical behavior in all samples of Study 6.1. 
Meta-analysis 
To assess the average correlation between dispositional greed and unethical 
behavior we conducted a random effects meta-analysis on the average correlation 
between dispositional greed and unethical behavior on the five samples in Study 
6.1 (see Figure 6.1). The mean effect size across all five samples was r = .28, 
indicating that there is a moderate correlation between dispositional greed and 
unethical behavior. The test for heterogeneity is significant, Q(df = 4) = 10.30, p 
= .04, implying that there are likely moderators that influence the magnitude of 
the effect between dispositional greed and unethical behavior.  
Mediation analyses 
Because part of the participants in Sample 6.1.3a and 6.1.3b had previously 
filled in the self-control scale, this gave us the opportunity to examine the idea 
that greed leads to more unethical behavior via a lower self-control. We ran two 
mediation analyses, following the bootstrapping procedure by Preacher and 





contains the unstandardized regression coefficients of Sample 6.1.3a and 6.1.3b. 
For both samples, the 95% confidence interval (CI) for the indirect effect of self-
control did not include zero (95% CI Sample 6.1.3a: lower = .01, upper = .17; 
95% CI Sample 6.1.3b: lower = .05, upper = .11), indicating that self-control 
statistically mediated the relationship between dispositional greed and unethical 
behavior. We find these results especially telling because the different constructs 
(greed, self-control, and the transgressions) were assessed at different points in 
time. 
To summarize, using three different samples, we found that dispositional 
greedy individuals find a variety of transgressions more acceptable and justifiable, 
and indicate that they more frequently transgress. Across all five studies, we find 
that this effect is moderate. In addition, Samples 6.1.3a and 6.1.3b showed 
evidence for the relationship between greed and unethical behavior being 









† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001; ns = not significant.   
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The next step was to investigate if dispositional greed predicted actual 
immoral behavior. In order to test this we related participants’ responses on the 
DGS to behavioral decisions in a corruption game (Frank & Schulze, 2000).  
Method 
Participants were 172 first year students (Mage = 19.68, SDage = 2.14, 19.8% 
male, 80.2% female) that participated in return for course credit. Participants 
completed the corruption game developed by Frank and Schulze (2000). 
Participants were asked to imagine a situation in which the psychology study 
association had lost 200 Euros (it fell down a drain pipe and could only be 
retrieved by a plumber company). The study association had asked the 
participant to choose the most favorable offer (for the study association). Ten 
plumber companies had placed an offer that only the participant knew. Each offer 
consisted of two parts, first, the price the study association had to pay for the 
plumber’s service, and second, the amount of money the participant would 
receive if he or she picked that particular company. The scheme with offers was 
constructed in such a way that the more money the participant would receive, 
the more money the study association had to pay to the plumber company. 
Participants had to choose one of the ten plumber companies. In the best case for 
the study association, the participant would pick the plumber who charged 20 
Euro (leaving 180 Euro for the study association), however, in that case the 
participant received no bribe (0 Euro). In the worst case for the study association, 
the participant would pick the plumber who charged 200 Euro (leaving no 
money for the study association), in that case the participant would receive a 
bribe of 144 Euro.  
It was made clear to the participants that at the end of the week we would 
randomly select one participant and that this participant (and the study 
association) would get paid according to that participants’ choice. For example, 
if a participant had chosen company A5, this would mean that the study 





minus the 100 Euro for the service of the plumber company) and the participant 
would receive the bribe of 64 Euro.   
After participants had made their decision in the corruption game they were 
asked to fill out the 7-item DGS. On average, participants scored 2.47 (SD = 
0.69) on the 5-point greed scale. Reliability of the scale was good (α = .81). Of 
the 172 participants, 78.5% of the participants accepted a bribe, and the average 
bribe was €70.28 (SD = 36.10). 
Results and discussion  
An ordered probit regression analysis was conducted to investigate the effect 
of dispositional greed on corruption. Greedy participants were more likely to 
choose a company that offered a higher bribe, b = 0.38, s.e. = 0.12, Wald = 10.90, 
p < .001. To further explore the relationship between greed and bribes we 
conducted a binary logistic regression analysis to see if greed predicts whether 
people accept a bribe or not and a linear regression analysis to investigate if they 
accept higher bribes (for those who accepted a bribe in the first place). The binary 
logistic regression analysis revealed that dispositional greed predicted whether 
people accepted a bribe or not, odds ratio = 2.03, Wald = 5.80, p = .016. This 
indicates that an increase of 1 point on the DGS doubles the probability of 
accepting a bribe. Lastly, we looked at the relationship between greed and the 
amount of bribe that people accepted (for those who had chosen to accept a 
bribe). The higher people scored on dispositional greed, the higher the bribe was 
they accepted, β = .19, t(134) = 2.24 p = .03. 
STUDY 6.3 
Thus far we found support for the idea that greedy people are more lenient 
when it comes to unethical behaviors; they evaluate them as more acceptable and 
they indicate to engage in them more often (Study 6.1). We also found that the 
greedy are more susceptible to bribes (Study 6.2). The results of Study 6.1 further 
suggest that the relationship between greed and unethical behavior runs via 
lowered self-control in greedy people. To further test this idea of mediation 
through self-control we designed Study 6.3. In this study we presented 
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participants with two scenarios in which they could choose to transgress or not. 
The Wallet scenario describes the dilemma of finding a wallet with money and 
an ID in it (do you keep the money or not?). The Attractive person scenario 
describes the dilemma of being romantically approached by an attractive person 
while you are in a relationship (do you act on the temptation or not?). The 
transgressions were tempting, and participants would need willpower to resist 
them. In this study we assessed how greedy people were, whether they would act 
on the temptation, how desirable they saw the temptations to be, and how much 
willpower they would need to refrain from transgressing. This allows for testing 
both elements of self-control as potential mediators of the effects of dispositional 
greed.   
Method 
Participants were 302 MTurk-workers with location restriction set at the 
U.S.A. (Mage = 33.08, SDage = 10.28; 54.6% male, 45.4% female) who 
participated in return for $0.30. Participants read both scenarios and answered 
the accompanying questions. In the Wallet scenario participants read the 
following:   
You are walking down the street when you come across a wallet 
lying on the ground. You open the wallet and find that it contains 
$50 in cash as well the owner‘s driver‘s license. From the credit 
cards and other items in the wallet it’s very clear that the wallet‘s 
owner is wealthy. You, on the other hand, have been hit by hard 
times recently and could really use some extra money. You consider 
sending the wallet back to the owner without the cash, keeping the 
cash for yourself.  
We then asked them the following questions: “Would you keep the money 
you found in the wallet in order to have more money to yourself?” (ranging from 
-3 = definitely no to 3 = definitely yes; M = -1.19; SD = 2.18); “How desirable 
would it be for you to keep the money yourself?” (ranging from -3 = very 





willpower would you need to return the wallet?” (ranging from -3 = no willpower 
to 3 = a lot of willpower; M = -0.25, SD = 2.22).  
In the Attractive person scenario participants read the following: 
You are away on a trip for work and spend a few days in a hotel in 
a large city on the other side of the country. You are the only one 
from your company and do not know anybody in that city. On the 
third night you decide to go out and have a drink in one of the local 
bars. When you notice an attractive person at the bar, s/he also 
notices you and is clearly interested. You start chatting and before 
you know it is a few hours and a few drinks later, and you are having 
the time of your life. It is clear that the two of you feel very much 
attracted to each other. You are actually aroused and excited. Now, 
s/he asks you to come to his/her hotel room and spend the night, 
no strings attached. The both of you are in a relationship and do 
not want to ruin that. But this night brings an unexpected 
opportunity to make out with a beautiful person, and no one has 
to find out anything.  
We then asked participants the following questions: “Would you accept the 
invitation to spend the night with this attractive person?” (ranging from -3 = 
definitely no to 3 = definitely yes; M = -1.18, SD = 2.09); “How desirable would 
it be for you to spend the night with this attractive person?” (ranging from -3 = 
very undesirable to 3 = very desirable; M = 0.78, SD = 2.16); and “How much 
willpower would you need to decline the invitation?” (ranging from -3 = no 
willpower to 3 = a lot of willpower; M = 0.73, SD = 2.15).  
In addition to answering these questions about the two scenarios they also 
completed the DGS (M = 2.73, SD = 0.96). The order in which the scenarios 
were presented and the order between scenarios and the DGS were 
counterbalanced, which did not affect the results.  
  
 
Greed and Unethical Behavior 
173 
 
Results and discussion  
Using linear regression analyses, we first investigated whether dispositional 
greed was associated with the transgressions. As expected, dispositional greedy 
individuals indicated that they were more likely to keep the money to themselves, 
β = .31, t(301) = 5.64, p < .001. In addition, greedy individuals indicated that 
they were more likely to cheat on their partner, β = .29, t(301) = 5.27, p < .001. 
This replicated the main finding of the present research that greed is related to 
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The further aim of Study 6.3 was to investigate if the relationship between 
greed and transgressions was mediated by self-control. More specifically, we 
wanted to test if higher levels of desire in greedy individuals would (partially) 
account for why they transgress. A mediation analysis of dispositional greed on 
returning the wallet revealed that the relationship between the two was partially 
mediated by desire (95% CI: lower = .14, upper = .36) and willpower (95% CI: 
lower = .03, upper = .17). If we contrast the two mediators, we find that desire is 
a stronger mediator than willpower (95% CI: lower = .03, upper = .30).  
A mediation analysis of dispositional greed on accepting the offer of the 
attractive person (and thus cheat on their partner) revealed that the relationship 
between the two was partially mediated by desire (95% CI: lower = .08, upper: 
.31), but not by willpower (95% CI: lower = -.01, upper = .09). As expected, if 
we contrast the two mediators, we again find that desire is a stronger mediator 
than willpower (95% CI: lower = .05, upper = .31). For a graphical representation 
of the mediation analyses see Figure 6.3. These results suggest that greedy people 
engage more in unethical behavior because they have less self-control especially 
because greed seems to increase desire, making it harder to refrain from 
transgressing.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The goal of this research was to investigate the often assumed link between 
greed on the one hand, and unethical behavior and immorality on the other. In 
line with common conceptions about greed, we found in three studies that 
dispositional greed was indeed associated with more unethical behavior. 
Combining responses of over 3000 participants, Study 6.1 revealed that 
dispositional greedy individuals found a wide range of transgressions more 
acceptable and indicated that they had more often engaged in a variety of 
transgressions. In addition, we found that the association between dispositional 
greed and acceptability ratings of transgressions was statistically mediated by 
individual differences in self-control.  
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Study 6.2 found that dispositional greed predicted people’s decisions in an 
incentivized corruption game. Participants had to pick a plumber company for 
their study association. There were multiple plumber companies they could 
choose from, all ranging in the price for their service to the study association, and 
in the amount of money they offered as a bribe. Greedy participants were more 
likely to choose a company that offered a bribe, and were more likely to choose a 
company that offered a larger bribe compared to a lower bribe.  
Study 6.3 further investigated the mediating role of self-control. Participants 
were asked to imagine two situations in which transgressing would have a 
desirable outcome (not returning a lost wallet; cheating on a partner with an 
attractive other person). For both situations participants had to indicate if they 
would transgress or not, and had to indicate how desirable it would be to 
transgress and how much willpower they would need to refrain from 
transgressing. Again, we found that the relationship between greed and unethical 
behavior was mediated by self-control. Greedy individuals experience especially 
more desire and are therefore more easily lured into unethical behavior.  
Contributions and implications 
The idea that greed is immoral is old and widespread (Oka & Kuijt, 2014). 
However, until recently, greed was mostly neglected in empirical research due to 
problems defining the construct (Wang & Murnighan, 2011). Greed has more 
clearly been defined (Seuntjens et al., 2015a), and research on greed has spurred 
in recent years (e.g., Gilliland & Anderson, 2014; Haynes, Hitt, & Campbell, 
2015; Haynes et al., 2014; Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015; Mussel, Reiter, Osinsky, 
& Hewig, 2015; Seuntjens et al., 2015b). The current research complements the 
existing literature on greed by demonstrating its relationship with unethical or 
immoral behavior. Several studies have suggested that greed leads to unethical 
behavior, but could not explicitly test this link because greed was confounded 
with self-interest or was inferred rather than measured (e.g., Cohen et al., 2009; 
Gneezy et al., 2015). To our knowledge, the present research is the first to show 
empirically that individual differences in greed reliably predict how acceptable 





In addition, this research demonstrated the mediating role of self-control in 
the relationship between greed and unethical behavior. Multiple studies have 
found that low self-control is associated with unethical behavior. Self-control is 
usually seen as a battle between desire and willpower (Hoch & Loewenstein, 
1991). Studies investigating unethical behavior and self-control failure have 
typically focused on how ego depletion lowers will-power, which in turn makes 
people more likely to act unethically (Gino et al., 2011; Barnes et al., 2011). In 
the current research we show that self-control failure is not only the result of low 
willpower, but can also occur when desires are elevated. We show that greedy 
individuals are more tempted by the desirable outcome related to the unethical 
behavior, and therefore are more likely to act unethically. 
The current findings may also shed light on the discussion of whether greed 
is good or bad. Traditionally, greed has been associated with unethical behavior 
and immorality. Most major religions, as well as famous philosophers have argued 
that greed is bad (Oka & Kuijt, 2014). However, from an economics standpoint 
greed is also related to positive outcomes, as greed motivates economic 
development (Greenfeld, 2001). In the current research we find that greed is 
indeed associated with unethical behavior. Greedy people were more acceptable 
towards, and more likely to engage in a variety of transgressions. Although this 
does not answer the question if greed is inherently bad, it does show that greed 
can have negative consequences.  
In the last decade a number of companies and organizations was confronted 
with large fraud cases and other financial scandals. The insight that greed may 
partially explain this behavior might help companies with the prevention of these 
types of scandals. Situations that could elicit greed, such as a competitive 
environment or high bonuses, could lead to people behaving more unethically. 
Previous research has found that companies with greedy CEOs perform worse 
than companies with less greedy CEO’s, which is partly due to the misuse of the 
financial resources of the firm (Haynes et al., 2014; see also Haynes et al., 2015). 
Insights in the relationship between greed and unethical behavior are thus helpful 
because it can help interventions that prevent unethical behavior as a result of 
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greed. This can be helpful at all levels of a company, because greed-fueled 
unethical behavior can be the result of greedy CEO’s that commit fraud, to 
employees that steal office supplies or dishonestly calling in sick for work. 
Limitations and directions for further research 
In the current research we argued that greed leads to more unethical behavior 
because it lowers self-control. People usually fail to exert self-control when desires 
are stronger than willpower (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). We hypothesized that 
because greed is an insatiable desire for more of something, greedy people would 
be more likely to fail in self-control. Although we do find that the relationship 
between greed and unethical behavior is mediated by self-control, this does not 
mean that there are no other underlying mechanisms that could explain this 
relationship. One of the mechanisms that could play a role is moral 
disengagement. Moral disengagement refers a process in which people disengage 
their internal moral standards from behavior and explains why normal people can 
behave unethically without feeling bad (Bandura, 1986). Previous research has 
found that moral disengagement is influenced by a variety of dispositions 
including cynicism and empathy (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008). A possible 
explanation for why dispositional greedy individuals are more prone to behave 
unethically could be that they are also more prone to moral disengagement. If 
they are less likely to feel bad about their transgressions, it is likely that they more 
often engage in this type of behavior.  
A related alternative explanations is that greed individuals simply do not think 
about the consequences of their behavior. Previous work shows that greed is 
associated with having a tunnel vision and being goal oriented (Seuntjens et al., 
2015a). Being focused on one specific goal can make people inattentive to other 
things which in turn can lead to more unethical behavior (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, 
& Douma, 2004; Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014). It might be that greedy people are 
so focused attaining their goal that they just do not consider the consequences of 





Further research could also investigate what other cues could increase desire. 
Previous research by Crusius and Mussweiler (2012) shows that increasing desire 
via upward comparison (e.g., a neighbor receiving nice chocolates, cookies, or ice 
cream) led to more envy and anger. This was especially the case when willpower 
was already low (because participants were intoxicated with alcohol or a cognitive 
load task). It would be interesting to see if greed could be elicited by upward 
social comparisons and in this way could lead to more unethical behavior.  
In the current research we solely focused on the relationship between 
individual differences greed and unethical behavior. However, greed can be 
dispositional as well as situational. Investigating the relationship between 
situational greed and unethical behavior would be interesting for two reasons. 
First, it could give insights into the causality of the relationship between greed 
and unethical behavior. In the current research we assumed that greed would lead 
to unethical behavior instead of vice versa, however, we could not test if this was 
indeed the case. Second, it would be interesting to see what types of stimuli 
induce greed. Gino and Pierce (2009) found that abundant wealth compared to 
scarcity, led to more immorality. Abundance might be one of the triggers of 
greed. If so, greed might also be elicited by the money primes in the research on 
the psychological effects of money. Money primes make people more self-
sufficient (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006) and more unethical (Kouchaki et al., 
2013). It would be interesting to investigate if these effect occur through the 
effects of money on greed, or whether these are direct effects of money primes, 
or both.  
Concluding remarks 
The idea that greed is unethical is widespread. The current research confirms 
the idea that greed is associated with unethical behavior. We find that 
dispositional greedy individuals evaluate a variety of transgressions more 
acceptable and are more likely to engage in these transgressions. The relationship 
between greed and unethical behavior can be partially explained by lower self-
control. Greedy individuals find the desirable outcomes associated with unethical 
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In the previous chapters I described my attempts to gain more insights into the 
psychology of greed. Now it is time to reflect on what this dissertation has taught 
us. This dissertation can be divided in two parts. The first part focused on what 
greed is. As I mentioned before, greed is an understudied topic, and one of the 
reasons for this is the disagreement on how to define greed. The aim of Part I was 
to get a clearer definition of greed and to construct a reliable instrument to 
measure greed. In Part II I looked at the behavioral implications of greed, or what 
greed does. People have ample assumptions about how greed influences behavior, 
nonetheless, few of these assumptions have actually been tested. In this part I thus 
looked at several of these proposed behavioral consequences of greed. In this final 
chapter, I will summarize the findings of this dissertation, and go beyond those 
findings by discussing the implications of the research presented. Then I will 
discuss several interesting new questions inspired by my research findings so far. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Part I: What greed is… 
Despite the numerous writings about greed, there is surprisingly little 
empirical research that has investigated greed. One plausible reason for this 
neglect might be that people seem to have difficulties defining greed (Wang & 
Murnighan, 2011). In order to overcome this hurdle, and to make it easier to 
conceptualize greed, Chapter 2 describes a prototype analysis to gain more insight 
in how people typically define greed. Prototype analysis is found to be a useful 
way to conceptualize fuzzy constructs such as emotions and other psychological 
constructs (e.g., Fehr & Russell, 1984; Rosch, 1975).  
In Chapter 2 I report on five studies that were conducted to develop the greed 
prototype. The first step was to get an idea of the things that come to mind when 
people think about greed. The aim of Study 2.1 (N = 195) was thus to get a list 
of things that people find important characteristics (exemplars) of greed. In order 
to get this list, participants were asked to name as many exemplars of greed that 
they could think of. Then, these lists of exemplars were structured in broader 
categories by two coders. For example, related exemplars such as “never enough” 
and “insatiable” were placed in the broader category never satisfied. This resulted 
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in 46 broader feature categories that were used to describe greed. Then two other 
coders assigned each exemplar to one of these feature categories. Of course, not 
all of the features of greed that people came up with are equally important to 
describe greed. For example, the feature acquisitiveness or never satisfied might 
be more important to describe greed than status or addiction. In order to test the 
relative importance of each feature, in Study 2.2 (N = 215) an independent group 
of participants was asked to rate each of the 46 features on the centrality to greed. 
They were presented with each feature, and were asked how much this feature 
was related to the construct greed. Based on a median split, the 23 features that 
were rated as most related were classified as central features, whereas the 23 
features that were rated lowest on relatedness to greed were classified as peripheral 
features of greed. This study thus further investigated what types of features 
people use to conceptualize greed.  
To test that the central features of greed are indeed more central to greed, a 
couple of other studies were conducted to validate the greed prototype. Study 2.3 
(N = 102) tested if people are better at remembering central features of greed 
compared to peripheral features. Features that are more important to describe 
greed, should be more easily activated when people think about the construct 
(e.g., Hassebrauck, 1997). And indeed, people were better at recalling and 
recognizing the more central features of greed. In similar vein, Study 2.4 (N = 
87) looked at the response times that people had when they had to classify if a 
feature was related to greed or not. Besides remembering central features easier, 
people should also be better and faster at classifying a feature as part of greed if 
this feature is more central (Fehr, Russell, & Ward, 1982). As expected, people 
more easily classified central features of greed as part of the prototype than the 
peripheral features. Lastly, Study 2.5 (N = 144) further validated the prototype 
by investigating the role each of the features plays in people’s daily experiences of 
greed. One would expect that the more central features of greed are more present 
when people feel greedy. In order to test this, participants were asked to describe 
a situation in which they were greedy or an ordinary situation. Then, participants 
had to rate how present each of the greed features was in the situation described. 





The five studies in Chapter 2 give thus more insight into the features that 
people use to conceptualize greed. The central features that people use to describe 
greed can be used to get a better conceptualization of what greed is. The 
prototype analysis revealed that the two core elements that people use to describe 
the experience of greed are the desire to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of 
never having enough. In other words, this led me to define greed as the insatiable 
desire for more. 
Knowing how to define greed, led to the next logical step: developing an 
instrument to measure greed. In Chapter 3 I report on the construction of an 
instrument to measure how people differ in their tendencies to be greedy, the 
Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS). The first step was to construct a list of 
potential items to measure dispositional greed. Using the results of Chapter 2 as 
input, 20 items that tapped into the idea of greed as wanting to acquire more and 
never being satisfied were constructed. Study 3.1 (N = 6092) was set up to 
investigate which of these 20 items could be used to construct a stable, reliable, 
and valid scale. A first sample of 167 participants was asked to fill out the 
potential items of the DGS. In addition, this sample filled out a variety of other 
instruments that measure constructs potentially related to greed. Using Principal 
Components Analysis I looked at the structure of the initial 20 items and 
eventually came up with a unidimensional scale with seven items (see Table 7.1). 
Further inspection of this scale revealed that it was internally consistent, reliable, 
and temporally stable. In addition, this scale had good construct validity, as it 
was related, but different, from theoretically related constructs, such as 
maximization, self-interest, envy, and materialism. Three other samples (using 
almost 6000 participants) were used to further demonstrate the consistency, 
reliability, temporal stability, and construct validity of the DGS.  
Because Study 3.1 found that greed was highly correlated with materialism, 
the discriminant validity for dispositional greed and material values was tested in 
Study 3.2 (N = 290). Participants indicated to what extent they experienced a 
variety of non-material and material desires. As one would theoretically expect, 
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the results of this study suggest that although the constructs are related, greed is 
a broader construct than materialism that also predicts non-material desires. 
In the next studies the predictive validity of the scale was investigated. A scale 
measuring individual differences in greed should of course predict greedy 
behavior. Study 3.3 (N = 300) looked at the relationship between greed and 
behavior in a dictator game. In this game, participants were asked to divide $10 
between themselves and another person. The participant had complete control 
over the situation, as the other player had no say in the division. As expected, 
greedy people kept more money to themselves than people that were less greedy. 
In Study 3.4 (N = 603) greed was related to behavior in an ultimatum game. 
Again, a division of $10 between two people had to be made. The difference 
between the two studies was that in this case, the receiver of the money did have 
a say. If this person did not like the proposed offer, he/she could decline, and 
both people would end up with nothing. Again, I found that greedy people kept 
more money to themselves than less greedy people. In addition, I also found that 
greedy people were more likely to decline low offers, suggesting that they are not 
as easily satisfied.  
Lastly, Study 3.5 (N = 305) investigated how greed is related to behavior in a 
harvesting game. In this game, participants imagined owning a timber company 
for which it was best to harvest as much forest as possible. However, if all 
companies behaved like this, the forest had not enough time to regrow, and 
would eventually vanish. Thus, on the short term harvesting as much as possible 
led to more profit, but on the long term it led to no profit at all. As expected, 
greedy individuals harvested more of the forest.  
In sum, based on the idea that greed is the insatiable desire for more of 
something, an instrument measuring the tendency of people to feel this way was 
constructed. This scale was reliable and valid, and predicted a variety of behaviors 
often attributed to greed. Although I already looked at some behavioral 






Part II: What greed does… 
The second part of this dissertation focused more on the behavioral 
consequences of greed. Greed is often seen as an important motive for financial 
behavior. On the one hand, people relate greed to prosperity (Greenfeld, 2001), 
but on the other hand people also see greed as a cause of financial problems, such 
as debt (Lunt & Livingstone, 1991). In Chapter 4 (N = 3899) I wanted to see 
how greed relates to financial behavior using a large sample of high school 
students. The data that for this study was provided by Nibud, the Dutch 
National Institute for Family Finance Information. Because of a constraint on 
the number of questions, first a shorter version of the DGS had to be constructed. 
In order to do so, all data from Chapter 3 was re-analyzed to come to a 3-item 
solution that performed well. Then, this 3-item version of the DGS was 
administered to the high school students alongside a variety of questions about 
their financial situation. More specifically, in this study, the association between 
greed and income, expenses, savings, and debts was investigated. Dispositional 
greed was associated with positive, as well as negative financial outcomes. On the 
one hand, greedy individuals had more income each month, but on the other 
hand, they also spend more money, had less savings, and more debt. Thus, these 
results suggest that greed indeed motivates people’s financial decisions. On the 
one hand, it might motivate them to acquire more, but on the other hand, they 
also seem to spend these acquired funds more.  
Chapter 5 further investigated the acquisitive nature of greed. Making use of 
a large sample of high school students, Chapter 4 suggested that greedy secure 
more resources each month. In this chapter, this idea was further explored in a 
more controlled setting. More specifically, in this chapter, I did not only look at 
whether people acquire more resources, but also if they acquire resources that 
they do not have use for. To investigate this, greed was related to behavior in the 
overearning paradigm (Hsee, Zhang, Cai, & Zhang, 2013). In this paradigm, 
participants first had the opportunity to earn resources (in this case: earn 
chocolates by pressing a button that produced annoying white noise), then they 
had time to use these resources (in this case: consume chocolates). Both earning 
and consumption of the chocolates was restricted to five minutes, so earning 
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more chocolates than one could consume resulted in overearning. In Study 5.1 
(N = 156) I found that greedy individuals indeed earned and overearned more.  
Study 5.2 (N = 297) looked at the motivations for people to (over)earn. 
According to Mill (1844) there are a few motives that drive economic behavior 
(Heukelom, 2014). On the one hand, people are motivated to work as less as 
possible (the aversion to labor), but on the other hand, people want to acquire 
new resources (the pursuit of wealth). Based on the earlier definition of greed as 
an insatiable desire for more, I expected that the relationship between greed and 
(over)earning could be explained by greedy people having a stronger pursuit of 
wealth, but not less aversion to labor. Participants were asked how much they 
liked the idea of earning chocolates (the pursuit of wealth) and how much they 
would dislike the white noise (the aversion to labor). As expected, greedy people 
liked the idea of earning more, but did not like the work more.  
Lastly, Study 5.3 (N = 185) investigated if the relationship between greed and 
overearning would remain if people had the opportunity to learn from past 
behavior. It could be argued that the results in Study 5.1 were due to people being 
uncertain about the number of chocolates they could eat. In order to control for 
this, participants in Study 5.3 completed the study twice, with a four-week 
interval. Even the second time, there still was a relationship between greed and 
overearning. Thus, where Chapter 4 found that greedy people acquire more 
resources, Chapter 5 went a step further, and found that greedy people even want 
to acquire resources so much that they have work to gain things they have no use 
for.  
In Chapter 6 I investigated how far greedy people are willing to go to get what 
they want. Are greedy people willing to behave unethically to get what they want? 
There are numerous situations in which we have to decide between doing the 
right thing or doing the right thing for ourselves. For example, when one finds a 
lost wallet the good thing would be to locate its owner, but it is also tempting to 
keep the money inside the wallet for oneself. In Chapter 6 I investigated if greedy 
people are more likely to behave unethically. Using various samples, Study 6.1 





acceptable and more often engage in transgressions. For example, greedy people 
find it more acceptable to lie in their own interest or to accept bribes. In addition, 
they indicate that they are more likely to illegally download movies or cheat on 
their partner. This relationship was mediated by self-control. That is, greedy 
participants have lower self-control, which partially predicts the extent to which 
they find transgressions acceptable.  
Where Study 6.1 relied on self-report measures on how acceptable 
transgressions were or how often people engaged in transgressions, Study 6.2 (N 
= 172) investigated this relationship using an incentivized corruption game 
(Frank & Schulze, 2000). In this game, participants had to make a decision to 
hire a plumber company for their study association. They could choose between 
ten companies ranging in the price for their service and the bonus that 
participants would receive if the company was chosen. Greedy participants more 
often chose for a more expensive company that offered a higher bonus (a kick-
back that is essentially corruption) to the participant. 
Lastly, Study 6.3 (N = 302) further investigated the mediating role of self-
control. Self-control is typically seen as a battle between desire and willpower 
(Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). As greed is associated with stronger desires, it was 
expected that greedy people have lower self-control, not because they have less 
willpower, but because they are more tempted by the benefits of transgressing. 
The results of this study reveal that this is indeed the case. Greedy people are 
more tempted by the benefits of transgressing than less greedy individuals. Thus, 
greedy people seem to go further to get what they want. They are more tempted 
by the things they desire and therefore more easily lured into unethical behavior.  
In sum, based on the idea from Chapter 2 that greed is the insatiable desire 
for more of something, I found in three chapters support for the behavioral 
manifestations of dispositional greed. Greedy people earn more (too much so), 
spend more, are more in debt, and are willing to bend the rules in their favor. 
These data are among the first to reveal what greed does behaviorally and they 
shed light on the implications of this important motivation. 
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MEASURING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN GREED 
Having established the reliability and validity of the Dispositional Greed Scale 
in the previous chapters, it is now the time to put these findings in perspective, 
and to relate them to recent developments in the literature.  As I already briefly 
mentioned in the Introduction, three other scales to measure greed have been 
developed independently and in parallel to the one discussed in this dissertation. 
In addition to the scale presented in this dissertation, a same-named 
Dispositional Greed Scale was constructed by Krekels and Pandelaere (2015), a 
trait greed scale by Mussel, Reiter, Osinsky, and Hewig (2015), and a greed 
subscale that is part of the Virtues and Vices Scale (Veselka, Giammarco, & 
Vernon, 2014). In this section I will first describe how each scale was developed 
and the similarities and differences with our scale. After that I will present data 
from a new study, conducted to compare the performance of the four scales. For 
an overview of the items of all four scales see Table 7.1.  
Dispositional Greed Scale (Chapter 3) 
The starting point for the Dispositional Greed Scale presented in the current 
dissertation was the prototype analysis in Chapter 2. Based on over 700 
participants’ conceptions about greed, the prototype analysis revealed that 
desiring more and never being satisfied are the core elements of greed. Based on 
these insights a list of 20 potential items was constructed that was administered 
to the first sample of Study 3.1 (N = 167). Principal Components Analysis 
revealed that the items could be reduced to either a unidimensional scale or a 
three-dimensional scale. The first factor consisted of items measuring the 
insatiable desire for more of something. The second and third factor consisted of 
items that were more related to (non)generosity and loss aversion. As the first 
factor was considered to be the core of greed, this factor was retained for the final 
scale. Based on this consideration, the final DGS consists of seven items 
measuring the tendency to always want more and to never be satisfied. In 
addition, the four samples in Study 3.1 (total N = 6092) also demonstrated that 
the scale was reliable, temporally stable, and valid. The validity of the scale was 





demonstrated that greed is different from materialism, and predicts greedy 
behavior in dictator, ultimatum, and common goods games.  
Dispositional Greed Scale (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015)  
The scale most similar to the scale presented here is the same named 6-item 
Dispositional Greed Scale developed by Krekels and Pandelaere (2015). They 
define greed as “an insatiable desire for more resources, monetary or other” (p. 
225), a definition of greed that is very similar to the outcome of the prototype 
analysis described in Chapter 2. Building upon insights based on the existing 
literature and focus groups, 25 potential items were constructed. A first sample 
of 317 participants filled out these questions, and based on exploratory factor 
analyses this list was reduced to the final 6-item DGS. With this initial sample of 
317 participants and a second one (N = 218) the DGS was further validated. 
Dispositional greed was related to constructs as materialism, competition, and 
productivity orientation.  
On the item level, this scale is very similar to the scale developed in Chapter 
3, which is reassuring. If two independent groups of researchers develop a scale 
to measure an individual difference, and end up with such similar scales, this 
indicates that the scales measure what they are supposed to measure. The biggest 
difference between the two scales is that the scale by Krekels and Pandelaere 
(2015) includes two reverse-coded items. Although reverse-coded items have 
historically been included to prevent inattention and acquiescence, recent 
research in scale development argues that there are both statistical and theoretical 
considerations to not include reverse coded items when developing a scale. First, 
Likert-scales including reverse-coded items often have unexpected factor 
structures (Swain, Weathers, & Niedrich, 2008). Second, it is often not clear 
what the opposite of a certain construct is. In this case, it is not clear what the 
opposite of being greedy is. Is not being greedy, being generous? Or is not being 
greedy, being easily satisfied? In Chapter 3, I chose to not include reverse-coded 
items in the scale (also because the brevity of the scale runs little risk for 
inattention), however, for measuring greed it does not seem to make a large 
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difference. Both scales measure greed reliably and find similar patterns with 
related constructs. 
Trait Greed Scale 
Another scale to measure greed was developed by Mussel et al. (2015). These 
authors “desire to get more at all costs, including the excessive striving for desired 
goods and the willingness to accept that such striving may be at the expense of 
others” (p. 126). Items were based on this definition and administered to 640 
students. The final 7-item scale was further validated in several other studies. 
Greed was negatively associated with agreeableness and positively with 
neuroticism (N = 71), greed was associated with a higher aimed income, related 
to risky investments, but not secure investments (N = 162), and taking more in 
a common goods dilemma (N = 92). Although the scale does include more 
general items about the insatiable desire for more, it also includes specific items 
about cheating and damaging others. The definition that these researchers use to 
define greed deviates from how people typically define greed (Chapter 2) and is 
more specifically focused on harming others. Although greedy people indeed 
harm others more (Chapter 6), I believe this is more a consequence of greed, 
rather than inherent to being greedy. Thus, the definition of greed these authors 
use, is narrower, as they include the detrimental consequences for others in their 
definition. 
Virtues and Vices Scale – greed subscale 
The Virtues and Vices Scale (VAVS) by Veselka et al. was published in 2014. 
Because this scale did not include ‘greed’ in the title, abstract, or key words, I 
only found out about this scale after the data collection of Chapter 3. The authors 
see greed as a sin, and similar to Mussel et al. (2015) they focus on greed as a 
tendency to hurt others to gain more. Here, greed is defined as the “tendency to 
manipulate and betray others for personal gain” (p. 76), a definition that is even 
more narrow than the one by Mussel et al., as the specify how greed leads to 
people attaining more (by manipulation and betrayal). In a first study (N = 
1507), a total of 175 potential items was administered to the participants. Based 





several items were deleted or revised, leaving a list of 108 potential items. In the 
second study (N = 253), the 70 items (10 per vice) that performed best were 
retained for the final VAVS. The greed subscale correlated with all the other vices, 
as well as with Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy.  
Assessing the four greed instruments 
In the previous part I discussed how greed was defined in each scale and how the 
scales were developed. As a next step, I conducted a new study (N = 300, Mage = 
36.51, SD = 11.26, 60.00% male) in which participants filled out all four greed 
instruments (30 items in total, all presented in a different randomized order for 
each participant). I first assessed each scale individually and then looked at how 
all four measures perform combined. As I used a short 3-item version of the DGS 
in Chapter 4, I also assessed the short version in this study.  
In general, all scales seem to be reliable (see Table 7.1), and although the way 
in which greed is conceptualized differs across several scales, the correlations 
between the scales is high (see Table 7.2). PCA on each scale individually revealed 
that both DGS instruments (as well as the 3-item DGS) are unidimensional. The 
scales by Mussel et al. (2015) and Veselka et al. (2014) give a two-dimensional 
solution. Conceptually, these scales are most different from the DGS 
instruments, as they focused more on the negative side of greed. Mussel et al.’s 
scale demonstrates that the insatiable desire for more and the negative 
consequences for others are not the same, as this scale had two factors with one 
corresponding to acquisition and the second to the negative consequences for 
others. Although Veselka et al. also included the consequences for others in their 
definition, the items were more focused on acquisition than on the consequences 
for others. Nevertheless, this scale also had a solution with two factors. The first 
factor included items that were more focused on acquisition, whereas the second 
factor included only one item, namely the extent to which charity was important. 
This was also the item that was most focused on the consequences for others. 
Again, this demonstrates that acquisition and possible negative consequences for 








Table 7.1. Items of the different instruments to measure individual differences in greed (N = 300). 
   Separate Combined 
  Descriptives Factor 
  M SD 1 2 1 
Dispositional Greed Scale (Chapter 3) – 7-item version      
1. I always want more.  2.51 1.12 .83  .69 
2. Actually, I’m kind of greedy.  2.26 1.11 .77  .42 
3. One can never have too much money. 3.02 1.23 .67  .37 
4. As soon as I have acquired something I start to think about the next thing I want.  2.56 1.15 .81  .57 
5. It doesn’t matter how much I have. I’m never completely satisfied. 2.23 1.09 .79  .68 
6. My life motto is ‘more is better’. 2.24 1.02 .80  .65 
7. I can’t imagine having too many things. 2.46 1.18 .69  .65 
Total 2.47 0.86    
Eigenvalue  4.10   
Explained variance  58.62%   
Cronbach’s α .88    
Dispositional Greed Scale (Chapter 3) – 3-item version     
1. I always want more.  2.51 1.12 .84   
2. Actually, I’m kind of greedy.  2.26 1.11 .83   
3. As soon as I have acquired something I start to think about the next thing I want.  2.56 1.15 .77   
Total 2.44 0.96    
Eigenvalue  1.99   





4 Cronbach’s α .82    
Dispositional Greed Scale (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015)     
1. No matter how much I have of something, I always want more. 2.30 1.07 .85  .81 
2. One can never have enough. 2.30 1.04 .81  .68 
3. Even when I am fulfilled, I often seek more. 2.47 1.09 .80  .54 
4. The pursuit of more and better is an important goal in life for me. 2.68 1.16 .77  .34 
5. A simple basic life is sufficient for me. (R) 3.62 1.02 -.64   
6. I am easily satisfied with what I’ve got. (R) 3.50 0.97 -.60   
Total 2.43 0.79    
Eigenvalue   3.36   
Explained variance   55.99%   
Cronbach’s α .84    
 Greed Trait Measure (Mussel et al., 2015)      
1. When I think about all the things I have, my first thought is about what I would 
like to have next. 
2.40 1.05 .71  .59 
2. My actions are strongly focused on material things. 2.15 1.00 .37 .57 .35 
3. Sometimes I feel a real urge to possess something. 3.06 1.17 .79   
4. When something is being shared, I try to get as big a share as possible. 2.23 0.98  .60  
5. In order to get what I want, I can accept the fact that other people may suffer 
damage. 
2.03 0.98  .84  
6. I get the most fun out of buying myself all sorts of things. 2.39 1.09 .86  .49 
7. When I play on my own, I sometimes cheat a little. 2.14 1.06  .79  
Total 2.34 0.73    








Explained variance   49.53% 14.42%  
Cronbach’s α .82    
Virtues and Vices Scale – Greed subscale (Veselka et al., 2014)      
1. I enjoy being a part of exclusive clubs or groups that are not open to everyone. 2.41 1.14 .70   
2. I do not enjoy sharing positions of power. 2.56 1.09 .50   
3. I like to collect expensive things. 2.11 1.05 .75  .36 
4. At work/school, I keep good ideas to myself so that only I can get credit for them 
in the long run. 
2.23 1.01 .65   
5. Financially supporting the less fortunate is a priority for me. (R) 2.86 1.08  .95 .42 
6. I believe that money is essential; friends are replaceable. 2.05 1.07 .63  .45 
7. Being financially wealthy is my number one goal. 2.53 1.24 .77  .45 
8. I consider myself successful if I have a job that pays a lot of money. 3.03 1.15 .61   
9. No matter how much I have, I always want more. 2.40 1.12 .80  .77 
10. “I want it all” would be a good motto for me. 2.10 1.10 .83  .76 
Total 2.46 7.11    
Eigenvalue   4.40 44.00% 13.65 
Explained variance   1.03 10.34% 45.49% 
Cronbach’s α .84    
Note. The column separate shows the factor loadings on the separate PCA for each of the scales. The column combined shows the factor 
loadings on the first factor of the PCA including all greed instruments.  In the case of multiple factor solutions, entries are factor loadings 
after OBLIMIN rotation. Loadings lower than .30 are suppressed. For the combined PCA only the first factor is shown. See Appendix 
7.1 for the other factors. Participants are asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. 
Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The first seven items were 





Table 7.2. Correlations of the different greed instruments.  
Note. There is overlap between these correlations. The three items of the DGS are also 
part of the 7-item DGS. Overall greed consists of the items of the DGS in Chapter 3 and 
the DGS by Krekels & Pandelaere, the Trait Greed scale and the Greed subscale of the 
VAVS. All correlations are significant at the .001 level.  
The last step in investigating the scales was to look at how the four scales 
perform together. In order to do this, I conducted a PCA on all 30 items. The 
scree plot suggests a unidimensional solution, but based on the eigenvalues five 
factors can be retained. However, the first factor is clearly the most important 
one, as it explains 45.49% of the variance (eigenvalue 13.65).  The other four 
factors (eigenvalues 1.51, 1.29, 1.15, 1.08) explain an additional 16.78% of the 
variance (see Appendix 7.1 for an overview). The first factor corresponds to the 
insatiable desire to acquire more, which is the definition of greed based on the 
prototype analysis in Chapter 2 and the definition that is used by myself and by 
Krekels and Pandelaere (2015). Inspection of the rotated solution, reveals that 20 
of the 30 items of the four scales load on this first factor. These 20 items include 
all seven items from the DGS presented in the current dissertation, four (out of 
six) of the items from the DGS by Krekels and Pandelaere, three (out of seven) 
items from the trait greed scale by Mussel et al. (2015), and six (out of ten) items 
from the greed subscale by Veselka et al. (2014). Thus, based on this analysis, the 
items of the DGS developed in this dissertation load best on the general greed 
factor.    
 Although this first factor was clearly the most important, there were four other 
factors that could be retained based on the eigenvalues. If we inspect these factors, 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Dispositional Greed Scale (Chapter 3) – seven items -     
2. Dispositional Greed Scale (Chapter 3) – three items  .93 -    
3. Dispositional Greed Scale (Krekels & Pandelaere) .86 .84 -   
4.  Trait Greed Scale  .85 .83 .79 -  
5.  Greed subscale (VAVS) .85 .82 .81 .83 - 
6.  Overall greed .96 .92 .92 .92 .93 
 




the second factor seems to include items about the (negative) consequences for 
others. The third factor includes the three reverse-coded items and measures 
being satisfied and charity. The last two factors, measure money (factor 4) and 
status or materialism (factor 5). These factors all represent things that people 
often relate to greed (see Chapter 2), however, they are less central to greed than 
acquisitiveness and insatiability. Given that the first factor is obviously the most 
important one, and is more in correspondence with how people define greed, I 
believe that an instrument to measure greed should focus on this acquisitiveness 
and insatiability.  
 In sum, over the last couple of years, four different instruments to measure 
greed have been developed. But which one should we use? Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, I recommend the use of the DGS that I constructed in Chapter 
3. I believe that a good scale to measure greed should focus on the core experience 
of greed. This leaves us with the two DGS measures. These two measures are 
highly alike and perform in a similar manner. However, the items of the DGS 
presented in this dissertation load slightly better. In addition, the 3-item short 
version of this scale performs almost equally well, which has benefits for 
parsimoniousness.  
READRESSING THE QUESTIONS OF THE INTRODUCTION 
In the Introduction I raised four important questions about greed that were 
based on my reading of the literature. I asked what greed is, when people are 
greedy, who the greedy are, and if greed is good or bad.  Now it is time to see 
what can be learned from this dissertation and how the research presented here 
helps in answering those questions.  
What is greed? 
In the Introduction I talked about the definitional issues with greed. People 
often seem to disagree on what greed is (Wang & Murnighan, 2011). The 
prototype analysis in Chapter 2 has shed light on these definitional issues. Greed 





satisfied with what one currently has. In the Introduction, I mentioned three 
issues that people often have when defining greed. I will now discuss the new 
insights that this dissertation has on each of these issues.  
One of the issues with greed was the broadness of the construct; is greed 
limited to material desires, or can people also be greedy for non-material desires? 
Saint Paul made the distinction between philargia, specific greed for money, and 
pleonexia, a more broadly focused desire to acquire more (Newhauser, 2000). 
The current dissertation suggests that the latter is the case, greed is a more general 
desire for more. In Chapter 2 we see that people see greed as broader than just a 
material desire. As expected, people often described material desires as a central 
part of greed, however, people also mentioned non-material desires. Other types 
of desires that were mentioned were power/status, food (gluttony), and sex (lust). 
Also Chapter 3 corroborates the idea that greed is more than just a desire for 
money or other things. Greed was not only associated with a desire to acquire 
material goods, but also with a desire for food, sex, and friends (Study 3.2). 
Moreover, greed does not only drive unethical behavior in the material domain, 
but also predicts unethical behavior such as cheating on a partner (Studies 6.1 
and 6.3). Thus, although the desire for more money or material goods is indeed 
the most important part of greed, this does not mean that people cannot be 
greedy for non-material desires.  
A second issue discussed was whether greed is an acquisition motivation or a 
retention motivation. In this dissertation I focused on greed as an acquisition 
motivation. Although I believe that there are instances in which greed is 
associated with a retention motivation, I think acquisition motivation plays a 
larger role. This can also be inferred from the empirical data in Chapters 2 and 
3. The greed prototype consists of both acquisition and retention elements, but 
the acquisition features are more central than retention features such as stinginess 
and thriftiness (Studies 2.1 and 2.2).  
Chapter 3 also provides evidence that greed is more about acquisition than 
about retention. In Study 3.1 I related dispositional greed to the tightwads-
 




spendthrifts scale (Rick, Cryder, & Loewenstein, 2008). This scale measures the 
extent to which people find spending money painful. People that lean more 
towards the tightwad side of the scale tend to experience high pain of paying, and 
ideally would spend more money. People on the spendthrift side of the scale 
experience not enough pain and typically spend more than they ideally would. 
Dispositional greed is associated with being a spendthrift, rather than with being 
a tightwad, indicating that for greedy people acquisition is more important than 
retention. Also Study 4.1 suggests that greedy people are more focused on 
acquisition than on retention. Greed was associated with more income (which 
suggests more acquisition motivation), and more expenses (which suggests little 
retention motivation). Although the results of this dissertation suggest that 
greedy people are mainly acquisition motivated, previous work by Krekels (2015) 
suggests that greedy people are also more motivated to retain goods. In that 
research, greed was related to loss aversion and an endowment effect, indicating 
that is thus broader than solely acquisition motivation. I believe that acquisition 
motivation is the most important part of being greedy. However, I do believe 
that in some cases, greedy people will also be retention motivated. For instance, 
if one is greedy for money, one should also be motivated to retain the money he 
or she already has.  
The third point I brought up in the Introduction was if greed is an emotion 
or a motivation. Theoretically, greed looks like an emotion. According to 
appraisal theory (e.g., Roseman, 1996), emotions are elicited by a specific 
appraisal pattern, and one could argue that greed is elicited by an appraisal 
pattern of having a strong desire for something one currently does not have. As 
emotions help people to deal with the problems they experience (Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2006), for greed this would mean that experiencing greed motivates 
people to reach their goals. In the current dissertation I focused on dispositional 
greed. I found that some people are greedier than others. I believe that people 
scoring high on dispositional greed more often experience greed, and as a result, 
are more motivated by it. An interesting question that remains is what 





line of greediness, or does it mean that they become more easily greedy? Although 
the current dissertation cannot answer this question, I believe that dispositional 
greedy people might have more or stronger appraisal patterns that elicit greed. In 
other words, I believe that they more easily, and more often, experience greed.  
When are people greedy? 
I just argued that greed cannot only be conceptualized as a motivation, but 
also as an emotion. Although the research presented in this thesis did not look at 
the appraisals or cues that elicit greed, it does provide some insight on what these 
cues or appraisals could be. Greed can be seen as an emotion or motivation that 
helps people deal with situations in which they want something, but do not yet 
have it. However, a first important thing to note is that I believe that there are 
large individual differences in the things people want. Dispositional greed 
measures a global tendency to be greedy and can apply to material as well as non-
material desires (Study 3.2). Nevertheless, I believe that that greedy people can 
differ in the things they value most (see the data discussed in Chapter 1). For 
instance, someone who values fashion will likely become greedy in a department 
store, whereas someone who wants success or status might become very greedy 
when he is in the race for a new job. However, the thing that all greed experiences 
have in common, is that people desire something that they currently do not have 
(or not have enough). One thing that probably elicits greed in many people is 
money. People can desire money just for the sake of having money, but it also 
allows them to acquire other things that they desire. Several studies have found 
that the abundance of money affects people’s behavior (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 
2006, 2008). I will elaborate on this effect when I discuss further research 
directions.   
Based on this reasoning, a logical appraisal for greed to occur is that the 
situation has to be tempting. Tempting situations will elicit more desire and thus 
more greed. This corresponds with the findings in this dissertation. Study 3.1 
revealed that greedy people tend to have lower self-control and Study 6.3 showed 
that greedy people indeed indicate that they are more easily tempted. Greedy 
 




people found the idea of cheating on their partner with an attractive other or 
keeping a lost wallet more tempting than people scoring low on greed. Most 
likely, not only individual differences determine whether people are tempted, but 
the allurement of the situation will play a role as well. Whether people are 
tempted to cheat on their partner is not only dependent on their individual 
differences in greed, but most likely also on the attractiveness (temptation) of the 
other person. Thus people will experience more situational greed in tempting 
situations.  
A second part of feeling greedy is that people do not yet have the thing that 
they desire. Situational characteristics that emphasize that one does not have what 
one wants could emphasize greed. Scarcity cues might make it extra apparent to 
people that they do not have the thing that they want, and that it will be hard to 
attain this thing. From an evolutionary perspective, it is often argued that greed 
is a strategy that is developed to deal with scarce resources (Robertson, 2001). In 
Chapter 2 people did identify poverty as one of the peripheral features of greed, 
indicating that also lay people seem to associate the two. Krekels (2015) looked 
at how scarcity is associated with individual differences in greed, and found that 
childhood socioeconomic status (SES), but not current SES, influences how 
greedy people are. Other research found a similar relationship between greed and 
childhood SES (Poluektova, Efremova, & Breugelmans, 2015). The author 
proposes that people develop greed as a response to deal with the uncertainty of 
not knowing if one can secure enough resources. Greedy people might be more 
susceptible to scarcity primes in general, but also less greedy people might become 
greedier in the face of scarcity, for example, in a consumer situation. According 
to commodity theory (Brock, 1968) people desire products that are scarce. And 
indeed, research has consistently found that scarcity cues increase the perceived 
value and desirability of products (Lynn, 1991). Thus, scarcity cues might trigger 
feelings of greed, and the effects that scarcity primes have on desirability might 





Another situation that might emphasize this feeling is seeing others with the 
thing that we want. Study 3.1 revealed that greed is associated with envy. Envy 
is the feeling that arises when someone else has something that we desire (Parrott 
& Smith, 1993). It is likely that greed becomes even stronger when we see others 
with the thing that we desire. Previous research suggests that in some cases there 
is indeed an envy premium, that is, in some situations people are willing to pay 
more for the products that they want that are owned by someone else (Van de 
Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011b). In sum, it is likely that some situations elicit 
more greed than others. Situations that elicit appraisal patterns of wanting 
something that one currently does not have will lead to stronger experiences of 
greed.  
Who are greedy? 
The main focus of this dissertation lies on individual differences in greed. So, 
what does this dissertation tell us about the people that are greedy? Study 3.1 
looked at the demographic characteristics that predict greed. The strongest 
demographic variable predicting greed is age. Younger people tend to be greedier 
than older people. However, we do not yet know the dynamics of this 
relationship. It could be that people become less greedy when they age, and value 
other things in life, such as social relationships. This would be consistent with 
previous research showing that growing older changes people’s priorities 
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Another possibility is that the 
relationship between age and greed is due to a cohort effect. Nowadays, greed is 
more accepted than years ago (Oka & Kuijt, 2014). It could be the case that 
younger people have been exposed to greed-is-good messages more often which 
increased their greedy tendencies. 
Men are often perceived as being greedier than women (Robertson, 2013). In 
Study 3.1 there is indeed a slight tendency for males to be greedier than females, 
however, in smaller samples I do not consistently find this pattern. This could be 
due to the smaller samples that are not able to detect such a small effect. Also 
other research suggests, that men are indeed greedier than women (Krekels & 
 




Pandelaere, 2015). However, there are also situations imaginable, in which 
women are typically seen as greedier. It is quite possible that greed manifests itself 
in different domains for men and women, and as a result, also influences their 
behavior in different ways. For example, previous research suggests that men 
desire more sexual partners (Miller & Fishkin, 1997) and status (Eastman, 
Fredenberger, Campbell, & Calvert, 1997), whereas women desire apparel more 
than men do (Falk & Campbell, 1997). Thus, although men might on average 
be greedier than women, this does not mean that this is the case across all 
domains.  
Another interesting question is the relationship between greed and wealth. 
Until now, this relationship remains unclear. As discussed before, greed is 
sometimes seen as a coping mechanism to deal with scarcity and resource 
insecurity (Robertson, 2001; Krekels, 2015). But, maybe even more so, greed is 
associated with the rich and wealthy (Goldberg, 1994). Although this dissertation 
did not look at absolute wealth, this dissertation did look at the relationship 
between greed and income. Study 3.1 looked at the relationship between greed 
and income in a representative sample, but found no evidence for poor or wealthy 
people to be greedier. Study 4.1, however, did find that greedy adolescents had 
more income, at the same time however, they also had less savings and more 
debts. Research by Van Muijen and Melse (2015) found that the relationship 
between greed and income is complicated. In a survey with over 120.000 
participants they found that across branches, there is no relationship between 
greed and income for people under 36 and a negative relationship for people 
older than 35. However, for specific occupations, such as sales managers, they 
find a positive relationship between greed and income. This suggests that greed 
can have a positive effect on income, however, there has to be a fit with the 
occupation. In sales, people often receive variable pay. If people get paid based 
on their performance, greed might motivate them to perform better and to earn 
more. However, for other occupations, for example in health care or education, 
greed might backfire, as greed may not lead to more income and greedy people 





If greed is beneficial in some occupations, but not in others, this raises the 
question if greedy people differ in the occupations that they have. The financial 
crisis is often ascribed to the greed of bankers (Zandi, 2008). If people are asked 
to come up with a prototype of a greedy person they are probably more likely to 
imagine a CEO or banker than a nurse or teacher. But is this actually true? 
Recently, Van Muijen and Melse (2015) found that people working in extractive 
industries, real estate, and banking scored highest on greed, whereas people with 
occupations in education, research, and healthcare scored lowest. Krekels and 
Pandelaere (2015) also found that people working in banking and management 
were greedier than people in other professions. However, it remains unclear if 
greedy people attracted to branches involving more money or that people 
working in these types of branches also become greedier over time.  
A last interesting question is how people’s beliefs affect their greediness. As 
discussed before, most religious writings condemn greed. From an economic 
perspective greed is often seen as driving the economy (Williams, 2000). This 
idea is typically resonated by right-wing parties that argue for the free market, 
and see the inequalities related to this as inevitable (Bobbio & Cameron, 1996). 
In Study 3.1 both religious and political ideas were assessed. Surprisingly, there 
was no significant relationship between religiosity and greed. However, there was 
a trend for non-religious people to be greedier than religious people. A pattern 
that is also apparent in others research (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015). This 
suggests, that although there may be a link between greed and religiosity, this 
relationship is likely weak. For political beliefs, there was an effect on greed. 
People identifying themselves as more right-wing in the political spectrum were 
greedier than people who identify as left-wing. In sum, there seems to be a 
relationship between people’s beliefs and how greedy they are. However, the 
causality between people’s beliefs is not clear yet. The question remains if people’s 
beliefs influence how greedy they are or if people change their beliefs so they fit 
with their greedy behavior.   
  
 




Is greed good or bad? 
In the Introduction I also raised the question if greed is good or bad. But 
actually, this is a weird question. This is the same as asking if emotions and 
motivations like anger, regret, or envy are good or bad. All these emotions and 
motivations are helpful in some situations, and do not help in other situations. 
Although the experience of these feelings might be aversive, being angry can 
restore unfairness (Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014), regret can 
help us to make better decisions next time (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), and 
envy can help us to perform better (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). 
The question if greed is good or bad is thus not that interesting. It is a given that 
greed exists and what is more interesting and important is to know how it 
operates and what its consequences are. This gives us insights in when greed can 
be dysfunctional and how we can prevent greed in those situations.  
The idea that greed is not inherently good or bad, but can have positive and 
negative consequences is supported by laypeople’s conceptions of greed. In 
Chapter 2 people identified people with positive as well as negative consequences. 
A pattern that is also apparent in the other chapters that empirically show that 
greed has positive and negative outcomes. Although always being excessively 
greedy is not good, not being greedy at all is not necessarily better. There are two 
important components of greed. First, greed is associated with a desire for more, 
and second, greed is associated with never having enough. It could be argued that 
this first part of greed motivates people to accomplish more and better things, 
but that the latter causes problems. For example, in Study 3.5 I related greed to 
behavior in a resource dilemma. In this study, people around the midpoint of the 
DGS performed best in the game. People that were too greedy depleted the 
resources which harmed themselves and others, but people that scored low on 
greed could have profited more without harming anyone.  
I believe that problems arise when people lose balance between the things they 
want or desire and the things they or others need to be happy. It is this neglect 





People compare their current state of affairs with a variety of standards, such as 
others, the past, and the things that they want or aspire (Michalos, 1985). A 
negative gap between the current state and these standards leads to lower 
satisfaction and happiness, whereas a positive gap between the two leads to more 
satisfaction and happiness. Having aspirations that are hard, or impossible to 
attain is a serious threat for people’s wellbeing (Wilson, 1967). Although it is 
good to have aspirations, greedy people are likely to have desires that are never 
going to be met, and that likely would not even make them more satisfied if they 
were to be met. For example, research suggests that people highly overestimate 
the relationship between money and income (Aknin, Norton, & Dunn, 2009). 
Although there is a small positive association between income and happiness, this 
progress mutes above an annual income of $75.000 (Kahneman & Deaton, 
2010). People are thus not very good at predicting how the things they want 
influence their happiness, and greedy people might be even worse at it. 
The data in the current dissertation accord this idea, and find that greedy 
people seem to maximize wealth, but not necessarily well-being. Greedy people 
consistently generate more resources in a variety of economic games (Studies, 3.3, 
3.4, and 3.5) and generate more income (Study 4.1). This is in line with previous 
research that has found that greedy people are more productivity oriented 
(Krekels, 2015). However, they do not seem to be happier. In fact, greedy people 
have lower self-esteem and lower satisfaction with life (Study 3.1). It seems as if 
greedy people are less able to enjoy the things they have. Previous research has 
found that wealthy people are less capable to savor positive emotions and 
experiences, which in turn leads to lower happiness (Quoidbach, Dunn, Petrides, 
& Mikolajczak, 2010). Always being focused on the next thing one wants, might 
have similar effects.  
Another explanation for why greedy people are less able to enjoy life might be 
the misbalance between time spend on their greedy desires and other important 
life goals. Greedy people are more focused on the pursuit of wealth (Study 5.2), 
even if they cannot use their acquired resources (Studies 5.1 and 5.3). If greedy 
 




people keep working, even if there is no use for this, this leaves little time for 
other pleasurable experiences, such as time with friends, family, and hobbies. This 
would be consistent with previous research that has found that people that value 
time over money are less happy than people who prioritize money over time 
(Whillans, Weidman, & Dunn, 2016).  
Even though greedy people seem to be more focused on acquiring money, 
they are worse at retaining this money. Study 4.1 suggests that greedy people are 
more likely to get into financial trouble. Although greedy people have more 
income, they also spend it more easily. This confirms earlier suggestions that 
greed is associated with more financial problems and debt (Lunt & Livingstone, 
1991). These financial problems can also negatively impact wellbeing (Brown, 
Taylor, & Price, 2005).  
However, as I mentioned before, I believe that greed itself is not inherently 
bad. I think that it is excessive greed that is causing these outcomes.  Having 
strong aspirations in itself is not bad, it is rather having aspirations that cannot 
be accomplished that negatively impact wellbeing (e.g., Stutzer, 2004). 
Therefore, I believe that more moderate desires for more can also have positive 
consequences. For example, in Chapter 2 people related greed to ambition. As 
long as people are greedy for things that are actually attainable, these aspirations 
can help people to reach these goals (Perrucci & Perrucci, 2014). Moreover, not 
being greedy seems also not the best way to go. Having too little desire or 
aspiration is associated with boredom (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) and less 
achievement (Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 1992). Thus, the key to 
a happy life seems to be a good balance between wanting more and knowing 
when it is enough.  
I just described the intrapersonal consequences that greed has, and argued that 
it is important for people to set goals that are motivating, but also reachable. 
However, most often, if people talk about the consequences of greed, they talk 
about how greed affects others. From an economic perspective, it is often argued 





the continuous striving for more promotes prosperity and economic development 
(Greenfeld, 2001). Although this idea is not explicitly tested in this dissertation, 
Studies 5.1 and 5.3 point in the direction of this productive nature of greed. 
These studies demonstrated that greedy people work harder and generate more 
income. Although in these studies, there was no use for this surplus, in real life, 
there often is. People that work and earn more, pay more taxes, which are used 
to support weaker members of society (Oka & Kuijt, 2014).  
Nonetheless, more often if people talk about the consequences of greed they 
talk about how it takes place at the expense of others. In these cases there is thus 
also a misbalance. The negative intrapersonal consequences of greed were due to 
focusing too much on the thing one wants and forgetting all other things that are 
important for the individual. The interpersonal adverse consequences of greed 
are caused by focusing too much on what one wants and forgetting about the 
things that are important for others. Indeed, Chapter 2 found that greed is often 
related to having tunnel vision. That is, greedy people are likely blinded by their 
desire and do not care about the rest anymore. I already mentioned that greedy 
people take more in resource games, which automatically means that the other 
players get less (Studies 3.3 and 3.4). In addition, greed is often seen as a cause 
of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). This phenomenon is named 
after medieval herders that let their livestock graze on a common parcel of land, 
instead of on their own, parcel. From an individual perspective this was rational, 
however, when all herders did this, it led to overgrazing and the ground becoming 
infertile. Also, in recent days, this tragedy exists, for example with overfishing 
(Kraak, 2011) and environmental pollution (Good & Beatty, 2011). The 
harvesting game in Study 3.5 mimicked this dilemma, and indeed found that 
greedy individuals were more likely to exhaust resources.  
Because greed is often at the expense of others, it is sometimes argued that 
greed is immoral. Indeed, greedy people find a variety of transgression more 
acceptable and are more likely to actually engage in unethical behavior (Studies 
6.1 and 6.2). One of the explanations for this is the lower self-control that greedy 
 




people typically exhibit (Studies 3.1 and 6.1). Self-control can be seen as a battle 
between willpower and desire; when desire is stronger than willpower people 
cannot control themselves (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). Greedy people have 
stronger desires, and as a result are more easily lured into transgressing (Study 
6.3). This further proves the idea that the desire associated with greed blinds 
people for the consequences of their behavior for others.  
In sum, the interesting question to ask is not whether greed is good or bad, 
but when and how greed is good and when and how it is bad. Greed motivates 
people to attain their goals, but problems arise if their desires conflict with the 
things they or others actually need. People seem to be best off if they are 
moderately greedy, compared to excessively greedy or not greedy at all.  
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Based on the discussion above, there are several interesting directions for 
further research. I just argued that greed itself is not necessarily bad, but that it is 
rather not knowing when to stop and be satisfied that leads to the negative 
consequences of greed. As a consequence, one could argue that the motivation to 
want more should lead to positive outcomes, whereas never being satisfied would 
lead to negative outcomes. Wanting more should lead to better outcomes 
objectively, but never being satisfied would cause people to feel being worse off 
subjectively. The insatiable part of greed can lead to people being constantly on 
a hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Campbell, 1971), making them unable to savor 
the nice feelings of getting what they want, and immediately look for the next 
thing. It would be interesting to investigate if greedy people are indeed often 
better off, but if they are more likely to perceive their situation as worse off. It 
seems, as if greedy people find it hard to find a balance between knowing when 
to want more and knowing when it is enough.  
It would also be interesting to see how greed affects outcomes in other 
domains. Greed can lead to tunnel vision, and as a result, other goals might be 
neglected. One obvious consequence of this neglect is that people might 





in other domains. For example, someone who is greedy for money or success 
might spend a lot of time and effort on work, which leaves less time for other 
important goals such as family and friends. This could lead to greedy people being 
better off in one domain, but being unhappy in other domains. In further 
research it would be interesting to see how greed influences goal attainment in 
other domains, and how people can be helped to make better decisions that 
eventually lead to more wellbeing.   
 Another interesting direction for further research would be to see how greed 
relates to risk taking. I got inspired to study greed after many newspaper articles 
claiming that it was greed that led bankers to take reckless and risky decisions 
resulting in the financial crisis. Yet, in this dissertation I did not find clear 
evidence for a relationship between greed and risk taking. In Study 3.1 I looked 
at the relationship between greed and risk taking, but did not find an association 
between the two. Also in follow-up studies, that are not part of this dissertation, 
I did not find a clear pattern between greed and risk taking.  
Nevertheless, other research did find that greed was associated with more risk 
taking (Mussel et al., 2015). In this study both state and trait greed were 
associated with risk taking to maximize outcomes. Further research should 
address these inconsistencies and look at possible moderators for the relationship 
between greed and risk taking. It might be that the relationship between greed 
and risk taking is more complex than is often assumed. It is possible that greedy 
people’s continual striving for more makes them more sensitive to the magnitude 
of outcomes and less to the associated probabilities (leading to more risk taking). 
If this is the case, greedy people should be more motivated to take risk in 
situations were the focus lies on the outcomes ($-bet) instead of on the 
probability (p-bet) of losing the bet (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971).  However, it 
is equally possible that striving for more makes people choose the option that 
gives the most certain outcome to (temporarily) satiate their needs (leading to 
more risk aversion). This would result in greedy people having a preference for 
the p-bet over the $-bet. A potential moderator could be how the gains and losses 
 




are structured. In the case of the bankers, the gains are more personal, whereas 
the losses are shared. It would be interesting to see if greedy people are more likely 
to take risk, but only if they take risk with other people’s money (Luyendijk, 
2015). 
Another way in which this inattention for other things could play a role is 
when people have to choose between now and later. The current research suggests 
that greedy people have lower self-control and are more impulsive. It would be 
interesting to see how greed influences people’s ability to delay gratification 
(Mischel, 1958, 2014), and to see how this affects their decisions. On the one 
hand greedy people should be more willing to wait for the big reward, however, 
it is also likely that they do not think about the consequences for later and are so 
tempted by the small reward that they fail.  
Another interesting venue for further research would be to look at greed in 
more specific domains. As I argued in this dissertation I believe that greed is a 
broad construct that is not restricted to one type of desire, but can be felt for 
everything that one desires. However, in the current dissertation I looked at greed 
as an acquisition motivation and mostly looked at outcomes in the financial 
domain. Further research could investigate the link between greed and the other 
specific sins of excess (lust and gluttony). It would be interesting to see how greed 
relates to promiscuity and satisfaction with one’s romantic relationship. Another 
interesting line of research would be to investigate if greed relates to caloric intake 
and obesity, and perhaps relate the DGS to BMI. In addition, it would be nice 
to see how greed is associated with power, status, and ambition. Especially the 
link with ambition could shed more light on the potential positive consequences 
of greed.  
Although not everyone will desire the same thing, one thing that is desired by 
many people is money. Several studies have found that priming people with 
money affects people’s behavior. Research suggests that people that are primed 
with money are more motivated to attain their goals, prefer to work alone, and 





(Vohs et al., 2006, 2008). In addition, exposure to money makes people endorse 
free market systems and social inequality (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz, 2013). 
Although these results might indeed be just the psychological consequences of 
money, it could also be the case that the concept of money elicits greed, and 
hence this behavior. If this is the case, money could be a good way to manipulate 
greed in the future.  
It would also be interesting to further explore the link between greed and 
retention motivation. Krekels (2015) found some first evidence that greedy 
people might not only be motivated to attain more resources, but also more likely 
to retain the resources they already have. It would be interesting to investigate in 
what situations greed is associated with retention and in what situations not. It is 
likely that greed is not always related to a retention motivation, for example, 
when one wants to buy a new, expensive car, one is probably not necessarily 
motivated to retain the old one. However, in the case of money, one cannot 
acquire more money, without securing the money one already has. It is likely that 
retention motivation plays a role in situations where people’s greed is focused on 
quantity, whereas it plays a lesser role in situations where people’s greed is focused 
on quality. In addition, it would be interesting to look at greed in collectors or 
even in compulsive hoarders.  
Lastly, I think follow up research should look more at state greed. 
Manipulating greed is important for two reasons. First, it can help us gain more 
insights in the antecedents of greed. And second, it makes it possible to make 
causal claims about greed and its consequences. In this dissertation I focused on 
dispositional greed, but I believe there is also situational greed. I believe that 
people that are dispositional greedy more strongly respond to cues or appraisals 
that lead to greed, but this does not mean, that people scoring low on 
dispositional greed never experience greed. I think research would benefit a lot if 
there was a good way to manipulate greed. Over the last couple of years I have 
done several attempts to elicit greed, however, they were not very successful. I 
failed several times to elicit greed using recalls. One possible reason for this is that 
 




it is hard for people in hindsight to imagine that they really wanted to have 
something. Usually, the pleasure of getting what one desires quickly disappears 
after one has attained it (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998), which 
might make greed not a good candidate for a recall study. Further research could 
try to manipulate greed by making them desire something that they currently 
lack.  
CODA 
In this dissertation I tried to gain more insights in the psychology of greed. 
Greed is an understudied topic, which is partly due to the definitional issues 
surrounding greed. I attempted to better conceptualize greed and found that 
greed is the insatiable desire for more of something. Some people are more prone 
to experience greed than other people. These individual differences affect 
behavior in a variety of domains. Greed’s acquisitive and insatiable nature 
influences financial, organizational, and moral decision making. Together, these 





4 Appendix 7.1. Pattern matrix of the factor analysis on the four greed instruments. 
  Factor 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Dispositional Greed Scale (Chapter 3)       
1. I always want more. * .69     
2. Actually, I’m kind of greedy. * .42 .38    
3. One can never have too much money. .37   .34 .43 
4. As soon as I have acquired something I start to think about the next thing I want. * .57     
5. It doesn’t matter how much I have. I’m never completely satisfied. .68     
6. My life motto is ‘more is better’. .65     
7. I can’t imagine having too many things. .65     
Dispositional Greed Scale (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015)     
1. No matter how much I have of something, I always want more. .81     
2. One can never have enough. .68     
3. Even when I am fulfilled, I often seek more. .54     
4. The pursuit of more and better is an important goal in life for me. .34    .44 
5. A simple basic life is sufficient for me. (R)   .69   
6. I am easily satisfied with what I’ve got. (R)   .76   
 Greed Trait Measure (Mussel et al., 2015)      
1. When I think about all the things I have, my first thought is about what I would 
like to have next. 
.59     
2. My actions are strongly focused on material things. .35     








4. When something is being shared, I try to get as big a share as possible.  .46    
5. In order to get what I want, I can accept the fact that other people may suffer 
damage. 
 .52  .38  
 
6. I get the most fun out of buying myself all sorts of things. .49    .33 
7. When I play on my own, I sometimes cheat a little.  .77    
Virtues and Vices Scale – Greed subscale (Veselka et al., 2014)      
1. I enjoy being a part of exclusive clubs or groups that are not open to everyone.  .45   .57 
2. I do not enjoy sharing positions of power.  .63    
3. I like to collect expensive things. .36    .39 
4. At work/school, I keep good ideas to myself so that only I can get credit for them 
in the long run. 
 .55    
5. Financially supporting the less fortunate is a priority for me. (R) .42  .62 -.39  
6. I believe that money is essential; friends are replaceable. .45   .51  
7. Being financially wealthy is my number one goal. .45    .42 
8. I consider myself successful if I have a job that pays a lot of money.     .80 
9. No matter how much I have, I always want more. .77     
10. “I want it all” would be a good motto for me. .76     
Eigenvalue 13.65 1.51 1.29 1.15 1.08 
Explained variance 45.49% 5.04% 4.31% 3.81% 3.61% 
Note. Entries are factor loadings after OBLIMIN rotation. Loadings lower than .30 are suppressed. Participants are asked to indicate 
the extent to which they agreed that these items were descriptive of themselves. Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, 
ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. Items that are included in the 3-item DGS are indicated with an asterisk (*). 
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Hebzucht is een veelbesproken onderwerp. Het is een populair onderwerp in 
verhalen zoals ‘De Gans en de Gouden Eieren’ en ‘Koning Midas’ en in films 
zoals ‘Wall Street’. Ook in het dagelijks leven zien we hebzucht om ons heen. Zo 
zijn er grote schandalen zoals Bernie Madoff’s Ponzifraude en het Enron 
schandaal. Tenslotte worden we ook regelmatig in onze onmiddellijke omgeving 
blootgesteld aan hebzucht. Bijvoorbeeld die collega die altijd klaagt over zijn 
salaris, een kind dat altijd het grootste cadeautje wil pakken of die vriend die altijd 
de eerste (en de laatste) snack pakt op een verjaardag.  
Hoewel er veel over hebzucht is geschreven door filosofen, economen en 
godsdienst wetenschappers, is er verrassend weinig empirisch onderzoek. Een van 
de redenen hiervoor is dat mensen het niet eens lijken te zijn over wat hebzucht 
is. In dit proefschrift heb ik getracht om meer inzicht te krijgen in wat hebzucht 
is en wat hebzucht doet. 
Hoofdstuk 2: Het definiëren van hebzucht  
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 2 was om inzicht te krijgen in hoe mensen hebzucht 
definiëren. Ik heb dit middels een prototype analyse onderzocht. Prototype 
analyse is een handige en gestructureerde manier om meer inzicht te krijgen in 
de definitie van ‘warrige’ constructen zoals emoties en andere psychologische 
constructen.  
Ik heb in totaal vijf studies uitgevoerd om het prototype van hebzucht bloot 
te leggen. Het doel van de eerste twee studies was om te kijken welke kenmerken 
mensen benoemen als ze aan hebzucht denken en achterhalen welk van deze 
kenmerken mensen het belangrijkst vinden (welke het meest “centraal” zijn in 
hebzucht). Het doel van de overige drie studies was om verder te valideren of deze 
centrale kenmerken inderdaad belangrijker zijn voor het construct hebzucht. Dit 
werd gedaan door middel van een geheugentaak, een reactietijdtaak en een 
autobiografische herinneringstaak. Deze studies bevestigden het prototype dat uit 





De prototype analyse wijst uit dat er twee kernelementen van hebzucht zijn. 
Hebzucht kenmerkt zich vooral door een verlangen naar meer, in combinatie met 
ontevredenheid omdat het nooit genoeg is. In andere woorden, hebzucht is een 
onverzadigbaar verlangen naar meer. Deze resultaten vormden de basis voor de 
rest van het onderzoek. 
Hoofdstuk 3: Individuele verschillen in hebzucht  
Hoewel de meeste mensen van tijd tot tijd wel eens hebzuchtig zijn, zijn 
sommige mensen over het algemeen meer of vaker hebzuchtig dan anderen. In 
Hoofdstuk 3 werd een schaal ontwikkeld om deze individuele verschillen in 
hebzucht te meten, de Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS) (of, in het Nederlands, 
de Dispositionele Hebzucht Schaal).  
In de eerste twee studies van Hoofdstuk 3 werd de DGS ontwikkeld en 
gevalideerd. Op basis van de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 2 werden er eerst een 
aantal potentiële stellingen bedacht die verder werden onderzocht in deze 
studies. De uiteindelijke zeven items van de DGS vormen een betrouwbare, 
temporeel stabiele en valide schaal. Hebzucht hangt samen met gerelateerde 
constructen zoals maximizatie, eigenbelang, afgunst en materialisme, maar is 
duidelijk een op zichzelf staand construct.  
De overige drie studies werden uitgevoerd om de validiteit van de schaal 
verder te testen. Een schaal die hebzucht meet zou hebzuchtig gedrag moeten 
kunnen voorspellen. In drie economische spellen (dictator game, ultimatum 
game, harvesting dilemma) werd gekeken of de DGS hebzuchtig gedrag 
voorspelde. Zoals verwacht hielden hebzuchtige mensen meer geld voor zichzelf 
en stelden ze minder eerlijke biedingen voor in onderhandelingen. Ook waren 
ze bereid om meer bos te kappen (zelfs als dit tot ontbossing zou leiden) als dit 
meer winst zou opleveren. Mensen die hoog scoorden op de DGS vertoonden 
dus meer gedrag dat je zou verwachten bij hebzuchtige mensen. Tezamen laten 
deze studies zien dat er stabiele verschillen zijn in hoe hebzuchtig mensen zijn, 






Hoofdstuk 4: Hebzucht en financieel gedrag  
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht een van de mogelijke gedragsconsequenties van 
hebzucht. Hebzucht wordt vaak gezien als een belangrijk motief voor financieel 
gedrag. Aan de ene kant wordt het gezien als een belangrijke drijfveer voor 
economische groei en welvaart, maar aan de andere kant wordt het ook gezien als 
een mogelijke oorzaak van financiële problemen zoals schulden.  
Doormiddel van een grote vragenlijststudie met bijna 4000 adolescenten 
(middelbare scholieren in de leeftijd van 11 tot 19) werd gekeken hoe hebzucht 
samenhangt met financiële keuzes. Hebzuchtige adolescenten hadden gemiddeld 
gezien meer inkomsten, maar hadden ook meer uitgaven, spaarden minder en 
hadden meer schulden. Deze studie laat dus zien dat hebzucht zowel positieve als 
negatieve consequenties kan hebben voor financieel gedrag.  
Hoofdstuk 5: Hebzucht, werk en oververdienen  
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzocht verder hoe hebzucht het genereren van inkomen 
bevordert. In Hoofdstuk 4 liet ik zien dat hebzuchtige adolescenten meer 
inkomen per maand hebben. In Hoofdstuk 5 werd er gekeken hoe hebzucht het 
verwerven van goederen motiveert. Meer specifiek werd er gekeken of hebzucht 
leidt tot oververdienen (meer verdienenen dan men kan consumeren).  
In de eerste studie werd gevonden dat hebzuchtige mensen inderdaad meer 
oververdienen dan mensen die minder hebzuchtig zijn. Hebzuchtige mensen 
werkten zo hard dat ze niet alle verdiende goederen (chocolaatjes) konden 
consumeren. Uit de tweede studie bleek dat hebzuchtige mensen oververdienen 
omdat ze verdienen zo aantrekkelijk vinden, niet omdat ze werken leuker vinden.  
De derde studie vond opnieuw dat hebzuchtige mensen meer oververdienen. 
Deze studie liet ook zien dat dit effect blijft bestaan als mensen vier weken later 
terug komen en dezelfde taak nog eens uitvoeren. Dit is een belangrijk resultaat, 
omdat het laat zien dat de effecten niet kunnen worden verklaard doordat mensen 






Hoofdstuk 6: Hebzucht en immoreel gedrag 
Hebzucht wordt vaak gekoppeld aan onethisch en immoreel gedrag, zoals 
stelen en fraude. In Hoofdstuk 6 werd onderzocht hoe ver hebzuchtige mensen 
bereid zijn te gaan om te krijgen wat ze willen. Met andere woorden, zijn 
hebzuchtige mensen bereid om zich onethisch te gedragen om te krijgen wat ze 
verlangen? Uit de eerste studie bleek dat hebzuchtige mensen een grote variëteit 
aan onethische gedragingen meer acceptabel vonden. Daarnaast gaven 
hebzuchtige mensen aan zich ook daadwerkelijk hebzuchtiger te gedragen.  
In de tweede studie werd, door middel van een corruptiespel, gekeken of 
hebzucht ook daadwerkelijk immoreel gedrag voorspelde. Hebzuchtige mensen 
accepteerden vaker een steekpenning en vaker een hoge steekpenning dan mensen 
die minder hebzuchtig waren.  
In de derde studie werd gekeken of lagere zelfcontrole mogelijk een rol speelt 
bij de relatie tussen hebzucht en immoreel gedrag. Zelfcontrole wordt vaak gezien 
als een strijd tussen verlangen en wilskracht. Aangezien hebzucht gekenmerkt 
wordt door een verhoogd verlangen, zou dit kunnen betekenen dat hebzuchtige 
mensen eerder immoreel gedrag vertonen omdat ze de voordelen van de 
immorele gedragingen aantrekkelijker vinden. Dit bleek inderdaad het geval. De 
voordelen van immoreel gedrag zijn meer verleidelijk voor hebzuchtige mensen.  
Conclusie 
In dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd om meer inzicht in de psychologie van 
hebzucht te krijgen. Hebzucht is een weinig bestudeerd onderwerp, wat 
gedeeltelijk komt door problemen omtrent de definitie. Ik heb geprobeerd een 
beter beeld te krijgen van wat hebzucht is en vond dat hebzucht een 
onverzadigbare verlangen naar meer is. Sommige mensen zijn meer hebzuchtig 
dan anderen. Deze individuele verschillen in hebzucht beïnvloeden gedrag in 















Eindelijk is het zover, mijn proefschrift is af! Vier mooie jaren worden 
afgesloten met dit boekje. Graag wil ik de mensen bedanken die me hier de 
afgelopen jaren bij hebben geholpen. Allereerst natuurlijk mijn promotoren 
Marcel en Niels. Ik ben super blij dat jullie me de afgelopen jaren hebben 
begeleid. Alhoewel we het niet altijd met elkaar eens waren hebben onze discussies 
de kwaliteit van dit proefschrift zeker verhoogd.  
Marcel, ik ben blij dat mijn masterthesis heeft kunnen uitgroeien tot dit 
proefschrift. Vanaf dag één vond ik onze samenwerking erg fijn. Ik heb veel gehad 
aan onze gesprekken over onderzoek (die vaak vergezeld werden door weer tien 
nieuwe boeken over hebzucht), je kritische feedback en je aanmoedigingen als ik 
weer eens onzeker was. Naast dat ik heel veel van je geleerd heb, ben je ook 
gewoon een hele fijne persoon bij wie ik altijd terecht kan. Bedankt kale man! 
Niels, ik ben blij dat jij me, zoals je zelf zei, wilde inwijden op ‘het pad der 
wetenschap’. Bedankt voor onze fijne samenwerking, je kritische commentaren 
en je goede adviezen. Ik vond het erg fijn om met je samen te werken en heb veel 
gehad aan jouw pragmatische kijk op dingen. Vanaf nu zit je een gebouw 
verderop. Ik ga je adviezen (en je danspasjes) missen maar kijk uit naar onze 
verdere samenwerking! 
Thea, door jou en Stichting Weet Wat Je Besteedt heb ik de mogelijkheid 
gekregen om dit proefschrift te schrijven. Bedankt voor het vertrouwen en de 
fijne samenwerking. Ik vond het altijd leuk en leerzaam om weer een dagje bij 
jullie op kantoor te werken. Gerjoke, nadat WWJB ophield met bestaan hebben 
jij en het Nibud mijn project geadopteerd. Ik vond onze samenwerking altijd erg 
prettig en ben blij dat ik een aantal leuke projecten heb kunnen starten in 
samenwerking met het Nibud.  
Seger, jij kunt natuurlijk niet in dit rijtje ontbreken. Jij bent de eerste waarmee 
ik het idee om hebzucht te onderzoeken besprak en jij moedigde me aan om naar 
Marcel te gaan om te kijken of ik mijn masterthesis niet kon schrijven over dit 





input is erg waardevol. Daarnaast ben je een fijne collega die me de afgelopen 
jaren veel goede (en soms ietwat lompe) adviezen heeft gegeven.  
Job, ik zit ondertussen al zes jaar met je op een kamer. Eerst als remaatje, nu 
als collega. Ik had me geen betere kamergenoot kunnen wensen de afgelopen 
jaren. Bedankt voor alle gezelligheid en je droge grappen. Eigenlijk wilde ik hier 
iets schrijven over dat ik blij was dat je er op mijn promotie bij kon zijn en dat je 
geen jas hoefde te kopen. Alleen ben je er nu echt niet bij omdat je nu in LA 
woont (wat ik overigens heel tof vind). Dat is super jammer, maar ik ben heel blij 
dat jij toch mijn (long distance) paranimf bent.  
Arnoud, ook jij was een hele fijne kamergenoot. Er zijn weinig mensen met 
zo’n blije bakkes als jij. Als ik jouw hoofd zie word ik gelijk vrolijk. Ook jij 
bedankt voor de gezelligheid en je flauwe grappen (vooral die over de man met 
het sinaasappelhoofd). Ik vind het fijn dat ik jou tijdens mijn promotie achter me 
heb staan. 
Catalina! Thank you for being such a great office mate. You are probably the 
most cheerful person I know and I loved listening to all the strange adventures 
that you had while living here! Ellen, Flip, Irene, Job en Joeri, bedankt voor de 
gezellige congressen, road trips en stedentripjes. Op congres gaan met jullie was 
altijd feest! Rob, bedankt voor onze goede gesprekken en je vooruitziende blik. 
Yvette, bedankt voor je (luidruchtige) vrolijkheid en gezelligheid. Tila, jij bent 
een van de liefste mensen binnen ons departement en ik vind het super dat jij in 
mijn commissie zit. I would also like to thank all my other colleagues. The last 
four years were great, and I am looking forward to the next couple of years! 
Laura en WJ, het is alweer een tijdje geleden dat we samen in het student-
assistenten-hok zaten. Bedankt voor de gezelligheid en daarnaast duizend maal 
dank dat jullie je vrijwillig hebben opgeofferd om mij te helpen bij het coderen 







Ook buiten mijn werk om zijn er natuurlijk een aantal mensen die ik wil 
bedanken. Harde Kern Groep Dolf, oftewel Els, Nikki, Renske en Roos, bedankt 
voor alle gezellige avondjes, SinterKersten en stedentripjes. Het is altijd DOLFijn 
met jullie. Citroen is een bank!  
Ook wil ik graag mijn lieve vriendinnen bij (oud)Beschuit bedanken. Zowel 
tijdens mijn studietijd als promotietijd heb ik veel aan jullie gehad. Bedankt voor 
jullie steun, maar zeker ook voor alle gezellige avonden en weekendjes weg. De 
avondjes met jullie zijn altijd een feest. Frenkie en Marleen, ik ben blij dat jullie 
de afgelopen jaren ook nog in Tilburg zijn blijven hangen. Bedankt voor de 
fantastische vakanties en leuke borrelavonden. Roos, ik kan met je lachen en met 
je huilen (en vooral ook heel goed middagdutjes doen). Bedankt dat je er altijd 
voor mij bent. Ik ben blij dat je tijdens mijn promotie achter me staat.  
Daarnaast wil ik ook graag mijn familie bedanken. Lieve mama, bedankt dat 
je altijd voor me klaar staat en altijd in mij gelooft. Bedankt voor de fijne basis 
die je me hebt gegeven. Dana, lief zusje. Zoals het hoort bij echte zusjes zijn we 
het niet altijd met elkaar eens, maar staan we altijd voor elkaar klaar! Jeanne en 
Nena, ik ben blij dat jullie ook onderdeel zijn van ons gezin. Oma, wat had ik 
graag gewild dat je er bij had kunnen zijn. Niemand zou zo trots zijn geweest als 
jij.  
Bob, Lianne, Stefan, Suzanne, Joost en kleine Sam, bedankt dat ik me zo 
welkom voel in jullie familie.  
Arthur, jij bent niet alleen mijn liefje, maar ook mijn beste vriend. Bedankt 
voor al je liefde en steun. Ik kan moeilijk uitdrukken hoe belangrijk je voor me 
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